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AS  ORIGINAL Abstract 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  efficiency  of  the  stock  options  market  of  the 
European  Options  Exchange.  'Riskless'  spreading  and 
hedging  strategies  using  the  Black-Scholes  call  option 
pricing  model  with  the  Merton  dividend  adjustment,  are 
used  to  test  market  efficiency.  The  results  show  that, 
although  for  the  zero  transactions  costs  case  above- 
normal  returns  are  possible,  these  returns  become 
negative  when  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  taken  into 
account.  These  results  persist  over  the  two  sample 
periods  studied.  Two  variations  of  the  trading  rule 
that  compute  model  prices  by  using  the  same  model  but 
with  two  different  estimators  of  the  standard  devia- 
tion  of  the  underlying  stock's  return  as  inputs  to  the 
model,  also  produce  similar  results.  The  study  con- 
cludes  that,  with  respect  to  the  trading  rules  used 
and  the  sample  periods  studied,  there  were  no  ineffi- 
ciencies  on  the  stock  options  market  of  the  European 
Options  Exchange. 
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2 1.1  Introduction 
"A  call  option  is  the  right  to  buy  a  given  amount  of  a 
security  at  a  given  price  on  or  before  a  specific 
date"  (Bookstaber(1987)  p.  1).  The  security  involved 
in  the  call  option  is  called  the  'underlying 
security'.  The  price  to  be  paid  is  called  the 
'exercise  price'  or  'striking  price'  and  the  specific 
date  is  called  the  'maturity  date'  or  'expiration 
date'.  The  call  is  an  'European'  call  if  it  can  only 
be  exercised  at  maturity.  If  it  can  be  exercised  at 
any  time  on  or  before  the  maturity  date,  it  is  known 
as  an  'American'  call. 
Options  were  traded  in  the  Netherlands  as  early  as  the 
seventeenth  century,  during  the  Dutch  tulip  boom 
(Ritchken(1987)).  In  the  UK,  there  was  a  well 
organised  and  sophisticated  market  for  trading  in  puts 
and  calls  as  early  as  the  1690s  and  in  the  US,  the 
first  mention  of  options  in  American  history  dated 
back  to  1790  (Malkiel  and  Quandt(1969)). 
Today,  options  are  still  being  traded  in  the 
Netherlands  and  there  is  an  organised  exchange  for 
trading  standardised  options.  This  exchange  is  known 
as  the  European  Options  Exchange  (hereinafter  EOE)  and 
3 it  is  located  in  Amsterdam.  This  study  is  concerned 
with  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE. 
In  this  chapter,  the  objective  of  this  study  is  stated 
and  the  motivation  for  this  research  is  explained.  The 
hypothesis  to  be  tested  is  then  presented  and  some 
basic  problems  related  to  the  test  of  the  hypothesis 
are  discussed.  Next,  the  importance  of  the  study  is 
highlighted  and  the  chapter  ends  with  an  outline  of 
the  remaining  chapters  of  this  study. 
1.2  Objective  of  this  study 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  efficiency  of  the  EOE.  Stock  options,  precious 
metals  (gold  and  silver)  options,  foreign  currency 
options,  bond  options  and  stock  index  options  are 
traded  on  the  EOE.  Stock  options  dominate  the  market 
in  terms  of  volume  traded.  In  1989  and  1988  stock 
options  represented  seventy  five  per  cent  of  the  total 
volume  traded  on  the  EOE  (EOE  Annual  Reports  1989  and 
1988).  This  study  concentrates  on  stock  options. 
1.3  Motivation  for  this  research 
The  EOE  is  the  largest  options  exchange  in  Europe  in 
terms  of  volume  traded  (measured  as  total  number  of 
contracts  traded).  Nearly  thirteen  and  a  half  million 
4 contracts  were  traded  in  1989  (EOE  Annual  Report 
1989).  However,  despite  its  opening  in  Amsterdam  more 
than  ten  years  ago  on  4  April  1978,  there  have  been 
very  few  studies  of  this  market.  Previous  studies  of 
options  market  efficiency  have  been  concentrated 
particularly  on  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange, 
with  a  few  later  studies  relating  to  the  London, 
Toronto,  Sydney  and  Amsterdam  markets.  This  study  is 
motivated  by  this  lack  of  evidence  and  fills  this  gap 
by  providing  hitherto  unavailable  evidence  on  the 
efficiency  of  the  EOE. 
There  are  three  known  studies  of  the  EOE  : 
Kemna(1987),  Beckers(1984)  and  Van  der  Hilst(1980). 
Kemna(1987)  is  concerned  with  testing  the  validity  of 
the  Black-Scholes  model  rather  than  the  efficiency  of 
the  EOE.  Beckers(1984)  tested  the  efficiency  of  the 
EOE  but  concentrated  on  the  gold  options  market.  Van 
der  Hilst(1980)  provided  evidence  on  the  efficiency 
of  the  stock  options  market  of  the  EOE.  However,  this 
does  not  rule  out  the  need  for  further  research  as 
Keane(1983)  emphasised  the  need  for  "a  regular 
programme  of  research  to  serve  the  dual  purpose  of 
providing  a  continuing  attestation  of  the  market's 
efficiency  and  of  acting  as  a  monitoring  process,  so 
that  any  short-term  imperfections  that  might 
occasionally  surface  can  be  quickly  identified  and 
5 eliminated"-(p.  157).  In  addition,  Kemna(1987)  also 
called  for  further  research  on  the  EOE  "in  the 
direction  of  ex  ante  testing  of  market  efficiency" 
(p.  25). 
Van  der  Hilst  found  the  EOE  to  be  less  than  perfectly 
efficient,  but  this  result  must  be  treated  cautiously 
because  transactions  costs  were  ignored  in  his  study. 
This  study  also  examines  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE  but 
it  differs  from  the  Van  der  Hilst  study  in  three 
ways.  It  uses  price  quotations  downloaded  from 
DATASTREAM  in  order  to  overcome  the  non-simultaneity 
problem  (see  Section  1.5  for  further  elaboration  of 
the  non-simultaneity  problem).  The  Van  der  Hilst  study 
used  daily  closing  stock  and  option  transactions 
prices,  with  the  potential  problem  of  non-simultaneity 
in  the  the  data.  Furthermore,  this  study  uses  the 
actual  bid  and  ask  prices  so  as  to  incorporate  a 
component  of  transactions  costs,  the  bid-ask  spread. 
The  Van  der  Hilst  study  ignored  transactions  costs.  In 
addition,  both  spreading  and  hedging  tests  are  con- 
ducted  in  this  study.  Van  der  Hilst  conducted  hedging 
tests  only. 
1.4  Hypothesis 
Fama(1970)  defined  an  efficient  market  as  a  market  in 
which  "prices  always  'fully  reflect'  available 
6 information"  (p.  383).  The  terms  'fully  reflect'  and 
'available  information'  had  been  described  as  "vague 
and  non-operational"  (Beaver(1981)  p.  146).  However, 
this  definition  does  imply  that  if  a  market  is 
efficient,  that  is,  security  prices  adjust  to  new 
information  in  a  rapid  and  unbiased  manner,  trading 
decisions  based  solely  on  existing  information  will 
not  yield  returns  in  excess  of  a  normal  expected 
return.  This  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  'fair  game' 
efficiency.  It  is  a  'fair  game'  in  the  sense  that  in  a 
market  where  prices  fully  reflect  all  available 
information,  investors  cannot  expect  to  earn  more  than 
the  normal  expected  return  by  trading  solely  on 
existing  information.  It  is  this  implication  of  market 
efficiency  that  is  of  interest  to  investors,  rather 
than  the  vague  concept  of  whether  security  prices 
fully  reflect  all  available  information.  This 
implication  is  also  important  because  it  enables  the 
efficient  market  hypothesis  to  be  tested.  Instead  of 
trying  to  measure  the  speed  and  quality  (direction  and 
magnitude)  of  the  adjustment  of  security  prices  to  new 
information,  market  efficiency  can  be  tested  by 
determining  whether  above-normal  returns  can  be  made 
by  using  various  trading  rules.  If  above-normal 
returns  can  be  made,  then  the  market  is  inefficient 
with  respect  to  the  information  employed  by  those 
trading  rules;  if  not,  the  market  is  efficient. 
7 Jensen(1978)  stated  that  market  efficiency  implies 
that  it  is  impossible  to  make  economic  profits  by 
trading  with  existing  information,  where  economic 
profits  are  "risk  adjusted  returns  net  of  all  costs" 
(p.  96).  In  practice,  investors  incur  costs  when 
transacting.  Hence,  when  determining  whether  above- 
normal  returns  can  be  earned  by  investors, 
transactions  costs  must  be  taken  into  account. 
However,  zero  transactions  cost,  is  one  of  the 
sufficient  conditions  for  market  efficiency 
(Fama(1970)).  Fama  argued,  however,  that  it  is  not  a 
neccesary  condition  because  "as  long  as  transactors 
take  into  account  all  available  information,  even 
large  transactions  costs  that  inhibit  the  flow  of 
transactions  do  not  in  themselves  imply  that  when 
transactions  do  take  place,  prices  will  not  'fully 
reflect'  available  information"  (p.  387).  Lorie  and 
Hamilton(1973),  in  a  discussion  of  the  neccesary  and 
sufficient  conditions  for  market  efficiency,  stated 
that  "the  neccesary  conditions  for  efficiency  are  far 
less  stringent"  (p.  80)  and  that  "exorbitant 
transaction  costs  might  restrict  the  frequency  of 
transactions  but  not  distort  the  prices  at  which  they 
take  place"  (p.  80).  Although  exorbitant  transaction 
costs  may  not  distort  the  prices  at  which  transactions 
take  place,  they  might  cause  prices  not  to  'fully 
reflect'  all  available  information  at  all  times. 
8 West(1975)  pointed  out  that  exorbitant  transaction 
costs  "reduce  the  incentive  for  investors  to 
arbitrage"  (p.  33)  and  as  a  result  "prices  are 
distorted  in  relation  to  the  prices  we  would  observe 
in  a  zero  transaction  costs  environment"  (p.  33). 
However,  it  is  still  possible  for  a  market  with 
exorbitant  transactions  costs  to  be  efficient  in  the 
fair  game  sense.  That  is,  as  long  as  no  investor  can 
consistently  generate  an  above-normal  average  rate  of 
return  after  transactions  costs,  the  market  can  be 
said  to  be  efficient.  Hence,  a  market  with 
transactions  costs,  or  even  exorbitant  transactions 
costs,  need  not  neccesarily  be  inefficient  in  the  fair 
game  sense.  Therefore,  in  this  study,  efficiency  is 
defined  as  the  inability  of  any  trader  to  consistently 
generate  an  above-normal  average  rate  of  return  after 
transactions  costs. 
This  study  uses  a  trading  rule  designed  to  exploit  any 
'mispricing'  of  options  on  the  EOE.  The  trading  rule 
uses  DATASTREAM's  option  pricing  model,  that  is,  the 
Black-Scholes  model  with  Merton's  dividend  adjustment 
(see  Appendix  1).  The  model  is  assumed  to  be  correct 
so  that  any  deviation  of  the  market  price  from 
DATASTREAM's  model  price  is  taken  as  a  signal  to  buy 
or  write  the  option.  Two  variations  of  the  trading 
rule  compute  model  prices  by  using  the  same  model  but 
9 with  two  different  estimators  of  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's  return  as  inputs 
to  the  model.  To-take  into  account  one  component  of 
transactions  costs,  the  bid-ask  spread,  in  the 
calculation  of  the  rate  of  return,  it  is  assumed  that 
options  are  bought  at  the  ask  price  and  written  at  the 
bid  price. 
Hedging  and  spreading  strategies  are  used  to  set  up 
'riskless'  positions.  These  positions  are  held  until 
the  end  of  the  sample  period,  or  until  the  mispricing 
of  the  option  in  the  hedge  is  reversed,  or  in  the  case 
of  spreads,  until  the  mispricing  of  at  least  one  leg 
of  the  spread  is  reversed.  During  the  period  the 
hedges  and  spreads  are  held,  daily  rebalancing  is 
employed  to  maintain  riskiess  positions. 
Since  the  positions  are  riskless,  no  trader  can 
consistently  earn  an  average  rate  of  return  after 
transactions  costs  in  excess  of  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  if  the  market  is  efficient.  Therefore,  the  null 
hypothesis  of  efficiency  is  HO  :u=  rf  and  the 
alternative  hypothesis  is  H1  :u>  rf,  where  u 
is  the  average  rate  of  return  after  transactions  costs 
and  rf  is  the  estimated  risk-free  interest  rate.  If 
the  market  is  inefficient  with  respect  to  the  trading 
rule  used,  Ho  will  be  rejected  since  it  will  be 
possible  to  earn  above-normal  average  rates  of  return. 
10 Similarly,  if  the  market  is  efficient  with  respect  to 
the  trading  rule,  HO  cannot  be  rejected. 
1.5  Problems  in  testing  options  market  efficiency 
One  main  difficulty  in  conducting  studies  of  this  kind 
is  that  it  involves  the  joint  tests  of  model  validity, 
market  efficiency  and  data  accuracy.  Data  may  be 
inaccurate  because  stock  and  option  prices  may  not 
have  been  observed  simultaneously,  with  the  result 
that  any  mispricing  may  be  illusory.  This  problem  will 
be  elaborated  later  in  this  section.  Even  if  the  data 
are  accurate,  there  remains  the  problem  of  the  joint 
hypothesis  of  model  validity  and  market  efficiency.  If 
no  abnormal  returns  are  found,  it  could  be  due  to 
either  market  efficiency  or  the  use  of  a  mis-specified 
model.  This  study  assumes  that  the  model  used  is  valid 
in  order  to  test  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE. 
The  Black-Scholes  model  depends  on  a  number  of 
assumptions  which  had  been  described  as  "unrealistic" 
(Black  (1989)  p.  67).  There  have  been  many  attempts  to 
develop  alternative  models  with  more  realistic 
assumptions.  Jarrow  and  Rudd(1983)  and  Hull(1989) 
reviewed  a  number  of  these  alternative  models. 
In  addition,  empirical  evidence  on  the  Black-Scholes 
model  showed  that  Black-Scholes  model  values  differ 
11 systematically  from  market  values  (see,  for  example, 
Black(1975),.  Macbeth  and  Merville(1979),  Galai(1983b), 
Rubinstein(1985)  and  Kemna(1987)). 
In  spite  of  these  limitations  of  the  Black-Scholes 
model,  Galai(1983b)  concluded,  after  surveying 
empirical  tests  of  option  pricing  models,  that  "no 
alternative  model  consistently  offers  better 
predictions  of  market  prices  than  the  Black-Scholes 
model"  (p.  68).  More  recently,  Black(1989)  noted  that 
"making  the  assumptions  more  realistic  hasn't  produced 
a  formula  that  works  better  ......  "  (p.  67).  In 
addition,  Hull(1989)  reviewed  a  number  of  alternatives 
to  the  Black-Scholes  model  and  empirical  evidence  on 
option  pricing  and  stated  that  "at  present,  there  does 
not  seem  to  be  any  compelling  arguments  for  using  any 
of  the  models  introduced  earlier  in  this  chapter  in 
preference  to  Black-Scholes"  (p.  318).  He  further 
concluded  that  "in  the  case  of  stock  options,  there  is 
no  single  model  that  reflects  all  the  biases  which  are 
actually  observed  in  practice.  The  best  strategy 
appears  to  be  to  use  an  extension  of  the  Black-Scholes 
model  which  captures  the  effects  of  dividends  and 
early  exercise  opportunities"  (p.  319). 
This  study  uses  the  DATASTREAM  option  pricing  model 
which  is  the  Black-Scholes  model  with  the  Merton 
12 dividend  adjustment.  DATASTREAM  also  uses  the  Pseudo- 
American  method.  to  account  for  early  exercise  opportu- 
nities.  Hence,  the  DATASTREAM  model  is  consistent  with 
the  conclusion  by  Hull(1989)  that  using  "an  extension 
of  the  Black-Scholes  model"  (p.  319)  appears  to  be  the 
best  strategy. 
As  mentioned  above,  data  inaccuracy  may  be  due  to  the 
non-simultaneity  of  stock  and  option  prices.  This 
refers  to  the  problem  where  the  reported  option  price 
and  the  reported  stock  price  are  recorded  at 
different  times  of  the  day.  This  can  cause 
inaccuracies  in  option  markets  efficiency  tests  when 
the  stock  price  is  used  as  an  input  to  the  option 
pricing  model  and  the  resulting  model  price  is 
compared  to  the  reported  option  price  to  detect  the 
mispricing  of  options.  Even  if  the  option  is  not 
mispriced,  it  can  appear  to  be  mispriced  when  the 
reported  stock  price  that  is  used  in  the  model  is  not 
the  stock  price  that  prevailed  in  the  market  when  the 
option  price  is  reported.  This  illusory  mispricing 
will  lead  to  an  apparently  profitable  hedging  strategy 
when  in  fact  no  such  profitable  strategy  exists.  This 
is  because  the  researcher  assumes  that  a  hedge 
position  can  be  set  up  using  the  reported  prices.  But, 
since  the  reported  stock  price  is  not  equal  to  the 
stock  price  at  the  time  the  option  price  is  observed, 
the  hedge  position  cannot  be  established  with  the 
13 reported  stock  and  option  prices.  In  the  case  of 
spreading  strategies,  the  reported  price  of  one  option 
in  the  spread  may  have  been  observed  at  a  time 
different  from  that  of  the  price  of  the  other  option 
in  the  spread.  In  practice,  it  may  not  be  possible  to 
execute  a  spreading  strategy  based  on  the  reported 
prices  because  of  the  non-simultaneity  of  the  option 
prices.  This  problem  is  in  addition  to  the  problem  of 
apparent  mispricing  caused  by  the  non-simultaneity  of 
the  stock  and  option  prices.  Bookstaber(1981) 
illustrated  these  problems  with  an  example. 
1.6  Importance  of  study 
The  main  contribution  of  this  study  is  to  provide 
hitherto  unavailable  evidence  on  the  efficiency  of  the 
EOE.  Evidence  on  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE  is 
important  because  of  the  potential  implications  of 
such  evidence  for  market  participants.  Market 
participants'  view  of  the  efficiency  of  the  market 
influences  the  investment  strategy  adopted  by  them. 
This  study  examines  the  fair  game  notion  of 
efficiency,  that  is,  the  ability  or  inability  of  any 
trader  to  consistently  generate  an  above-normal 
average  rate  of  return  after  transactions  costs.  If 
the  evidence  suggests  that  the  market  is  inefficient, 
the  implication  is  that  above-normal  profit 
14 opportunities  exist  for  at  least  some  traders.  It  may 
then  be  worthwhile  for  those  traders  to  look  for 
mispriced  options  so  as  to  exploit  those  profit 
opportunities.  Such  a  strategy  is  obviously  not 
without  costs.  So,  if  the  market  is  not  inefficient,  a 
strategy  of  actively  seeking  mispriced  options  is  a 
waste  of  the  traders'  resources  since,  on  average,  no 
above-normal  profit  opportunities  exist. 
In  addition  to  providing  evidence  on  the  efficiency  of 
the  EOE,  this  study  also  highlights  the  following 
(i)  the  impact  of  the  bid-ask  spread  on  trading 
profit.  The  profitability  of  the  trading  rule  is 
examined  with  and  without  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  so 
as  to  isolate  the  impact  of  the  spread  on  profits. 
Actual  bid  and  ask  quotations  are  used  in  this  study. 
Phillips  and  Smith(1980)  had  shown  that  transaction:  -- 
cost  is  an  important  factor  in  determining  whether 
above-normal  average  returns  can  be  earned.  Many 
previous  studies  have  either  ignored  the  bid-ask 
spread  as  a  transactions  cost  or  used  an  estimate  of 
the  spread.  In  particular,  a  previous  study  of  the  EOE 
by  Van  der  Hilst(1980)  ignored  transactions  cost  and 
found  the  market  to  be  less  than  perfectly  efficient 
(see  Chapter  Three  Section  3.2). 
(ii)  the  persistence  (or  otherwise)  of  efficiency  or 
15 inefficency  over  time.  Two  sample  periods  are  used  to 
test  for  persistence.  Keane(1983)`  identified 
persistence  as  one  of  the  criteria  an  inefficiency 
must  satisfy  for  it  to  be  exploitable. 
(iii)  the  difficulties  involved  in  computing  a  rate  of 
return  for  options  trading  when  option  writing  is 
involved.  A  method  of  computing  the  rate  of  return  is 
suggested  and  used  in  this  study. 
1.7  Outline  of  chapters 
The  rest  of  the  study  is  organised  as  follows  : 
Chapter  Two  provides  an  overview  of  some  of  the 
institutional  aspects  of  the  EOE  in  order  to  provide 
background  information  on  this  market.  The  EOE's 
formation,  growth,  the  terms  of  the  stock  option 
contract,  margin  requirements  and  minimum  commissions 
are  described,  together  with  the  taxation  of  option 
trading  profits  in  the  Netherlands  and  the  trading  of 
options  on  the  EOE. 
Chapter  Three  reviews  the  evidence  relating  to  the 
efficiency  of  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  and 
other  options  markets  including  the  over-the-counter 
market  in  the  US,  the  London  Traded  Options  Market, 
16 the  Toronto  Options  Exchange,  the  Australian  Traded 
Options  Märket  and  the  EOE. 
Chapter  Four  reviews  the  methodological  issues 
associated  with  tests  of  options  market  efficiency  and 
describes  the  methodology  used  in  this  study.  One 
major  issue  discussed  is  the  choice  of  estimators  for 
the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return.  This  is  followed  by  descriptions  of  the  types 
of  tests  carried  out,  the  trading  strategies  used,  the 
criteria  used  for  determining  mispriced  options  and 
the  method  of  calculating  the  rate  of  return.  The 
problems  related  to  the  incorporation  of  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  into  the  tests  and  the  possibility  of 
premature  exercise  of  options  are  also  addressed, 
together  with  the  limitations  inherent  in  the  daily 
rebalancing  of  spreads  and  hedges. 
Chapter  Five  describes  how  the  data  for  this  study  are 
obtained  from  DATASTREAM.  The  DATASTREAM  option 
pricing  model  is  described,  followed  by  a  discussion 
of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  obtaining  data 
from  this  source.  It  also  describes  the  calculation  of 
the  model  values,  hedge  ratios,  time  to  maturity  and 
states  the  reasons  for  the  exclusion  of  certain 
options.  It  elaborates  on  DATASTREAM's  method  of 
imputing  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  the 
underlying  stock's  return  from  each  option  and  shows 
17 how  th'isc  implied  standard  deviation  is  combined  with 
a  historical  measure  to  estimate  the  stock's 
volatility. 
Chapter  Six  presents  the  results  of  this  study  and 
discusses  the  implications  of  these  results  for  market 
efficiency.  Some  of  the  results  are  presented  in  the 
tables  in  Appendix  Two. 
Chapter  Seven  provides  a  summary  of  this  study.  The 
conclusions  and  limitations  of  this  study  are  also 
discussed.  The  chapter  ends  with  some  suggestions  for 
future  research. 
In  addition  to  the  seven  chapters,  there  are  four 
appendices.  Appendix  One  describes  the  DATASTREAM 
option  pricing  model  while  Appendix  Two  contains  the 
results  of  the  tests  using  two  alternative  estimators 
of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return.  Appendix  Three  contains  the  results  of  the  ex 
post  tests  with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread 
cost,  using  the  DSISD  estimator.  Appendix  Four  reports 
on  the  values  of  the  skewness  measure  of  the 
distribution  of  the  rates  of  return  from  all  tests 
using  the  DSISD  estimator  and  also  the  results  of  the 
SIGN  test  of  the  median  rates  of  return  from  the  ex 
post  tests  with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread 
18 cost,  using  the  DSISD  estimator. 
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24 2.1  Introduction 
This  study  examines  the  efficiency  of  the  stock 
options  market  of  the  EOE.  The  EOE  was  officially 
opened  by  the  Dutch  Minister  of  Finance  on  4  April 
1978.  In  spite  of  its  location  in  Amsterdam,  the  EOE 
uses  English  as  its  official  language. 
Since  its  establishment  in  1978,  the  EOE  has 
experienced  enormous  growth  and  is  now  the  largest 
options  exchange  in  Europe  in  terms  of  volume 
(measured  as  the  total  number  of  contracts  traded).  In 
1989  (1988),  13.4  (8.5)  million  contracts  were  traded, 
compared  with  9.1  (8.4)  million  on  the  London  Traded 
Options  Market  (EOE  Annual  Reports  1989  and  1988). 
Over  the  years  the  EOE  had  increased  its  range  of 
products.  Options  on  stocks,  gold,  bonds,  currency, 
silver  and  stock  indices  are  now  traded  on  the  EOE. 
However,  stock  options  still  dominate  in  terms  of 
total  volume  traded.  In  1989  and  1988,  stock  options 
represented  75%  of  total  volume  (EOE  Annual  Reports 
1989  and  1988).  This  study  concentrates  on  stock 
options. 
Spreading  and  hedging  trading  strategies  on  stock 
25 options  are  used  in  this  study  to  test-the  efficiency 
of  the  EOE.  In  order  to  understand  how  stock  options 
are  traded  on  the  EOE,  the  next  section  explains  the 
terms  of'the  EOE  stock  options  contract.  The  process 
of  executing  option  orders  on  the  EOE  is  then 
described.  Since  American  options  can  be  exercised  at 
or  before  maturity,  the  process  of  assigning  exercise 
notices  to  option  writers  is  also  described  to  show 
how  option  writers  can  be  selected  at  random  to 
deliver  the  underlying  security.  This  study  involves 
uncovered  call  option  writing.  Uncovered  call  option 
writers  have  to  meet  the  margin  requirements  of  the 
EOE.  These  requirements  are  presented,  together  with 
brokers  minimum  commissions  set  by  the  EOE  and  the 
taxation  of  option  trading  profits  in  the  Netherlands. 
Although  commissions  and  taxes  are  ignored  in  this 
study,  they  are  nevertheless  presented  to  give  some 
idea  of  the  magnitude  of  these  costs  at  the  EOE. 
2.2  The  terms  of  the  stock  options  contract 
The  EOE,  like  other  organised  options  exchanges,  has 
standardised  the  terms  of  its  options  contracts. 
Standardisation,  together  with  the  fact  that  the 
clearing  organisation  stands  as  the  opposite  party  to 
every  trade,  facilitates  secondary  trading  of  these 
contracts. 
26 Standardisation  applies  to  the  contract  size,  the 
expiration  date  and  the  exercise  price.  The  price  of 
the  option  is  the  only  variable  element. 
The  unit  of  trading  is  a  contract.  For  stock  options, 
the  EOE  has  standardised  the  contract  size  to  one 
hundred  underlying  shares. 
The  last  trading  day  and  the  expiration  day  are  also 
standardised.  The  last  trading  day  for  an  option 
series  is  the  last  day  on  which  trading  in  the  series 
is  possible,  whereas  the  expiration  day  is  the  last 
day  on  which  it  is  possible  to  exercise  the  right 
given  by  the  option  to  buy  or  sell  (EOE  Explanatory 
Memorandum  1988).  The  last  trading  day  is  the  third 
business  Friday  in  the  expiration  month  until  1400 
hours  (EOE  Brochure  "Stock  Option").  The  usual  trading 
day  starts  from  1030  hours  and  ends  at  1630  hours.  The 
expiration  day  is  on  the  Saturday  following  this 
Friday  at  1300  hours  (EOE  "Contract  Specifications"). 
That  is,  it  is  possible  to  exercise  the  option  until 
this  time.  All  times  refer  to  Amsterdam  time. 
The  above  are  the  official  dates  and  times  set  by  the 
EOE.  Each  broker  may  set  an  earlier  time  up  to  which 
his  client  may  give  orders  to  trade  in  the  expiring 
series  or  instructions  to  exercise  options  in  these 
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The  expiration  cycle  for-stock  options  is 
January/April/July/October  and  the  initial  time  to 
maturity  has  been  set  to  three,  six  and  nine  months, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  stocks  where  options  with 
initial  time  to  maturity  of  three,  four  and  five  years 
are  traded. 
The  exercise  price  is  the  price  at  which  the  holder  of 
the  option  is  entitled  to  buy  or  sell  the  underlying 
stock  if  he  exercises.  The  exercise  price  is  quoted 
per  unit  of  the  underlying  stock  (EOE  Explanatory 
Memorandum  1988). 
It  is  a  general  rule  that  no  adjustment  will  be  made 
to  reflect  a  cash  dividend  paid  by  the  issuer  of  the 
underlying  stock,  whether  shares  are  offered  as  an 
alternative  or  not  (EOE  Explanatory  Memorandum  1988). 
2.3  Stock  options  trading  at  the  EOE 
An  investor  wishing  to  buy  or  sell  options  traded  at 
the  EOE  may  do  so  by  placing  an  order  with  a  broker. 
Various  types  of  orders  can  be  placed.  This  study  is 
concerned  with  buying,  selling  and  writing  options  at 
closing  price  quotations.  Therefore,  the  appropriate 
type  of  order  to  give  to  the  broker  is  the  market-on- 
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the  Trading-Rules  as  "an  order  to  buy  or  sell,  to  be 
executed  as  late  in  the  day  as  possible".  Other  types 
of  orders  are  listed  and  defined  in  Paragraph  12  of 
the  Trading  Rules. 
When  a  broker  receives  an  order,  he  will  transmit  the 
order  to  the  trading  floor.  Upon  receipt  of  the  order, 
the  trader  at  the  floor  will  either  execute  it 
himself  or  pass  it  to  another  trader  for  execution. 
All  orders  must  be  executed  by  open  outcry  at  the  post 
designated  for  that  particular  class  of  options  (Rules 
14  and  16(a)).  The  broker  may  trade  with  three  types 
of  traders  : 
1)  Market  makers  are  only  permitted  to  trade  for  their 
own  accounts  and  are  obliged  to  make  a  market  in  the 
classes  assigned  to  them.  That  is,  they  must  make  a 
bid  and  an  offer  when  asked  to  do  so  by  the  order  Book 
Official  or  floor  brokers.  Such  bids  and  offers  are 
valid  for  at  least  five  contracts  (Regulation  7(B)). 
To  maintain  a  competitive  market,  the  EOE  assigns  at 
least  four  market  makers  to  each  stock  option  class 
(Regulation  7A). 
2)  Order  Book  Officials  are  employees  of  the  EOE  who 
supervises  trade  at  a  post.  They  keep  the  public  limit 
order  book  and  display  the  book's  highest  bid  and 
lowest  offer  for  each  series  .  They  are  also 
responsible  for  executing  the  orders  in  the  book. 
29 3)  Floor  Brokers  executes  orders  on  the  floor  of  the 
EOE  on  behalf  of  their  clients  or  for  their  own 
account.  However,  floor  brokers  cannot  act  for  their 
own  account  unless  they  have  elected  not  to  act  for 
the  account  of  their  clients  (Rule  32). 
Once  an  order  has  been  executed  on  the  floor,  the 
broker  must  promptly  confirm  to  the  client  that  the 
order  has  been  executed  (Rule  31(1)). 
An  investor  who  has  bought  a  stock  option  can  exercise 
it  at  or  before  maturity  if  he  wishes.  To  do  so,  he 
must  notify  his  broker  of  his  intention.  The  broker 
will  in  turn  pass  the  exercise  notice  to  the  clearing 
organisation.  When  the  clearing  organisation  receives 
an  exercise  notice  for  a  call  option,  it  will  randomly 
assign  the  exercise  notice  to  a  clearing  member  who 
has  an  account  containing  a  written  option  on  the 
written  stock.  The  clearing  member  selected  will  in 
turn  randomly  select  a  broker  with  the  relevant  short 
position  and  assign  the  exercise  notice  to  him.  The 
broker  will  select  a  client  with  the  relevant  short 
position  for  re-assignment  of  the  exercise  notice.  By 
this  random  process,  any  investor  who  has  short 
positions  in  the  relevant  series  can  be  assigned  the 
exercise  notice  no  matter  when  the  short  position  was 
entered  into. 
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The  EOE  requires  a  writer  of  covered  call  options  to 
deposit  the  underlying  stock  in  sufficient  quantity  to 
enable  the  obligations  arising  from  his  option 
transaction  to  be  satisfied  in  full  (EOE  Explanatory 
Memorandum  1988). 
The  EOE  also  allows  call  options  to  be  written 
uncovered,  in  which  case  the  writer  is  required  to 
meet  the  EOE's  minimum  margin  requirement.  This  margin 
requirement  is  reduced  by  the  premium  received  from 
writing  the  options.  The  premium  is  retained  by  the 
broker  until  the  position  is  closed.  The  minimum 
margin,  net  of  this  premium,  can  be  satisfied  by 
depositing  cash  or  securities.  In  the  case  of  call 
options,  the  minimum  margin  must  be  worth  not  less 
than  the  current  option  premium,  plus  a  percentage  of 
the  difference  between  twice  the  price  of  the 
underlying  stock  and  the  exercise  price.  The 
percentage  is  set  at  regular  intervals  by  the  EOE  in 
consultation  with  the  clearing  organisations  (EOE 
Explanatory  Memorandum  1988). 
Expressed  in  formula  form,  the  minimum  margin 
requirement  for  call  options  is  : 
Margin  for  calls  =  option  premium  +  P%  (  2S  -X) 
31 where  S=  price  of  the  underlying  stock, 
X=  exercise  price  for  the  call, 
P=a  value  set  by  the  EOE. 
Concessions  are  granted  for  "spread  orders"  and 
"straddle  orders"  as  defined  in  Trading  Rule  12.  In 
the  case  of  spreads  on  calls,  the  margin  required  is 
the  exercise  price  of  the  long  leg  minus  the  exercise 
price  of  the  short  leg  of  the  spread.  This  concession 
is  only  granted  when  the  long  leg  does  not  expire 
earlier  than  the  short  leg.  In  the  case  of  straddles, 
the  short  leg  of  the  straddle  with  the  higher  premium 
is  treated  as  the  naked  short  position 
(Swanson(1984)). 
Note  that  the  spread  orders  in  this  study  are  not 
spread  orders  within  the  meaning  of  Rule  12.  Rule  12 
defined  a  spread  order  as  an  order  to  buy  and  to  sell 
the  same  number  of  options  in  the  same  class.  Spread 
orders  in  this  study  do  not  necessarily  buy  and  sell 
the  same  number  of  options.  The  number  of  options 
bought  and  sold  depends  on  the  hedge  ratios  of  the  two 
option  series  in  the  spread  and  they  will  be  the  same 
only  by  chance.  Hence,  the  concessions  for  spread 
orders  do  not  usually  apply  to  the  orders  in  this 
study. 
32 In  the  case  of  uncovered  call  writing,  brokers  have  to 
require  their  clients  to  provide  margin  before 
executing  the  order  (Rules  3l(a)(b)  and  31(m)).  The 
brokers  requirements  may  be  higher  than  the  minimum 
prescribed  by  the  EOE  (EOE  Explanatory  Memorandum 
1988). 
2..  5  Minimum  Commissions 
Prior  to  1  July  1990,  every  broker  had  to  charge  their 
clients  commissions.  The  EOE  prescribed  minimum  rates 
of  commission  that  brokers  were  required  to  charge 
their  clients.  These  rates  were  given  in  the  EOE  bro- 
chure  "Minimum  Commissions,  1988".  The  actual  commis- 
sions,  however,  could  be  higher  than  those  prescribed  by 
the  EOE. 
In  the  case  of  stock  options,  the  minimum  commission 
per  contract  was  as  follows  : 
Opening  Transactions  DFl. 
Premium  of  DF1.0.01  to  1.50  15.00 
Premium  of  DF1.1.51  or  more  22.50 
Minimum  per  order  40.00 
33 Closing  Transactions  DF1. 
Premium  of  DF1.0.01  to  0.10  No  minimum 
Premium  of  DF1.0.11  to  1.50  7.50 
Premium  of  DF1.1.51  or  more  15.00 
Minimum  per  order  30.00 
The  minimum  commission  applied  to  the  first  ten 
contracts  in  an  order;  no  minimum  commission  was 
prescribed  for  contracts  above  the  first  ten. 
All  orders  of  the  same  type,  for  the  same  series,  for 
the  same  client,  executed  on  the  same  day,  may  be 
added  together  before  commission  was  calculated.  The 
four  types  of  orders  were  :  open  buy,  open  sell,  close 
buy  and  close  sell. 
For  combination  orders  (for  example,  spreads  and 
straddles),  the  first  ten  contracts  for  options  on  the 
same  underlying  stock,  which  were  presented  as  one 
unit,  were  subject  to  the  minimum  commission.  No 
minimum  commission  was  prescribed  for  contracts  above 
these  ten.  If  the  combination  contained  one  or  more 
opening  contracts,  the  applicable  minimum  per  order 
for  opening  transactions  would  apply.  If  the 
combination  contained  only  closing  contracts,  the 
applicable  minimum  per  order  for  closing  transactions 
34 would  apply. 
From  1  July  1990,  the  EOE's  minimum  commissions  have 
been  abolished  and  commissions  are  negotiable  between 
brokers  and  their  clients. 
2.6  Taxation 
In  the  Netherlands,  there  is  a  tax  on  exchange 
dealings  (stamp  duty)  of  0.12  percent  on  the  premium, 
with  a  maximum  of  DF1.1200  per  transaction.  However, 
this  tax  will  be  scrapped  from  1  July  1990  (Financial 
Times  2  February  1990). 
For  residents,  profits  on  traded  options  realised  by 
individuals  are  tax-exempt;  corporations  are  liable  to 
tax  at  a  normal  rate.  For  non-residents,  profits  are 
not  taxable  unless  the  income  is  attributable  to  a 
Dutch  permanent  establishment  (Communication  with 
EOE's  Commercial  Affairs  Department). 
2.7  Summary 
This  chapter  has  provided  a  brief  overview  of  the 
institutional  aspects  of  the  EOE.  The  EOE's  formation, 
growth,  the  terms  of  the  stock  options  contract,  the 
trading  of  options  at  the  EOE,  minimum  margin 
35 requirements  and  minimum  commissions  have  been 
described,  -together  with  the  taxation  of  option 
trading  profits  in  the  Netherlands. 
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39 3.1  Introduction 
This  study  examines  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE.  There 
has  been  a  number  of  studies  of  the  efficiency  of 
options  markets.  Most  of  these  studies  were 
concentrated  on  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange 
(CBOE),  with  a  few  relating  to  the  over-the-counter 
options  markets  in  the  United  States,  the  London 
Traded  Options  Markets,  the  Toronto  Options  Exchange, 
the  Australian  Traded  Options  Market  and  the  EOE.  This 
chapter  reviews  the  evidence  relating  to  the 
efficiency  of  these  options  markets. 
The  results  of  hedging  tests  are  presented  in  the  next 
section,  followed  by  the  results  of  spreading  tests, 
lower  boundary  condition  tests,  convexity  condition 
tests,  put-call  parity  tests  and  volatilty  tests.  This 
chapter  ends  with  a  summary. 
3.2  Results  of  hedging  tests 
Galai(1977)  conducted  one  of  the  first  tests  of  the 
efficiency  of  the  CBOE.  He  used  daily  data  on  options 
traded  on  the  CBOE  from  26  April  1973  to  30  November 
1973,  a  total  of  152  trading  days.  Galai  used  the 
Black-Scholes  model  to  identify  mispriced  options.  A 
40 hedge  was  set  up  consisting  of  an  under-priced  or 
over-priced  option  and  the  underlying  stock  and  it  was 
liquidated  one  day  later. 
The  ex  post  hedging  test  produced  average  returns  that 
were  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  five  per 
cent  level  of  significance.  This  result  indicated 
strongly  that  his  hedge  strategy  with  the  Black- 
Scholes  model  could  locate  mispriced  options.  The 
conclusion  remained  unchanged  when  the  estimated  risk- 
free  interest  rate  and  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
underlying  stock's  return  were  changed.  However,  when 
an  ad  hoc  one  per  cent  transactions  costs  was  imposed 
on  buying  or  selling  of  the  stock  and  option,  almost 
all  the  hedge  returns  were  eliminated. 
In  the  case  of  the  ex  ante  hedging  test,  the  average 
returns  were  lower  than  those  from  the  ex  Dost  tests. 
The  one  day  delay  in  the  execution  of  the  hedges  had 
reduced  the  profitability  of  Galai's  trading  rule. 
However,  the  average  returns,  ignoring  transactions 
costs,  were  still  significantly  different  from  zero. 
Hence,  Galai  concluded  that  his  ex  ante  tests 
suggested  that  "the  CBOE  might  not  have  been  perfectly 
efficient  during  the  period  investigated  and  abnormal 
profit  opportunities  did  exist"  (p.  189).  However, 
Phillips  and  Smith(1980)  showed  that  these  significant 
41 returns  may  be'completely  eliminated  if  the  bid-ask 
spread.  Fas  cönsidered. 
Blomeyer  and  Klemkosky(1983)  also  tested  the 
efficiency  of  the  CBOE  using  a  hedging  strategy.  Both 
the  Roll(1977)  model  and  the  Black-Scholes  model, 
together  with  the  Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  weighted 
implied  standard  deviation,  were  used.  The  data 
consisted  of  twelve  trading  days  transactions  data 
from  the  period  July  1977  to  June  1978.  These  twelve 
days  were  selected  one  day  per  month  from  the  week 
following  the  third  Friday  of  each  month. 
In  the  ex  post  test,  the  hedge  position  was  set  up 
immediately  upon  observing  the  mispriced  option  and 
was  maintained  till  the  next  option  transaction.  The 
ex  post  test  produced  mean  returns  that  were 
significantly  greater  than  zero  at  the  five  per  cent 
level  for  fifteen  out  of  eighteen  stocks  for  both  the 
Black-Scholes  and  the  Roll  models.  Both  models 
performed  well  in  most  cases  in  identifying  mispriced 
options. 
In  the  ex  ante  test,  two  lags  were  tested.  The  hedges 
were  set  up  with  the  next  available  transaction 
prices  occurring  at  least  (i)  five  minutes  and  (ii) 
fifteen  minutes  after  identification  of  the  mispriced 
option  and  were  held  for  one  month.  All  the  ex  ante 
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returns  were  significantly  greater  than  zero  at  the 
five  per  cent  level.  However,  all  the  mean  returns 
turned  negative  when  the  risk-free  rate  of  interest 
and  transactions  costs  were  taken  into  account. 
Blomeyer  and  Klemkosky  concluded  that  the  "option 
markets  appear  to  be  efficient  to  the  arbitrageur 
using  the  trading  rules  involving  Black-Scholes  and 
Roll  pricing  models"  (p.  119). 
In  another  test  of  the  efficiency  of  the  CBOE, 
Krausz(1985),  using  the  Black-Scholes  model  with 
Merton's  dividend  adjustment,  also  found  that  there 
were  "no  abnormal  profit  possibilities  that  may  be 
exploited  by  hedging  strategies"  (p.  893).  Daily, 
weekly  and  monthly  data  for  the  period  January  1977  to 
January  1979  were  used. 
Black  and  Scholes(1972)  also  used  a  hedging  strategy, 
but  they  studied  the  efficiency  of  the  over-the- 
counter  options  market  in  the  US  instead.  The  options 
data  was  obtained  from  the  diaries  of  an  option  broker 
from  1966  to  1969.  The  share  prices  were  daily  closing 
prices.  The  Black-Scholes  model  was  used  to  compute 
model  prices  using  the  variance  computed  from 
historical  stock  prices. 
43 They  found  that  by  using  historical  stock  prices  to 
estimate  the  variance,  options  on  stocks  with  high 
variances  were  underpriced  (model  >  market)  and 
options  on'stocks  with  low  variances  were  over-priced 
(model  <  market).  However,  they  found  that  the  profits 
from  a  strategy  of  buying  options  on  high  variance 
stocks  and  selling  options  on  low  variance  stocks  were 
lower  than  the  transactions  costs  estimated  by  them. 
Hence,  they  concluded  that  "even  though  the  option 
market  does  not  appear  to  be  efficient  before  taking 
account  of  transaction  costs,  there  is  no  opportunity 
for  other  traders  to  take  advantage  of  this 
mispricing"  (p.  417). 
Castagna  and  Matolcsy(1982)  tested  the  efficiency  of 
the  Australian  traded  options  market  using  a  hedging 
strategy.  The  data  sample  consisted  of  daily  closing 
share  and  option  prices  from  the  inception  of  the 
market  in  February  1976  to  30  September  1977. 
The  Black-Scholes  model,  adjusted  for  dividends  by 
subtracting  the  present  value  of  the  expected 
dividends  during  the  life  of  the  option  from  the  share 
price,  was  used  to  compute  option  model  values.  Three 
different  estimators  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return  were  used  as  input  to  the  model. 
An  ex  'Post  test  was  employed  and  hedges  were  held  till 
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maturity  with  the  original  long  or  short  positions 
being  maintained.  The  hedges  were  rebalanced  daily  to 
reflect  changes  in  the  hedge  ratio. 
The  results  indicated  the  existence  of  significant 
average  excess  returns  which  were  eliminated  when 
transactions  costs  were  considered.  Castagna  and 
Matolcsy  concluded  that  "the  Australian  traded  options 
market  is  efficient"  (p.  531). 
Van  der  Hilst(1980)  studied  the  efficiency  of  the  EOE 
using  the  Black-Scholes  model  and  daily  closing  data 
for  the  year  1979,  sub-divided  into  three  sample 
periods.  The  variance  input  into  the.  model  was 
computed  from  the  daily  share  prices  of  each  of  the 
sub-periods. 
An  ex  post  test  was  conducted  where  a  hedge  was  set  up 
immediately  upon  observing  a  mispricing.  The  hedge  was 
liquidated  one  day  later  and  the  hedge  return 
computed.  Transactions  costs  were  ignored. 
The  results  showed  that  the  EOE  was  not  completely 
efficient  during  the  period  studied.  However,  since 
transactions  costs  were  ignored,  this  result  must  be 
viewed  with  caution. 
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Galai(1977)  tested  the  efficiency  of  the  CBOE  with  a 
spreading  strategy.  Relatively  over-priced  options 
were  sold  and  relatively  under-priced  options,  on  the 
same  stock  and  with  the  same  striking  price  but  of 
different  maturity  were  bought.  The  ex  post  spreading 
test  showed  that  the  Black-Scholes  model  was  able  to 
differentiate,  on  average,  between  over-priced  and 
under-priced  options.  This  confirmed  the  results  of 
his  hedging  test  given  in  the  previous  section  of  this 
chapter.  The  ex  ante  spreading  test  yielded,  on 
average,  lower  returns  than  the  ex  post  test  but  the 
average  returns  were  still  significantly  different 
from  zero  at  the  five  per  cent  level.  This  also 
confirmed  the  results  of  the  hedging  test.  However, 
Phillips  and  Smith(1980)  showed  that-their  estimated 
bid-ask  spread  cost  for  one  call  was  sufficient  to 
eliminate  Galai's  average  profit. 
Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  also  used  a  spreading 
strategy  to  test  the  efficiency  of  the  CBOE.  They  used 
the  Black-Scholes  model  with  Merton's  dividend 
adjustment  and  monthly  data  for  the  period  beginning 
June  1973  and  ending  April  1975. 
Risk-free  spreads  were  created  by  buying  the  most 
under-priced  option  and  writing  the  most  over-priced 
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the  model  value  deviated  from  the  market  price  by  at 
least  ten  per  cent.  The  spreads  were  set  up 
immediately  upon  observing  a  mispriced  situation,  that 
is,  an  ex  post  test,  and  liquidated  one  month  later. 
This  spreading  strategy  produced  an  average  monthly 
return  of  9.96  per  cent.  Chiras  and  Manaster  concluded 
that  "the  CBOE  was  inefficient  during  the  period 
covered  by  this  study"  (p.  231). 
However,  they  cautioned  that  their  result  may  be  due 
to  the  potential  problem  of  non-simultaneity  of  option 
prices.  Bookstaber(1981)  checked  the  Chiras  and 
Manaster  data  for  non-simultaneity  and  found  that 
there  was  strong  support  for  the  concern  that  "the 
observed  profits  were  due  to  the  non-contemparoneous 
data,  and  are  not  achievable  in  practice"  (p.  155).  In 
addition,  Phillips  and  Smith(1980)  showed  that  by 
introducing  transactions  costs,  especially  the  bid-ask 
spread,  the  profits  of  the  Chiras  and  Manaster  study 
were  eliminated. 
In  order  to  overcome  the  non-simultaneity  problem 
associated  with  daily  closing  prices, 
Bhattacharya(1983)  used  transactions  data  to  test  the 
efficiency  of  the  CBOE.  The  transactions  data  included 
every  reported  transaction  and  every  reported  bid-ask 
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was  196  trading  days  from  24  August  1976  to  12  June 
1977.  The  Black-Scholes  model  with  discrete  dividend 
adjustment  was  used  in  his  study. 
His  ex  ante  spreading  test  required  spreads  to  be  set 
up  with  the  next  available  prices  after  the  mispricing 
signals  were  observed.  The  spreads  were  held  until 
maturity  or  until  the  mispricings  were  eliminated. 
They  were  rebalanced  fortnightly  with  an  average  of 
1.38  revisions  over  their  lifetime.  This  test  produced 
after  transactions  costs  profits  that  would  imply 
market  inefficiency.  However,  Bhattacharya  noted  that 
his  fortnightly  revision  of  spreads  could  not  maintain 
riskless  positions  and  hence  this  result  must  be 
treated  with  caution. 
French  and  Henderson(1981)  used  a  substitute  hedging 
strategy  to  study  the  efficiency  of  the  CBOE  and  the 
American  Stock  Exchange  options  market.  A  substitute 
hedge  is  similar  to  a  spread  in  that  it  consists  of 
one  under-valued  (model  >  market)  option  and  one 
over-valued  (model  <  market)  option  where  the  under- 
valued  option  is  bought  and  the  over-valued  option  is 
written.  It  is  different  from  a  spread  in  that  the  two 
options  are  not  written  on  the  same  stock.  French  and 
Henderson  developed  a  hedge  ratio  which  established  a 
theoretically  riskless  substitute  hedge. 
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and  option  prices  for  the  period  from  the  last  day  of 
May  1976  to  the  last  day  of  December  1977,  a  total.  of 
twenty  sample  dates.  The  Black-Scholes  model  with 
Merton's  dividend  adjustment  was  used  to  compute  model 
values  for  options.  On  each  sample  date,  riskless 
substitute  hedges  were  set  up  and  these  hedges  were 
liquidated  one  month  later.  An  ex  Post  trading 
strategy  was  employed.  It  was  found  that  over  the 
period  of  study,  returns  in  excess  of  the  risk-free 
interest  rate  were  possible,  indicating  that  the 
options  markets  were  less  than  efficient.  However, 
when  commissions  were  taken  into  account,  the  mean 
after-commission  substitute  hedge  return  was  zero. 
French  and  Henderson  concluded  that  "arbitrage 
opportunities  existed  that  would  allow  a  sophisticated 
commissionless  trader  to  make  an  economic  profit" 
(p.  30).  However,  they  cautioned  that  "it  is 
questionable  whether  such  returns  would  be  attainable 
in  practice"  (p.  30). 
In  the  UK,  option  markets  efficiency  tests  have  been 
conducted  by  Kerruish(1984)  and  Gemmill  and 
Dickins(1986). 
Kerruish(1984)  used  the  Black-Scholes  model  with  two 
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of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return,  and  two  methods  of  dealing  with  the  bid-ask 
spread.  The  data  sample  consisted  of  daily  closing 
stock  and  option  prices  for  the  period  beginning  July 
1981  and  ending  in  July  1982. 
An  ex  Post  spreading  test  was  used  with  the  spreads 
being  liquidated  when  one  option  price  returned  to  its 
equilibrium  value  or  when  the  mispricing  was  reversed, 
or  when  one  option  reached  maturity.  The  spreads  were 
rebalanced  daily. 
Kerruish  found  that  the  overall  returns  from  spreading 
were  not  significantly  greater  than  zero  and  concluded 
that  the  London  Traded  Options  Market  (LTOM)  was 
efficient  during  the  period  studied. 
Gemmill  and  Dickins(1986)  also  used  ex  post  tests  and 
a  spreading  strategy  to  test  the  efficiency  of  the 
LTOM.  The  data  sample  consisted  of  monthly  stock  and 
option  closing  prices  from  May  1978  to  July  1983.  The 
Black-Scholes  model  with  the  Chiras  and  Manaster 
weighted  implied  standard  deviation  was  used  to 
compute  option  model  values  . 
Gemmill  and  Dickins  found  statistically  significant 
profits  in  excess  of  the  risk-free  interest  rate, 
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identify  over-priced  and  under-priced  call  options. 
However,  these  profits  turned  into  losses  when  an 
estimated  bid-ask  spread  was  applied,  and  therefore 
the  market  could  not  be  said  to  be  inefficient. 
3.4  Results  of  lower  boundary  condition  tests 
Galai(1978)  tested  for  violations  of  the  lower 
boundary  condition  for  CBOE  options  and  the  ability  to 
earn  above-normal  profits  by  exploiting  these 
violations.  For  an  American  call  with  no  dividend 
protection,  Galai  showed  that  the  lower  boundary 
condition  is  : 
C(S,  T,  X,  D)  >  Max{O,  max[S  -  Ke-rTi  -D  e-rý], 
S-  Ke-rT  -. 
EDtLe-rTi 
where  C(.  )  is  the  value  of  the  unprotected  American 
call,  S  is  the  price  of  the  underlying  share,  T  is  the 
time  to  expiry  of  the  option,  X  is  the  exercise  price, 
D=  Dt,  D4......  Dtý  is  the  vector  of  the  n  known 
dividends  and  T1,  T2,.....  Tn  are  the  n  known  periods 
to  dividend  payment  days. 
An  ex  post  test  and  an  ex  ante  test  were  performed 
mainly  with  data  consisting  of  daily  prices  for  each 
option  traded  on  the  CBOE  for  152  trading  days  from  26 
April  1973  to  30  November  1973.  A  limited  test  was 
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few  options  traded  during  1973. 
The  results  of  the  ex  post  test  using  daily  closing 
prices  showed  that  there  were  frequent  violations  of 
the  lower  boundary  condition  and  that  their  magnitudes 
were  not  trivial.  Tests  using  transaction-by- 
transaction  data  yielded  similar  results,  leading  to 
rejection  of  the  hypothesis  that  stock  and  option 
markets  were  sufficiently  synchronized. 
When  a  trader  observed  a  violation  of  the  lower 
boundary  condition,  he  had  to  place  orders  in  the 
markets  to  exploit  what  seemed  to  be  a  profit 
opportunity.  This  takes  time  and  there  is  no  guarantee 
that  prices  at  the  next  available  transaction  will 
enable  the  trader  to  earn  the  profit  he  observed 
earlier.  Hence,  to  determine  whether  the  observed 
violations  can  be  exploited  to'earn  above-normal 
profits,  indicating  market  inefficiency,  Galai  carried 
out  an  ex  ante  test. 
The  results  of  the  ex  ante  test  showed  that  profits 
were  substantially  reduced.  However,  on  average, 
above-normal  profits  could  still  be  earned.  Phillips 
and  Smith(1980)  showed  that  this  profit  will  be 
eliminated  when  transactions  costs,  in  particular  the 
bid-ask  spread,  were  taken  into  account.  Hence,  the 
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Bhattacharya(1983)  also  tested  the  possibility  of 
making  above-normal  profits  by  exploiting  violations 
of  lower  boundary  conditions  for  CBOE  options.  Galai's 
lower  boundary  condition  was  modified  to  incorporate 
the  bid  and  ask  prices  for  stock  and  options.  The  data 
sample  consisted  of  transactions  data  for  196  trading 
days  from  24  August  1976  to  12  June  1977. 
Bhattacharya's  ex  ante  test  produced  an  average  profit 
of  $8.20  per  contract  for  the  zero  transactions  costs 
case.  This  profit  changed  to  a  loss  of  $8.63  per 
contract  when  transactions  costs  of  an  option  market 
maker  were  taken  into  account.  Hence,  the  hypothesis 
of  market  efficiency  cannot  be  rejected. 
Halpern  and  Turnbull(1985)  also  conducted  tests  of 
lower  boundary  conditions  using  transactions  data. 
However,  they  studied  the  Toronto  Stock  Exchange  (TSE) 
options  market  instead.  The  data  sample  consisted  of 
records  of  every  options  transaction  on  the  TSE  from  3 
January  1978  to  31  December  1979. 
They  found  that  violations  of  the  lower  boundary 
condition  did  occur  and  their  results  indicated  that 
the  TSE  options  market  was  inefficient  during  the 
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taken  intö.  "account.  However,  they  cautioned  that  the 
high  growth  experienced  in  the  sample  period  was  not 
typical,  and  therefore  that  observed  inefficiencies 
shoud  not  be  generalised  to  current  periods  where  the 
options  market  has  matured  and  its  growth  has  levelled 
off"  (p.  500). 
3.5  Results  of  convexity  condition  test 
Galai(1979)  tested  the  convexity  condition  for  CBOE 
options.  The  Merton(1973a)  convexity  condition  for 
European  calls  showed  that  the  premium  of  a  call  is  a 
declining  convex  function  of  the  exercise  price. 
Merton's  proof  is  also  valid  for  an  American  call  if 
it  is  dividend-protected.  However,  CBOE  calls  are  not 
dividend-protected.  Galai  proved  that  Merton's 
convexity  condition  applies  to  CBOE  options  too.  The 
convexity  condition  stated  that  three  options  written 
on  the  same  underlying  stock,  with  the  same  expiration 
date  but  with  different  exercise  prices,  should  be 
priced  such  that  : 
aC1  +  (1  -  a)  C3  >  C2 
where  C1,.  C2  and  C3  are  the  prices  of  the  three 
options  with  exercise  prices  K1,  K2  and  K3 
respectively,  such  that  K1  <  K2  <  K3,  and 
a=(K3  -  K2)  /  (K3  -K1). 
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to  30  October  1973,  Galai  found  twenty  four  violations 
of  the  convexity  condition  out  of  a  total  of  one 
thousand  observations.  The  examination  of  transaction- 
by-transaction  data  for  the  three  options  involved  in 
each  violation  revealed  that  most  of  the  observed 
violations  appeared  for  closing  prices  only,  and  could 
not  be  detected  during  the  day.  Quite  often,  the 
closing  prices  reflected  transactions  that  took  place 
during  different  hours  of  the  day  and  "what  looks  like 
a  profit  opportunity  can  be  an  illusion  caused  by  the 
procedures  used  in  reporting  the  closing  prices" 
(p.  87).  With  this  evidence,  it  is  quite  obvious  that 
ex  ante  tests  were  unnecessary  and  the  market  cannot 
be  said  to  be  inefficient. 
Bhattacharya(1983)  also  tested  the  convexity  condition 
for  CBOE  options  using  transactions  data.  Bid  and  ask 
prices  were  incorporated  into  the  convexity  condition. 
Only  one  violation  of  the  convexity  condition  was 
found  among  the  1006  triplets  of  options  written  on 
the  same  stock  and  with  identical  maturity.  He 
concluded  that  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot  be 
rejected. 
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Stoll(1969)  developed  the  original  put-call  parity 
model  which  was  later  extended  by  Merton(1973b).  Based 
on  Stoll's  analysis,  the  following  relationship 
between  put  and  call  prices  must  hold  in  a 
'frictionless'  market  at  equilibrium  : 
C-P=S-X/  (1  +  r)  (1) 
where  C=  current  market  price  of  a  European  call, 
P=  current  market  price  of  a  European  put, 
S=  current  market  price  of  the  underlying 
stock, 
X=  exercise  price  of  the  call  and  the  put, 
r=  risk-free  interest  rate. 
Stoll  did  not  differentiate  between  European  and 
American  options  and  in  essence  implied  that  (1)  holds 
regardless  of  the  type  of  options  used  in  constructing 
the  hedges.  However,  Merton(1973b),  in  a  comment  on 
Stoll's  paper,  showed  that  (1)  holds  for  European 
options  only.  Stoll(1973),  in  reply  to  Merton,  conced- 
ed  the  point  but  argued  that  the  conditions  under 
which  early  exercise  would  occur  were  not  likely  to 
happen. 
Merton  suggested  that  the  best  that  can  be  done  for 
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inequalities  :.  -- 
S-X<C-  Pa  <S-X/  (1  +  r) 
where  Pa  is  the  current  market  price  of  an  American 
put. 
Stoll(1969)  also  empirically  tested  the  put-call 
parity  model  for  over-the-counter  put  and  call 
options.  The  data  sample  included  1966  and  1967  put 
and  call  prices  submitted  weekly  by  the  Put  and  Call 
Dealers  Association  to  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission.  In  this  sample,  there  were  ten  "regular" 
companies  for  which  put  and  call  prices  were  quoted 
every  week  and  ten  "new  business"  companies  which 
changed  weekly  and  presumably  represented  stocks  with 
the  greatest  amount  of  activity.  Hence,  only  companies 
with  a  relatively  active  option  market  were  included 
in  the  sample.  Stoll's  results  showed  that  "by  and 
large  the  theory  is  supported  by  the  time  series  and 
cross  section  regression  analysis  carried  out" 
(p.  823). 
Gould  and  Galai(1974)  tested  the  put-call  parity  model 
with  modifications  by  Merton(1973b).  Using  the 
Stoll(1969)  data  sample  expanded  to  include  1968  and 
1969  data  provided  by  Black  and  Scholes,  they  found  a 
surprising  number  of  violations  of  the  modified  put- 
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(C  -  Pa)/S  <  r/(l+r).  These  violations  represented 
potential  profit  opportunities,  which  disappeared  when 
transactions  costs  for  non-members  of  the  exchange  are 
considered.  However,  they  found  that  a  member  of  the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange  could  have  exploited  these 
profit  opportunities  and  that  these  profit 
opportunities  persisted  over  time.  Also,  tests  with 
the  Black-Scholes  data  sample  supported  these 
findings.  However,  these  profit  opportunities  were 
determined  ex  post.  It  is  not  known  whether  they  would 
still  be  available  if  a  time  lag  is  allowed  for  before 
a  trader  enters  into  a  transaction  to  exploit  them.  In 
addition,  the  authors  cautioned  that  "the  put  and  call 
market  is  not  organised  as  well  as  the  market  for 
common  stocks  and  other  securities  and  the  costs  of 
finding  buyers  and  sellers  may  be  higher  than  we 
think"  (p.  123). 
Klemkosky  and  Resnick(1979)  derived  the  put-call 
parity  conditions  for  exchange-traded  dividend- 
unprotected  American  options.  These  conditions  were 
tested  using  transactions  data  for  one  day  each  month 
during  the  period  July  1977  to  June  1978  for  fifteen 
companies  with  puts  and  calls  listed  on  the  CBOE,  the 
American  and  the  Philadelphia  Stock  Exchanges.  This 
data  sample  made  it  possible  to  construct  a  nearly 
simultaneous  position  in  the  call,  the  put  and  the 
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the  put  and  the  underlying  stock  all  had  to  trade 
within  one  minute  of  each  other. 
Klemkosky  and  Resnick  found  234  (about  forty  per  cent) 
profitable  hedges  out  of  a  total  of  540.  However,  when 
an  estimated  transactions  cost  of  twenty  dollars  for  a 
member  firm  was  introduced,  only  147  (27  per  cent) 
hedges  out  of  the  540  remained  profitable.  With  a 
sixty  dollars  transactions  costs  for  non-member 
investors,  the  number  of  profitable  hedges  is  reduced 
to  38  (seven  per  cent).  They  concluded  that  "the 
empirical  results  of  the  models  tested  are  consistent 
with  put-call  parity  theory  and  thus  support  this 
aspect  of  efficiency  for  registered  options  markets" 
(p.  1154). 
Klemkosky  and  Resnick(1980)  extended  their  previous 
work  by  conducting  ex  ante  tests  of  the  put-call 
parity  model.  In  the  ex  ante  test,  two  lags  were 
tested.  The  execution  of  hedges  were  lagged  by  (i) 
five  minutes  and  (ii)  fifteen  minutes  after  they  had 
been  initially  identified  as  having  ex  Post  returns  in 
excess  of  twenty  per  hedge.  The  results  showed  that  ex 
ante  profits  were  available.  However,  these  tended  to 
be.  lower  than  the  ex  post  profits.  When  the  bid-ask 
spread  was  included  in  each  position,  most  of  the 
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correction  appears  to  take  place  rapidly  enough  on  the 
registered  options  exchanges  to  eliminate  most  if  not 
all  of  the  economic  profits  for  an  arbitraging  member 
firm"  (p.  372). 
Loudon(1988)  provided  Australian  evidence  on  the  put- 
call  parity  theorem.  He  found  that  the  sizes  of  most 
of  the  violations  of  the  put-call  parity  theorem  were 
quite  small,  with  only  one  violation  exceeding 
transactions  costs.  He  concluded  that  "observed 
violations  of  the  put-call  parity  theorem  were  not 
sufficiently  large  to  suggest  that  there  existed 
potential  for  investors  facing  normal  transactions 
costs  to  generate  economic  profits"  (p.  65). 
3.7  Results  of  volatility  tests 
Maloney  and  Rogalski(1989)  tested  the  efficiency  of 
the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  by  determining 
whether  equity  call  option  prices  reflect,  ex  ante, 
the  higher  variability  of  stock  returns  in  January,  as 
documented  by  Rogalski  and  Tinic(1986). 
They  found  that  "during  the  last  six  weeks  of  the 
calendar  year,  implied  volatility  estimates  from 
market  call  prices  trend  upward"  and  that  "after  the 
turn  of  the  year,  implied  volatility  estimates  de- 
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They  concluded  that  their  evidence  t5  "consistent 
with  the  prediction  of  an  efficient  option  market  that 
anticipates  higher  than  average  volatility  around  the 
turn  of  the  year  and  incorporates  that  expectation 
into  market  call  prices"  (p.  551). 
Sheikh(1989)  observed  that  Dravid(1984),  Ohlson  and 
Penman(1985)  and  Dubofsky  and  French(1985)  have  docu- 
mented  significant  increases  in  the  variance  of  common 
stock  returns  subsequent  to  splits  of  larger  than  25 
per  cent.  He  tested  the  efficiency  of  the  Chicago 
Board  Options  Exchange  by  examining  the  announcement 
and  ex-date  behaviour  of  stock  return  volatilities 
implied  by  call  prices  of  options  written  on  stocks 
that  announced  a  split.  The  question  addressed  is 
whether  the  implied  volatilities  of  stocks  that  an- 
nounced  a  split  increase  relative  to  the  implied 
volatilities  of  other  stocks. 
His  study  found  no  evidence  of  such  an  increase  at  the 
announcement  date.  However,  a  relative  increase  is 
detected  at  the  ex-date,  showing  that  the  Chicago 
Board  Options  Exchange  did  not  anticipate  post-split 
increases  in  stock  return  volatilities  till  the  ex- 
date.  It  was  further  shown  that  "the  ex-date  increase 
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market-makers"  (p.  1371).,  therefore  implying  that  the 
Chicago  Board-Options  Exchange  was  not  efficient. 
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  excess  returns  were 
computed  under  the  assumption  that  the  market-makers 
not  only  need  not  pay  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  but  can 
in  fact  earn  the  spread.  Sheikh  noted  that  "this  may 
not  be  possible  and  then  their  returns  could  be  simi- 
lar  to  those  of  arbitrageurs"  (p.  1369).  Returns  of 
arbitrageurs  have  been  shown  to  be  insignificantly 
different  from  zero. 
3.8  Summary 
This  chapter  reviewed  the  evidence  on  stock  options 
market  efficiency.  Evidence  on  the  efficiency  of  stock 
options  markets  in  the  US,  UK,  Australia,  Canada  and 
the  Netherlands  was-  presented. 
In  general,  it  seemed  that  while  there  were  abnormal 
profit  opportunities  before  transactions  costs  were 
taken  into  account,  these  profits  were  eliminated  once 
they  were  adjusted  for  transactions  costs.  Hence,  the 
hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot  be  rejected. 
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69 4.1  Introduction. 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  efficiency  or  otherwise  of  the  stock  options 
market  of  the  European  Options  Exchange. 
This  chapter  reviews  the  methodological  issues 
associated  with  tests  of  options  market  efficiency  and 
describes  the  methodology  used  in  this  study.  One 
major  issue  discussed  is  the  choice  of  estimators  for 
the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return.  This  is  followed  by  descriptions  of  the  types 
of  tests  carried  out,  the  trading  strategies  used,  the 
criteria  used  for  determining  mispriced  options  and 
the  method  of  calculating  the  rate  of  return.  The 
problems  related  to  the  incorporation  of  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  into  the  tests  and  the  possibility  of 
premature  exercise  of  options  are  also  addressed, 
together  with  the  limitations  inherent  in  the  daily 
rebalancing  of  spreads  and  hedges. 
4.2  Estimators  for  the  Volatility  of  a  Stock's  Return 
The  original  Black-Scholes  model  requires  five 
inputs  :  the  underlying  share  price,  the  risk-free 
interest  rate,  the  time  to  expiry  of  the  option,  the 
70 exercise  price  and  the 
. 
standard.  deviation  of  the 
returns  on  the  underlying  stock  during  the  remaining 
life  of  the  option. 
Of  all  these  inputs  to  the  model,  the  most  difficult 
item  to  measure  is  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return.  The  underlying  share  price  at  the 
close  of  the  market  can  be  observed,  the  risk-free 
interest  rate  can  be  estimated  by  computing  the  yield 
on  government  securities  with  the  same  time  to 
maturity,  the  time  to  maturity  is  easily  computed  from 
the  expiration  date  and  the  current  date,  and  the 
exercise  price  is  given.  The  standard  deviation  cannot 
be  obtained  from  newspapers,  nor  calculated,  because 
the  standard  deviation  of  interest  is  the  future 
standard  deviation  between  the  current  day  and  the 
expiration  day.  This  input  has  to  be  estimated.  The 
importance  of  an  accurate  estimation  of  the  standard 
deviation  was  highlighted  by  Black  and  Scholes 
(1972).  They  noted  that  "if  the  model  has  an  accurate 
estimate  of  the  variance,  it  works  very  well  .....  More 
work  must  be  done  to  predict  variances  using  the 
information  available"  (p.  416). 
Various  estimators  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return  have  been  used  in  previous  empirical 
works.  These  include  : 
a)  Historical  standard  deviation  (Gemmill(1986),  Chiras 
71 and  Manaster(19.7-8)  and  Latane  and  Rendleman(1976)), 
b)  Chiras  and  Manaster's  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  (Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  and  Gemmill 
and  Dickins(1986)  and  Blomeyer  and 
Klemkosky(1983)), 
c)  Latane  and  Rendleman's  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  (Latane  and  Rendleman(1976),  Latane  and 
Rendleman(1979)  and  Beckers(1981)), 
d)  Arithmetic  mean  of  the  implied  standard  deviations 
of  all  options  of  the  same  class  (Kerruish(1984) 
and  Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)), 
e)  Beckers'  weighted  implied  standard  deviation 
(Beckers(1981)), 
f)  Implied  standard  deviation  of  the  at-the-money 
option  (Macbeth  and  Merville(1979)), 
g)  Implied  standard  deviation  of  the  most  out-of-the- 
money  option  (Gemmill(1986)), 
h)  Implied  standard  deviation  of  the  most  in-the-money 
option  (Gemmill(1986)), 
i)  Implied  standard  deviation  of  the  option  that  is 
most  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  standard  deviation 
of  the  underlying  stock  (that  is,  the  option  with 
the  highest  fiC/jn7  (Beckers(1981)), 
j)  Arithmetic  mean  of  the  options  nearest  to  or  at- 
the-money  and  the  two  options  on  either  side  in 
terms  of  exercise  prices,  provided  they  are  of 
medium  or  long  term  duration  (that  is,  greater  than 
72 ninety  days)  (Kerruish(1984)), 
k)  Arithmetic  mean  of  the  options  nearest  to  or  at- 
the-money  and  the  two  options  on  either  side  in 
terms  of  exercise  prices,  provided  they  are  of 
medium  term  maturity  (that  is,  greater  than  ninety 
days  but  less  than  one  hundred  and  eighty  days) 
(Kerruish(1984)), 
1)  Black's  estimator  (Beckers(1981)  and  Cox  and 
Rubinstein(1985))  and 
m)  DATASTREAM's  estimator  (DATASTREAM  Traded  options 
Services  User  Manual). 
Out  of  this  list  of  thirteen  estimators,  three  (items 
(b),  (i)  and  (m))  are  selected  for  testing  in  this 
study.  The  reasons  for  selecting  these  three 
estimators  and  rejecting  the  others  are  given  below. 
Five  of  the  estimators  do  not  seem  to  have  any 
theoretical  justification.  These  are  items  (d),  (g), 
(h),  (j)  and  (k)  and  they  are  not  tested  in  this 
study. 
In  the  case  of  item  (d),  there  is  no  justification  for 
each  of  the  implied  standard  deviations  to  be  given 
equal  weights  to  obtain  the  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation.  The  reason  given  for  its  use  is  that  it  is 
a  convenient  way  to  combine  all  the  individual  implied 
standard  deviations  into  a  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation.  For  example,  Gemmill(1986)  described  this 
73 estimator  as  a  "much  simpler  way  to  combine  the 
implied  standard  deviations  into  a  single  estimate" 
(p.  538). 
Items  (j)  and  (k)  were  used  by  Kerruish(1984). 
Kerruish  excluded  deep-in  and  deep-out-of-the-money 
options  on  the  grounds  that  Merton(1976)  provided 
evidence  on  the  inaccuracy  of  the  Black-Scholes  model 
in  valuing  these  options  when  the  underlying  stock 
returns  are  not  continuous.  However,  she  is  unclear 
about  how  the  implied  standard  deviations  were 
combined  into  a  single  estimate  and  no  justifications 
were  given  for  any  method  used. 
Items  (g)  and  (h)  were  tested  by  Gemmill(1986). 
Gemmill  did  not  provide  any  reasons  for  his  choice. 
There  are  no  theoretical  justifications  for  these  two 
estimators. 
Item  (a)  is  the  historical  standard  deviation.  This 
item  is  the  standard  deviation  of  a  series  of  past 
logarithmic  stock  returns.  To  obtain  an  unbiased 
estimator  of  the  population  standard  deviation,  a 
correction  factor  of  n/(n-1)  is  applied  to  the 
variance  so  that 
_  (1/(n-1))E(logRj  -  U)2 
where  jr2  =  unbiased  estimated  variance  of  the 
74 logarithmic  stock  returns, 
Rý  =  stock  returns  (final  stock  price  divided 
-by  initial  stock  price), 
u=  estimated  mean  of  the  logarithmic  stock 
returns  (that  is,  (1/n)ElogRj)  and 
n=  number  of  stock  returns. 
The  unbiased  standard  deviation  is  approximately  the 
square  root  of  o'  (Cox  and  Rubinstein(1985)  p.  256). 
If  the  true  standard  deviation  is  constant  over  time, 
as  is  assumed  in  the  Black-Scholes  model,  then  the 
historical  standard  deviation  would  have  been  a  good 
estimator  of  the  true  standard  deviation. 
Unfortunately,  this  Black-Scholes  model  assumption  is 
not  a  good  approximation  of  reality.  Some  evidence  of 
this  for  stocks  with  options  traded  on  the  EOE  can  be 
found  in  Kemna(1987).  Kemna  subdivided  her  sample  of 
twenty  weeks  into  two  subsamples  of  ten  weeks  each. 
The  average  implied  standard  deviations  of  each  stock 
for  the  two  subsamples  are  then  compared.  She  found 
that  "for  most  stocks  the  average  implied  standard 
deviation  over  the  first  ten  weeks  is  not  equal  to  the 
average  implied  standard  deviation  over  the  second  ten 
weeks,  which  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  over  these 
time  periods  the  implied  standard  deviation  is  not 
constant"  (p.  12). 
Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  and  Latane  and 
75 Rendleman(1976)  provided  evidence  to  show  that  the 
implied  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return  is 
superior  to  the  historical  standard  deviation  as  a 
predictor  of  the  true  standard  deviation.  Chiras  and 
Manaster(1978)  tested  the  following-hypothesis 
"Standard  deviations  inferred  from  option  prices  have 
been  better  predictors  of  standard  deviations  of 
future  stock  returns  than  standard  deviations  obtained 
from  historic  stock  returns"  (p.  218).  They  regressed 
the  actual  standard  deviation  on  the  historical 
standard  deviation,  and  also  regressed  the  actual 
standard  standard  deviation  on  their  weighted  implied 
standard  deviation  for  twenty  three  stocks  with  twenty 
three  monthly  observations  each.  For  the  monthly 
regression,  the  average  R2  (over  the  twenty  three 
months)  was  0.26  for  the  first  regression  and  0.32  for 
the  second  regression.  For  the  'grand  regression', 
where  all  observations  were  pooled,  they  found  that 
the  R2  was  0.31  compared  to  0.63  for  the  second 
regression.  Hence,  they  concluded  that  "the  WISDs  have 
been  substantially  better  predictors  of  SDFUTs  than 
have  the  SDHISTs"  (p.  226).  WISD  refers  to  their 
weighted  implied  standard  deviation,  SDFUT  refers  to 
the  actual  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return 
over  the  remaining  life  of  the  option,  and  SDHIST 
refers  to  the  historical  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return. 
76 Latane  and  Rendleman(1976)  found  that  the  correlation 
(0.823)  between  their  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  and  the  actual  standard  deviation  is  much 
stronger  than  the  correlation  (0.558)  between  the 
historical  standard  deviation  and  the  actual  standard 
deviation.  They  concluded  that  "the  weighted  implied 
standard  deviation  is  generally  a  better  predictor  of 
future  variability  than  standard  deviation  predictors 
based  on  historical  data"  (p.  381). 
Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  and  Latane  and 
Rendleman(1976)  both  found  the  weighted  implied 
standard  deviation  to  be  superior  to  the  historical 
standard  deviation.  The  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  was  superior  even  though  they  used  different 
weighting  systems.  If  the  market  uses  only  the  past 
time  series  of  stock  returns  to  estimate  future 
standard  deviations,  then  the  weighted  implied 
standard  deviations  could  not  have  been  found  to  be 
superior.  It  is  possible  that  the  market  uses  more 
information  than  merely  the  past  time  series  of  stock 
returns  in  assessing  the  future  standard  deviation. 
Given  this  evidence,  the  historical  standard  deviation 
will  not  be  tested  in  this  study. 
The  historical  standard  deviation  had  been  used  by 
Galai(1977)  and  Trippi(1977)  as  an  estimator  of  the 
77 standard  deviation  of  a  stock's  return.  Latane  and 
Rendleman(1976),  on  the  other  hand,  used  a  different 
approach..  They  equated  the  Black-Scholes  model  price 
to  the  market  price  of  the  option  to  solve  for  the 
implied  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return. 
Since  the  implied  standard  deviation  is  obtained  from 
the  market  price  of  the  option,  it  represents  the 
market's  assessment  of  the  future  standard  deviation 
of  the  stock's  return.  However,  in  practice  not  all 
options  written  on  a  particular  stock  would  be  priced 
with  the  same  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's 
return.  This  is  because  some  options'  prices  are  more 
sensitive  to  a  precise  specification  of  the  standard 
deviation  than  others.  The  implied  standard  deviations 
on  those  options  whose  prices  are  least  sensitive  to  a 
precise  specification  of  the  standard  deviation  are 
likely  to  be  unrepresentative  of  the  market's 
underlying  expectations.  Implied  standard  deviations 
on  such  options  could  take  on  a  wide  range  of  values 
within  a  narrow  range  of  option  prices,  so  that  minor 
errors  in  the  recording  of  the  option  prices  could 
result  in  major  errors  in  the  implied  standard 
deviation.  Accordingly,  implied  standard  deviations  of 
such  options  should  not  be  given  as  much  weight  as 
implied  standard  deviations  of  options  in  which  the 
standard  deviation  is  a  more  important  factor.  Latane 
and  Rendleman  therefore  proposed  a  weighted  implied 
78 standard  deviation,  in  which  the  weights  of  the 
implied  standard  deviations  are  given  by  the  partial 
derivative  of  the  Black-Scholes  equation  with  respect 
to  each  implied  standard  deviation.  Latane  and 
Rendleman(1979)  gave  the  weighting.  system  as  : 
WISDit  =  (XISDijt  dijt)0.5 
dijt)-0.5 
where  WISDit  =  WISD  for  company  i  in  period  t, 
ISDijt  =  ISD  for  option  j  of  company  i  in  period 
t, 
N=  number  of  options  analysed  for  company  i 
and  is  always  greater  than  or  equal  to 
two  and 
digit  =  partial  derivation  of  the  price  of 
option  j  of  company  i  in  period  t 
with  respect  to  its  implied 
standard  deviation  using  the 
Black-Scholes  model. 
This  weighted  implied  standard  deviation  is  item  (c) 
in  the  list  above. 
Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  also  used  a  weighted  implied 
standard  deviation  rather  than  the  historical  standard 
deviation.  However,  they  weighted  the  implied  standard 
deviations  according  to  the  price  elasticities  of  the 
option  with  respect  to  their  implied  standard 
deviation.  They  argued  that  the  Latane  and  Rendleman 
weighting  scheme  emphasised  the  total  dollar  return 
without  regard  to  the  size  of  the  investment  :  it 
79 weighted  implied  standard  deviations  according  to  the 
dollar  price  change  for  the  options  relative  to  the 
incremental  change  in  the  implied  standard  deviation. 
A  rational  investor  measures  return  as  the  ratio  of 
the  dollar  price  change  to  the  size  of  the  investment. 
Therefore,  weighting  implied  standard  deviations 
according  to  the  price  elasticity  of  the  option  with 
respect  to  their  implied  standard  deviation  is 
consistent  with  a  rational  measure  of  returns,  because 
the  price  elasticity  measures  the  percentage  change  in 
the  price  of  an  option  with  respect  to  the  percentage 
change  in  its  implied  standard  deviation.  Chiras  and 
Manaster's  weighted  implied  standard  deviation  is 
WISD  =  (EISDj(6wl/4vß)  (vj/wj))  /  (E  (Jwd/gvj)  (vj/wj)  ) 
where  N=  the  number  of  options  recorded  on  a 
particular  stock  for  the  observation  date, 
ISDj  =  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  option  j 
(Jwj/avj)(vj/wj)  =  the  price  elasticity  of 
option  j  with  respect  to  its 
implied  standard  deviation. 
Beckers(1981)  proposed  two  other  estimators  for  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return.  One 
estimator  (item  (i))  is  the  implied  standard 
deviation  of  the  option  whose  value  is  most  sensitive 
to  changes  in  its  implied  standard  deviation.  Beckers 
observed  that  this  is  usually  the  option  that  is  only 
80 slightly  out-of-the-money;  hence,  Beckers  referred  to 
this  as  the  at-the-money  option  (AMISD).  The 
justification  for  using  this  estimator  is  that  "all 
available  information  should  be  reflected  in  the  at- 
the-money  option  and  that  other  option  prices  had  too 
much  noise  to  be  of  any  relevance"  (Beckers(1981) 
p.  370).  Also,  Black(1975)  had  noted  that  there  is  a 
tendency  for  the  Black-Scholes  model  to  work  poorly 
for  deep-in-the-money  and  deep-out-of-money  options. 
Therefore,  if  implied  standard  deviations  of  these 
options  are  imputed  from  the  Black-Scholes  model, 
inclusion  of  these  implied  standard  deviations  in  the 
computation  of  a  weighted  implied  standard  deviation 
could  worsen  its  predictive  ability  relative  to  that 
of  the  AMISD.  The  other  estimator  proposed  by  Beckers 
(item  (e))  is  obtained  by  searching  for  the  implied 
standard  deviation  that  minimizes  the  following  "loss 
function" 
f  (ISD)  =  iEWi 
(  Ci  -  BSi  (ISD)  )z  /.  Wi 
where  Ci  =  market  price  of  option  i, 
BSi  =  Black-Scholes  option  price  as  a  function 
of  the  implied  standard  deviation, 
I  total  number  of  options  on  a  given  stock 
with  the  same  maturity  and 
Wi  =  weight  for  the  ith  option  = 
ýBSi(ISD)/JISD 
(that  is,  the  first  derivative  of  the 
Black-Scholes  formula  with  respect  to 
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Beckers'argüed  that  this  procedure  will  produce  an 
estimator  that  puts  "more  weight  on  options  that  are 
highly  sensitive  to  an  exact  specification  of  the 
standard  deviation"  (p.  370)  as  the  actual  weights  in 
this  procedure  "are  proportional  to  the  squared  values 
of  the  Latane  and  Rendleman  weights"  (p.  370). 
Beckers  found  that  the  AMISD  out-performed  both  the 
Latane  and  Rendleman  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  and  his  own  weighted  implied  standard 
deviation  obtained  from  minimising  his  "loss 
function".  In  the  case  of  Beckers'  own  weighted 
implied  standard  deviation,  the  AMISD  out-performed  it 
in  seven  out  of  ten  cases,  that  is,  the  R2  of  the 
regression  of  the  actual  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return  over  the  remaining  life  of  the  option 
(SSD)  on  AMISD  is  higher  than  the  R2  of  the 
regression  of  the  SSD  on  Beckers'  weighted  implied 
standard  deviation  in  seven  out  of  ten  cases.  Beckers' 
results  confirmed  that  the  use  of  weighting  schemes, 
and  in  particular  Latane  and  Rendleman's  and  Beckers' 
own  schemes,  worsens  the  predictive  ability  (R2)  of 
the  estimator.  Hence,  the  Latane  and  Rendleman 
estimator  and  Beckers'  estimator  will  not  be  tested  in 
this  study.  Beckers,  however,  did  not  test  the  AMISD 
against  the  Chiras  and  Manaster  estimator.  Therefore, 
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estimator  will  be  used. 
The  implied  standard  deviation  of  the  at-the-money 
option  (item  (f))  has  been  used  by  Macbeth  and 
Merville(1979).  The  problem  with  this  estimator  is 
that  there  is  usually  no  option  that.  is  exactly  at- 
the-money.  Hence,  the  implied  standard  deviation  for 
the  at-the-money  option  cannot  be  observed.  To 
overcome  this  problem,  Macbeth  and  Merville  used  a 
regression  model  to  deduce  the  implied  standard 
deviation  of  the  at-the-money  option.  The  regression 
model  is 
ýijt  =  slot  +  e11tMijt  +  Eijt  j=1,2, 
...  J 
where  Tijt  is  the  implied  standard  deviation  for 
option  j  on  stock  i  on  day  t  and 
Mijt  _  (Sit  -  Xije-rT)  /  Xije-rT 
where  Sit  is  the  closing  price  of  stock  i  on  day  t  and 
Xije-rT  is  the  present  value  at  time  t  of  the  exercise 
price  of  option  j  on  stock  i.  For  an  at-the-money 
option,  Sit  equals  Xije-rT,  so  that  Mijt  equals  zero. 
Therefore,  the  estimated  implied  standard  deviation 
for  the  at-the-money  option  on  stock  i  at  day  t  is  the 
value  of  eiot. 
The  problem  with  this  regression  model  is  that  there 
are,  in  most  cases,  very  few  observations  for  each 
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five  observations.  In  this  study,  the  number  of 
options  per  maturity  per  stock  is  also  around  five. 
With  few  observations,  the  estimates  of  ep  and  e1  will 
be  unreliable.  Moreover,  this  at-the-money  implied 
standard  deviation  is  likely  to  be  close  to  the  AMISD 
because  Beckers(1981)  observed  that  the  AMISD  is 
usually  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  the  option 
that  is  slightly  out-of-the-money.  Hence,  item  (f) 
will  not  be  tested  in  this  study. 
Item  (1)  refers  to  Black's  estimator.  Cox  and 
Rubinstein(1985)  provided  some  insight  into  how 
Black's  estimator  is  obtained.  Black  combined 
information  from  historical  stock  prices  with  an 
option's  implied  volatility,  and  empirical  knowledge 
about  how  volatilities  change  over  time,  to  obtain  his 
estimates  of  a  stock's  volatility.  He  took  into 
account  four  observations 
1)  Volatilities  of  different  stocks  tend  to  change 
together  in  the  same  direction, 
2)  Changes  in  volatilities  are  often  temporary;  after 
a  significant  change  up  or  down,  volatilities  seem 
to  revert  back  toward  their  previous  levels, 
3)  Changes  in  stock  prices  not  caused  by  stock  splits 
or  stock  dividends  are  inversely  related  to  changes 
in  their  associated  volatilities  and 
4)  An  option's  implicit  volatility  contains  useful 
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its  associated  stock. 
Black  incorporated  these  observations  into  his 
estimator.  In  addition,  Black  sometimes  used  his 
judgement  to  adjust  his  estimates  up  or  down. 
Beckers(1981)  tested  Black's  estimates  of  volatility, 
obtained  from  Black's  Option  Pricing  Service,  against 
Beckers  own  weighted  implied  standard  deviation  (item 
(e))  and  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  the  option 
that  is  most  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  underlying  stock  (item  (i)).  He  found 
that  Black's  estimator  out-performed  item  (e)  and  item 
(i)  in  seven  out  ten  cases  :  the  R2  from  the 
regressions  of  the  actual  standard  deviation  of  the 
stock's  return  over  the  remaining  life  of  the  option 
(SSD)  on  Black's  estimates  were  higher  than  the  R2 
from  the  regressions  of  SSD  on  either  item  (e)  or  item 
(i)  in  seven  out  of  ten  cases.  Beckers  therefore 
concluded  that  "by  including  additional  information  in 
his  prediction  rule,  Black  is  able  to  obtain  better 
predictive  results"  (p.  376).  In  spite  of  this 
evidence,  Black's  estimator  will  not  be  tested  in  this 
study  because  his  estimates  cannot  always  be  computed 
mechanically;  the  exact  prediction  rule  is  not  known 
and  sometimes  Black's  judgement  plays  an  important 
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The  final  estimator  of  the  stock's  volatility  to  be 
considered  is  that  used  by  DATASTREAM  (hereinafter 
DSISD).  The  method  of  computation  of  the  DSISD  is 
described  in  Chapter  Five.  The  DSISD  incorporates 
both  historical  and  implied  volatility  measures.  This 
estimator  will  be  tested  in  this  study  because 
DATASTREAM  is  widely  subscribed  to  by  the  financial 
community,  and  it  would  be  of  interest  to  see  how  it 
performs. 
In  addition  to  the  estimators  considered  above, 
Brenner  and  Galai(1984)  suggested  using  transactions 
data  instead  of  closing  price  data  to  impute  the 
implied  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return.  Brenner  and  Galai  reasoned  that  an  ISD 
computed  from  transactions  data  will  be  superior  to 
the  ISD  computed  from  closing  prices,  because  closing 
prices  might  be  manipulated  by  traders  to  reduce  their 
overnight  margin  requirements,  and  also  closing  stock 
and  option  prices  might  be  non-synchronous.  They 
proposed  a  transactions'  average  implied  standard 
deviation  (AISD)  computed  as  the  average  of  all  ISDs 
generated  by  transactions  during  the  day.  The  AISD 
gives  little  weight  to  the  last  transaction  of  the 
day. 
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the  period-3  June  1977  to  21  October  1977,  they  found 
that  the  ISD  computed  from  closing  prices  deviated 
significantly  from  the  AISDs.  They  reasoned  that  for 
stocks  less  actively  traded  than  IBM,  the  deviations 
are  expected  to  be  more  pronounced.  However,  whatever 
the  merits  of  the  AISD,  it  will  not  be  tested  because 
transactions  data  is  not  used  in  this  study. 
No  matter  which  estimator  is  used,  it  is  more 
meaningful  to  compute  one  estimate  of  the  stock's 
volatility  for  each  maturity.  This  is  because 
Kemna(1987)  presented  evidence  that  the  stock's 
volatility  may  not  be  constant  over  time.  If  the 
stock's  volatility  is  not  constant  over  time,  then 
options  with  differing  maturities  can  be  expected  to 
generate  different  implied  standard  deviations. 
Moreover,  the  implied  standard  deviations  of  options 
with  differing  maturities  may  reflect  "different 
perceptions  of  short  run  versus  long  run  volatility" 
(Brenner  and  Subrahmanyam(1988)  p.  80). 
Given  the  presumption  that  the  volatility  is  not 
constant,  the  B-S  model  may  be  an  inappropriate  model 
to  use  since  the  model  assumes  that  the  volatility  is 
constant.  Beckers  (1981)  noted  that  there  is  a  basic 
inconsistency  in  using  the  B-S  model  to  obtain 
87 predictions  of.  a  presumably  non-constant  variance. 
However,  '  he  reasoned  that  the  results  of  Latane  and 
Rendleman(1976)  "indicated  that  the  approach  is 
valuable,  at'least  from  a  pragmatic  standpoint" 
(p.  364).  Similarly  Galai  (1983b)  noted  that  "the 
results  of  Latane  and  Rendleman  (1976)  and  Schmalensee 
and  Trippi  (1978)  indicate  that  the  B-S  model  is  still 
valuable  in  predicting  future  volatilities.  It  may  be 
the  case  that  the  model  is  not  very  sensitive  to 
violations  of  the  non-stationarity  assumption"  (p.  66). 
4.3  Types  of  Tests 
It  is  of  interest  to  know  whether  the  market  is 
efficient  to  both  those  traders  who  are  not  permitted 
to  trade  on  the  floor  of  the  exchange  and  those 
traders  who  are  permitted  to  do  so.  The  first  group 
includes  individual  traders  and  some  members  of  the 
exchange,  for  example,  off-floor  traders.  The  second 
group  includes  market-makers  and  floor-brokers. 
It  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  two  groups 
because  the  second  group  of  traders  may  be  able  to 
transact  almost  immediately  upon  observing  any 
mispriced  situations.  Bhattacharya(1983)  stated  that 
"it  is  conceivable  that  a  market-maker  recognises  a 
mispriced  option  and  trades  immediately  ...  "  (p.  182). 
The  first  group  can  be  expected  to  require  a  much 
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physically  present  and  to  trade  on  the  floor  of  the 
exchange.  Their  orders  have  to  be  passed  through  their 
brokers  to  the  traders  on  the  floor. 
To  examine  the  performance  of  these  two  groups  of 
traders,  four  types  of  tests  are  conducted  in  this 
study  :  an  ex  post  test  with  zero  transactions  costs, 
an  ex  ante  test  with  zero  transactions  costs,  an  ex 
ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost,  and  an  ex  post 
test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost. 
An  ex  post  test  is  one  in  which  the  trading  strategy 
determined  with  prices  at  time  t  is  assumed  to  be 
implemented  at  time  t.  An  ex  ante  test  is  one  in  which 
there  is  a  time  lag  between  formation  of  the  strategy 
(at  time  t)  and  its  implementation  one  period  later 
(at  time  t+l  ).  Thus,  if  an  option  is  found  to  be 
mispriced  at  time  t,  it  can  only  be  bought  (written) 
at  time  t+l.  Similarly,  if  the  mispricing  of  the 
option  is  reversed  at  time  t+l,  it  can  only  be 
liquidated  at  time  t+2.  As  daily  data  is  used  in  this 
study,  the  minimum  lag  that  can  be  built  into  the 
tests  is  one  day.  Thus,  in  the  ex  ante  test,  the  time 
lag  between  the  formation  of  the  strategy  and  its 
execution  is  one  day. 
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on  the  floor  of  the  exchange,  it  is  impossible  for  him 
to  observe  a  mispricing  and  trade  almost  immediately, 
and  so  the  ex  post  test  is  not  appropriate.  The  ex 
ante  test,  with  a  one  day  time  lag  is  used. 
In  the  case  of  a  trader  who  is  permitted  to  trade  on 
the  floor  of  the  exchange,  it  may  be  possible  to 
observe  a  mis-pricing  and  trade  almost 
instantaneously.  The  ex  ante  test  in  this  study  allows 
for  a  one  day  delay  in  execution  of  the  spreads,  as 
daily  data  is  used.  For  such  a  trader,  the  ex  ante 
test  therefore  overstates  the  delay  in  the  execution 
of  the  spread.  The  ex  post  test  may  approximate  the 
position  of  such  a  trader  more  closely. 
The  ex  post  test  with  zero  transactions  costs  provides 
evidence  of  the  ability  of  the  trading  rule  to 
identify  mis-priced  options.  The  difference  between 
the  profits  of  the  ex  post  test  with  zero  transactions 
costs  and  ex  ante  test  with  zero  transactions  costs 
gives  some  indication  of  the  extent  to  which  market 
prices  converge  to  model  prices  during  the  one-day 
lag.  The  ex  ante  test  determines  the  extent  to  which 
the  ability  of  the  trading  rule  to  identify  mis-priced 
options  can  be  exploited  by  a  trader  who  is  not 
permitted  to  trade  on  the  floor  of  the  exchange.  The 
impact  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  can  be  observed  from 
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zero  transactions  costs,  and  the  tests  with  the  bid- 
ask  spread  cost. 
4.4  Bid-ask  Spread  Cost 
To  test  for  the  market's  efficiency,  returns  after 
transactions  costs  will  be  computed  to  determine 
whether  there  are  abnormal  returns  after  transactions 
costs.  As  Jensen  (1978)  stated,  market  efficiency 
implies  that  economic  profits  from  trading  are  zero, 
where  economic  profits  are  "  risk-adjusted  returns  net 
of  all  costs"  (p.  96). 
Transactions  costs  include  not  only  commissions  but 
also  the  bid-ask  spread  cost,  information  costs  in 
identifying  'mispriced'  options,  and  for  market-makers 
the  cost  of  a  seat  on  the  exchange.  Phillips  and  Smith 
(1980)  demonstrated  the  importance  of  taking  into 
account  all  transactions  costs  in  market  efficiency 
tests.  After  estimating  the  bid-ask  spread,  they 
adjusted  the  reported  returns  of  five  previous  studies 
of  option  market  effficiency  by  deducting  the 
estimated  spread  from  the  reported  returns.  All  five 
studies  had  shown  that  their  trading  rules  produce 
above-normal  profits.  However,  Phillips  and  Smith 
showed  that  after  taking  into  account  the  bid-ask 
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Galai  (1977)  reported  a  profit  of  $4.00  per  spread  per 
day  for  his  ex  ante  spreading  test,  and  concluded  that 
the  market  did  not  seem  perfectly  efficient  to 
market-makers.  But  Phillips  and  Smith  showed  that 
their  estimated  spread  of  $16.00  for  one  call  was 
sufficient  to  offset  Galai's  $4.00  average  profit. 
Phillips  and  Smith  argued  that  a  market-maker  is  not 
exempted  from  the  bid-ask  spread  because,  to  actively 
establish  a  position  in  his  own  security,  he  must  deal 
with  the  limit  order  book  or  a  competing  market-maker. 
This  study  takes  into  account  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
by  assuming  that  options  are  bought  at  the  ask  price 
and  written  at  the  bid  price.  The  bid-ask  spread  is 
therefore  accounted  for  directly  and  there  is  no  need 
to  use  an  estimated  average  bid-ask  spread.  However, 
to  assume  that  options  are  bought  at  the  ask  price  and 
written  at  the  bid  price  is  to  incorporate  the  whole 
of  the  bid-ask  spread  as  transactions  costs.  In 
practice,  transactions  may  occur  within  the  quoted 
bid-ask  spread,  and  this  assumption  will  therefore 
tend  to  bias  the  results  in  favour  of  efficiency. 
However,  this  problem  cannot  be  avoided  as  the  true 
bid-ask  spread  is  not  known. 
Roll(1984)  developed  a  measure  for  estimating  the 
effective  bid-ask  spread  from  a  time  series  of  past 
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2  -cov(LI  Pt,  dPt+l)"  The  Roll  model  is  extended  by 
Choi,  Salandro  and  Shastri(1988)  by  incorporating  the 
possibility  of  serial  correlation  in  transaction  type. 
Their  formula  is  as  follows  : 
[  -cov(L  Pt,  OPt+1)  7/  (1-e) 
where 
d  is  the  conditional  probability  that  the 
transaction  at  time  t+1  is  at  the  bid  (ask)  price, 
given  that  the  transaction  at  time  t  is  at  the  bid 
(ask)  price.  Roll  assumed  that 
4=0.5. 
The  derivation 
of  both  the  Roll  and  Choi,  Salandro  and  Shastri 
formulae  requires  the  assumption  that  the  asset  is 
traded  in  an  efficient  market.  As  this  study  is 
concerned  with  providing  evidence  on  the  market's 
efficiency,  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  use  their 
models  to  obtain  estimates  of  the  effective  bid-ask 
spread. 
4.5  Mispriced  Options 
This  study  uses  a  theoretically  'riskless'  strategy 
to  exploit  any  mis-pricing  in  the  options.  An  option 
is  assumed  to  be  mis-priced  when  its  market  price 
deviates  from  the  model  value.  For  the  zero 
transactions  costs  case,  the  model  value  is  compared 
to  the  mid-market  value,  that  is,  the  average  of  the 
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taken  into  account  as  a  transactions  cost,  it  is 
assumed  that  options  are  bought  at  the  market  ask 
price  and  written  at  the  market  bid  price.  Therefore 
it  is  necessary  to  compare  the  model  value  to  the 
market  bid  and  ask  prices  instead  of  the  mid-market 
price,  because  comparison  with  the  mid-market  price 
might  provide  wrong  signals  to  buy  or  write  an  option. 
To  illustrate,  let  the  market  bid  price  be  DF1  3  and 
offer  price  be  DF1  5.  The  mid-market  price  is 
therefore  DF1  4.  If  the  model  value  is  DF1  3.5,  the 
mid-market  price  is  greater  than  the  model  value.  This 
indicates  that  the  option  is  over-priced  in  the  market 
and  therefore  should  be  written.  However,  the  option 
can  only  be  written  at  the  bid  price  of  DF1  3,  which 
is  less  than  the  model  value,  indicating  that  the 
option  is  actually  under-priced  in  the  market  and 
should  be  bought.  Hence  the  signal  generated  by 
comparison  of  the  model  value  with  the  mid-market 
price  is  not  correct. 
To  overcome  this  difficulty,  mispriced  options  are 
identified  by  comparing  the  model  value  to  the  market 
bid  and  ask  prices  as  follows  : 
1)  if  the  bid  price  is  greater  than  the  model  value, 
the  option  is  over-priced  and  can  be  written  at  the 
bid  price; 
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option  is  under-priced  and  can  be  bought  at  the  ask 
price; 
3)  if  the  bid  price  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  model 
value  or  the  ask  price  is  greater  than  or  equal  to 
the  model  value,  the  option  is  not  mis-priced. 
When  bid  and  ask  prices  are  used,  the  criterion  for 
determining  whether  the  initial  mispricing  has 
reversed  follows  from  the  rule  used  for  determining 
mis-priced  options  in  the  presence  of  bid  and  ask 
prices.  That  is,  for  an  initially  over-priced  option 
(model  price  is  less  than  the  bid  price),  this  mis- 
pricing  is  reversed  when  the  ask  price  is  less  than  or 
equal  to  the  model  price.  Similarly,  for  an  initially 
under-priced  option  (model  price  is  greater  than  the 
ask  price),  the  mis-pricing  is  reversed  when  the  bid 
price  is  greater  than  or  equal  to  the  model  price. 
4.6  Riskless  Strategies 
If  the  model  used  is  assumed  to  be  correct,  then  when 
an  option  is  mis-priced,  we  expect  the  market  price  to 
return  to  the  model  value  some  time  in  the  future. 
Therefore  this  deviation  of  the  market  price  from  the 
model  value  represents  a  potential  profit.  The 
strategy  is  to  buy  (write)  the  under-valued  (over- 
valued)  option  to  lock  in  the  potential  profit  without 
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sense  that  its  return  is  insensitive  to  small  changes 
in  the  price  of  the  underlying  stock  over  a  short 
period  of  time.  This  would  be  the  case  if  the  model 
used  is  correct  and  the  position  is  continuously 
hedged,  so  that  the  deviation  of  the  market  price  from 
the  model  price  is  a  certain  profit  and  the  risk-free 
rate  of  return  on  the  investment  in  the  position  is 
also  certain.  It  is  necessary  to  set  up  a  riskless 
position  because  if  the  position  is  risky  then  the 
rate  of  return  from  that  position  must  be  above  a 
risk-adjusted  rate  of  return  to  be  considered 
abnormal.  But  what  is  the  appropriate  risk-adjusted 
rate  of  return  is  not  clear.  Jarrow  and  Rudd  (1983) 
showed  that  the  option's  beta  is  equal  to  the  option's 
elasticity  times  the  stock's  beta,  that  is  ßc  =  nßs, 
where  ßc  is  the  option's  beta, 
Bs  is  the  underlying  stock's  beta, 
n  is  the  option's  elasticity  and  is  equal  to 
SCIiS 
(SIC)  and 
AC/AS  is  the  first  partial  derivative  of  the 
Black-Scholes  call  price  with  respect  to 
the  underlying  stock  price. 
S  and  C  are  defined  in  Appendix  1.  For  the  Black- 
Scholes  formula,  AC/AS  is  equal  to  N(d1)  (see 
Appendix  1  for  definition). 
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price  and  time,  it  follows  that  the  option's  beta 
changes  over  the  life  of  the  option  even  if  the 
stock's  beta.  remains  constant.  Therefore,  unlike 
stocks,  the  option's  beta,  which  is  non-constant, 
cannot  be  estimated  from  the  past  time-series  of 
returns  on  the  option  and  the  returns  on  the  market 
portfolio,  and  hence  the  Capital  Assets  Pricing  Model, 
commonly  used  in  empirical  studies  of  stock  market 
efficiency,  cannot  be  used  to  determine  the  expected 
return.  In  the  case  of  a  riskless  position,  the 
expected  rate  of  return  is  obvious  :  it  is  the 
riskless  rate  of  return. 
An  example  of  a  study  that  used  a  risky  strategy  and 
an  unadjusted  rate  of  return  is  Trippi(1977).  Trippi 
investigated  the  efficiency  of  the  Chicago  Board 
Options  Exchange.  His  trading  strategy  involved  buying 
options  that  were  under-valued  and  writing  options 
that  were  over-valued.  The  positions  were  not  hedged 
and  therefore  not  riskless.  Based  on  an  average  weekly 
return  of  11.4  per  cent  he  concluded  that  the  Chicago 
Board  Options  Exchange  was  inefficient  during  the 
period  studied.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  evaluate 
Trippi's  result  fully  :  he  conducted  ex  post  test,  and 
his  strategy  was  not  riskless,  and  the  reported  return 
was  not  risk-adjusted. 
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used  to  create  riskless  positions.  A  hedge  "combines 
an  option  with  its  underlying  stock  in  such  a  way  that 
either  the  stock  protects  the  option  against  loss  or 
the  option  protects  the  stock  against  loss"  (Cox  and 
Rubinstein(1985)  p.  8).  To  implement  a  hedge,  orders 
have  to  be  placed  in  two  markets  :  the  stock  and  the 
options  market.  This  usually  takes  a  longer  time  than 
executing  the  orders  in  one  market.  As  long  as  one  leg 
of  the  hedge  is  not  executed,  the  position  is  not 
hedged,  and  the  longer  the  time  between  the  execution 
of  both  legs  of  the  hedge,  the  higher  the  risk. 
Black  and  Scholes(1972)  avoided  the  need  to  determine 
a  risk-adjusted  return  by  establishing  a  riskless 
hedge  position  consisting  of  buying  (selling)  an 
option  and  selling  (buying)  a  certain  proportion  of 
the  underlying  stock.  This  proportion  is  known  as  the 
hedge  ratio  and  is  given  by  the  first  partial 
derivative  of  the  Black-Scholes  call  price  with 
respect  to  the  stock  price.  This  has  been  shown  to  be 
equal  to  N(dl).  (Black  and  Scholes(1973)). 
Alternatively,  the  riskless  position  can  be  achieved 
by  buying  (selling)  100  shares  of  the  underlying  stock 
and  writing  (buying)  1/N(d1)  contracts  of  the  option. 
For  the  Black-Scholes  model  with  the  Merton  dividend 
adjustment,  Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  showed  that  the 
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definition  of  parameters). 
"A  spread  combines  options  of  different  series  but  of 
the  same  class,  where  some  are  bought  and  others  are 
written"  (Cox  and  Rubinstein  (1985)  p.  12).  The 
advantage  of  using  a  spreading  strategy  is  that  both 
legs  of  the  transaction  can  be  executed  in  one  market, 
and  possibly  with  one  market-maker,  since  only  one 
class  is  involved.  A  riskless  position  can  be 
established  by  a  spreading  strategy  involving 
positions  in  two  options  of  the  same  class.  To 
illustrate,  suppose  there  are  two  options,  option  j 
and  option  k,  written  on  the  same  stock.  Let 
e-DTN-(d1j)  and  e-DTN(dlk)  be  the  hedge  ratios  of 
options  j  and  k  respectively.  That  is,  for  every  100 
shares  of  the  underlying  stock  bought  (sold),  write 
(buy)  eDT/N(d1j)  contracts  of  option  j  to  form  a 
riskless  hedge.  The  riskless  hedge  can  also  be  formed 
by  buying  (selling)  100  shares  of  the  underlying  stock 
and  writing  (buying)  eDT/N(dlk)  of  option  k.  Since  the 
100  shares  are  the  same  in  both  cases,  it  provides  the 
link  between  the  two  options.  A  riskless  spread  can  be 
established  by  buying  (writing)  eDT/N(d1j)  contracts 
of  option  j  and  writing  (buying)  eDT/N(dlk)  of  option 
k.  Equivalently,  the  riskless  spread  can  be 
established  by  buying  (writing)  one  contract  of  option 
j  and  writing  (buying)  N(dlj)/N(dlk)  contracts  of 
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Conversion  strategy  is  used  to  exploit  the  relative 
mis-pricing  of  put  and  calls.  It  is  essentially  one  of 
arbitrage  between  put  and  call  markets.  If  a  call  is 
found  to  be  over-priced  relative  to  a  put,  a  riskless 
position  is  set  up  using  a  conversion  strategy.  This 
involves  writing  a  call  and  buying  it  back  immediately 
by  buying  a  put,  buying  a  share,  and  borrowing  an 
amount  equal  to  the  present  value  of  the  exercise 
price  of  the  option  (  assuming  the  stock  pays  no 
dividends  ).  Similarly,  if  a  put  is  over-priced 
relative  to  the  call,  the  strategy  will  be  to  write  a 
put  and  buy  it  back  immediately  by  buying  a  call, 
selling  the  underlying  stock  short,  and  lending  an 
amount  equal  to  the  present  value  of  the  exercise 
price  of  the  option.  The  positions  established  are 
riskless  because  the  call  (  put  )  that  is  written  is 
immediately  bought.  Conversion  strategies  require 
orders  to  be  placed  simultaneously  in  three  markets  : 
option,  stock  and  bond  markets.  This  makes  its 
implementation  difficult  and  it  is  of  higher  risk. 
Leland(1985)  showed  that  when  transactions  costs  were 
present,  the  use  of  the  B-S  hedge  ratio  did  not  result 
in  a  perfect  hedge  even  with  continuous  hedging.  He 
developed  a  modified  hedge  ratio  to  ensure  that 
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transactions  costs.  The  modified  hedge  ratio  uses  a 
modified  standard  deviation  as  input.  This  modified 
standard  deviation  incorporates  the  transactions 
costs  (including  the  bid-ask  spread)  and  the 
rebalancing  interval.  The  actual  bid-ask  spread  may 
be  different  from  the  quoted  spread  because  trades 
sometimes  occur  within  the  quoted  spread.  The  actual 
bid-ask  spread  cannot  be  easily  determined  and  errors 
in  its  estimation  will  translate  into  errors  in  the 
modified  hedge  ratio.  The  benefit  from  using  the 
modified  hedge  ratio  without  an  accurate  estimation  of 
the  transactions  costs  is  not  clear,  and  it  is 
therefore  not  used  in  this  study.  The  sensitivity  of 
the  results  to  this  deviation  is  a  matter  for  future 
research. 
4.7  Spreading  Test 
The  spreading  test  in  this  study  sets  up  spreads  that 
consist  of  an  under-priced  series  and  an  over-priced 
series  of  the  same  class.  If  there  are  no  under- 
priced  series  or  no  over-priced  series  within  that 
class  then  no  spreads  will  be  set  up. 
Although  spreads  that  consist  of  two  under-priced  or 
two  over-priced  series  can  also  be  profitable,  they 
are  ignored  in  this  study.  Such  spreads  are  profitable 
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price)  of  the  two  options  are  different,  and  the 
relatively  under-priced  option.  is  bought  and  the  other 
option  written.  These  spreads  are  ignored  because  this 
study  rebalances  spreads  daily  till  they  are 
liquidated.  This  daily  rebalancing  might  lead  to  the 
undesirable  situation  where  over-priced  options  have 
to  be  bought  or  under-priced  options  have  to  be 
written  in  order  to  maintain  the  hedge  ratio.  To  see 
how  this  may  come  about,  consider  a  riskless  spread 
consisting  of  two  over-priced  options  A  and  B  and  one 
contract  of  A  is  bought  and  0.8  contract  of  B  is 
written  (hedge  ratio  of  1:  0.8  assumed).  Further  assume 
that  the  hedge  ratio  has  now  changed  to  1.5  :  1.  To 
conform  to  this  ratio,  the  spread  can  be  adjusted  by 
buying  another  0.2  contract  of  option  A  (which  is 
over-priced)  or  by  buying  back  0.13  contract  of  option 
B  (which  is  also  over-priced).  Either  alternative 
requires  an  over-priced  option  to  be  bought.  Such 
action  will  therefore  result  in  expected  losses. 
The  spread  is  liquidated  when  the  price  of  one  or 
both  legs  of  the  spread  returns  to  its  model  value, 
or  the  mispricing  of  at  least  one  leg  is  reversed  or 
at  the  end  of  the  sample  period. 
An  option  is  bought  (written)  when  its  market  price 
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priced  (over-priced).  As  pointed  out  earlier  on,  this 
mispricing  is  a  potential  profit  and  the  strategy  is 
to  'lock  in'  this  profit.  When  the  market  price  of 
the  option  returns  to  its  model  value  or  when  the 
mispricing  is  reversed,  this  potential  profit  would 
have  been  realised.  Hence  the  option  position  should 
be  liquidated.  However,  one  difficulty  is  that  there 
are  two  legs  in  a  spread,  and  it  is  highly  unlikely 
that  both  legs  will  have  their  mis-pricing  reversed  on 
the  same  day.  It  is  possible  that  the  mispricing  of 
one  leg  has  widened  before  it  moves  toward  the  model 
value.  This  being  the  case,  if  the  spread  is 
liquidated,  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  profit 
from  the  leg  that  has  its  mis-pricing  reversed  might 
be  reduced  or  even  turned  into  a  loss  by  the  loss  from 
the  leg  that  is  still  mis-priced.  However,  if  the 
spread  is  not  liquidated  when  the  mis-pricing  of  one 
leg  of  the  spread  has  reversed,  the  spread  will  have  a 
long  (short)  position  on  an  option  that  has  become 
over-priced  (under-priced).  Moreover,  both  legs  of  the 
spread  will  now  consist  of  under-priced  (over-priced) 
options.  As  discussed  above,  this  is  undesirable  when 
the  spread  has  to  be  rebalanced  daily  because  it  will 
become  necessary  to  buy  over-priced  options  or  sell 
under-priced  options  to  maintain  a  riskless  position. 
To  overcome  this  problem,  when  only  one  leg  of  the 
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replace  the  leg  whose  mis-pricing  has  reversed  with 
another  option,  so  that  the  leg  whose  mis-pricing  has 
not  reversed  need  not  be  liquidated.  This,  of  course, 
is  not  always  possible  as  it  depends  on  the 
availability  of  another  over-priced  (or  under-priced) 
option  of  the  same  class  to  match  the  currently  under- 
priced  (or  over-priced)  option  whose  mis-pricing  has 
not  reversed.  If  another  option  is  available,  the 
number  of  contracts  of  the  new  option  to  be  bought  (or 
written)  depends  on  the  number  of  contracts  of  the 
existing  option  and  the  hedge  ratios  of  both  options. 
This  rule  allows  the  leg  whose  mis-pricing  has 
reversed  to  be  liquidated  and  the  other  leg  to 
continue  to  be  held  until  its  mis-pricing  has 
reversed.  It  is  consistent  with  Cox  and 
Rubinstein(1985)'s  suggestion  that  "whenever  one  side 
of  a  neutral  position  becomes  unfavourable,  liquidate 
that  side  and  replace  it  with  another-option  with  a 
favourable  price"  (p.  185). 
4.8  Calculation  of  the  Rate  of  Return  from  a  Spread 
When  a  spread  is  liquidated,  its  rate  of  return  is 
computed.  Computation  of  the  rate  of  return  is 
problematical  when  option  writing  is  involved. 
Gastineau(1975)  noted  that  "although  the  dollar  profit 
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transaction  will  be  closed  out  is  given,  the  amount  of 
capital  invested  (the  denominator  in  the  rate  of 
return  calculation)  is  not  easy  to  determine"  (p.  223). 
In  option  writing,  the  writer  receives  the  option 
premium.  However,  he  is  required  to  furnish  a  margin 
(see  Chapter  Two  Section  2.4)  to  ensure  that  he  is 
able  to  fulfil  his  obligations  under  the  contract.  The 
option  premium  reduces  the  margin  required.  This  net 
margin  can  be  satisfied  by  depositing  cash  or 
securities. 
Chiras  and  Manaster(1978)  used  the  gross  investment 
(the  sum  of  the  values  of  the  long  and  short 
positions)  as  the  denominator  in  their  rate  of  return 
calculations.  Their  justification  for  doing  this  was 
that  many  of  the  rates  of  return  in  their  sample  were 
infinite  when  the  net  investment  (the  value  of  the 
long  position  less  the  short  position)  was  used, 
because  the  net  investment  was  negative.  However,  it 
is  clear  that  the  capital  'tied-up'  in  the  spread  is 
not  equal  to  the  gross  investment.  Hence,  using  the 
gross  investment  cannot  be  correct. 
Gastineau(1975)  suggested  that  the  net  margin  be 
included  in  the  denominator  but  at  the  same  time  the 
return  from  the  securities  furnished  as  margin  be 
included  in  the  numerator.  If  it  is  assumed  that  the 
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requirements  are  not  already  in  the  investment 
portfolio  of  the  trader,  and  these  securities  have  to 
be  purchased,  then  Gastineau's  suggestion  would  seem 
to  be  correct,  as  the  options  could  not  have  been 
written  without  the  securities  being  purchased.  Hence, 
the  options  written  and  the  securities  purchased  are 
viewed  as  one  investment  portfolio,  and  it  is  the 
return  on  this  portfolio  that  is  of  interest. 
However,  in  the  context  of  this  study,  there  is  a 
difficulty  in  using  Gastineau's  method  because  two 
assumptions  are  necessary  :  one  regarding  the  type  of 
securities  purchased  and  deposited  and,  the  other 
regarding  the  return  from  that  security.  These 
assumptions  complicate  the  rate  of  return  calculations. 
In  order  to  overcome  this  difficulty,  it  is  assumed 
that  the  trader  already  possesses,  in  his  portfolio, 
the  securities  needed  to  satisfy  the  net  margin 
requirement.  With  this  assumption,  the  net  margin  can 
be  ignored,  since  the  securities  deposited  to  satisfy 
this  requirement  are  already  invested,  and  the  net 
margin  requirement  makes  no  difference  to  the  trader's 
return.  Hence,  the  net  margin  is  ignored  and  the 
investment  in  the  spread  is  equal  to  the  amount 
required  to  set  up  the  buy  leg  of  the  spread. 
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computed  as  follows  : 
Total  profit  (or  loss)  for  the  spread  250 
Investment  in  the  spread  Holding  Period 
where  the  holding  period  is  measured  from  the  time  the 
spread  is  set  up,  to  the  time  it  is  liquidated. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  days  is  used  to  annualise  the 
rate  of  return  since  it  is  the  approximate  number  of 
trading  days  in  a  year.  It  is  assumed  that  whatever 
return  is  earned  during  the  period  in  which  the  spread 
is  held,  it  can  only  be  replicated  during  trading 
days.  To  be  consistent,  the  holding  period  is  also 
measured  in  trading  days. 
4.9  Rebalancing  of  Spreads 
For  the  duration  that  the  spread  is  held,  the  spread 
ratio  (that  is  N(dlj)/N(dlk)  for  two  options  j  and  k, 
where  j  is  bought  and  k  is  sold)  is  re-calculated  each 
day  and  the  proportions  of  options  in  the  spread  are 
adjusted  accordingly.  This  adjustment  is  achieved  by 
buying  more  of  the  under-valued  option  or  selling  more 
of  the  over-valued  option.  If  the  spread  ratio  (that 
is  N(d1j)  /  N(d1k))  at  day  t+l  is  greater  than  the 
spread  ratio  at  day  t,  then  at  day  t+1  the  spread  is 
adjusted  by  writing  more  of  the  over-valued  option 
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spread  ratio  at  day  t,  then  at  day  t+l  the  spread  is 
adjusted  by  buying  more  of  the  under-valued  option 
(j).  In  the  ex  ante  test,  the  adjustments  that  are 
determined  on  day  t  can  only  be  executed  on  day  t+l. 
In  the  tests  with  transactions  costs,  options  are 
bought  and  written  at  the  bid  and  ask  prices 
respectively  during  rebalancing. 
Rebalancing  the  spreads  daily  deviates  from  the 
Black-Scholes  assumption  of  continuous  rebalancing  and 
the  spread  will  not,  therefore,  be  completely 
riskless.  However,  Galai(1975)  argued  that  "the  fact 
that  the  adjustment  in  the  position  is  not  done 
continuously,  but  daily  (or  even  over  longer  periods) 
should  not  significantly  affect,  on  average,  the 
returns  on  the  spread"  (p.  140).  He  showed  that  the 
spreading  return  can  be  decomposed  into  the  weighted 
difference  between  the  hedging  returns  from  the  two 
options  in  the  spread,  and  that  the  effect  of 
discreteness  of  adjustment  for  one  hedge  will  to  some 
extent  offset  the  effect  for  the  other  hedge.  This 
offsetting  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  effects  in  both 
cases  are  a  function  of  the  reduction  in  time  to 
maturity  and  the  change  in  price  of  the  underlying 
stock.  These  two  factors  are  the  same  for  both  options 
since  they  are  written  on  the  same  underlying  stock. 
The  spreading  return  will  in  fact  be  dominated  by  the 
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deviation  of  the  actual  price  from  the  model  price  for 
each  option. 
4.10  Hedging  Tests 
The  hedging  test  in  this  study  sets  up  hedges 
consisting  of  one  contract  of  an  option  and 
100e-DTN(d1)  shares  of  its  underlying  stock,  where 
e-DTN(d1)  is  the  hedge  ratio  (see  Appendix  1  for 
definition  of  the  parameters).  If  the  option  is  under- 
priced,  it  is  bought  and  the  underlying  stock  sold 
short;  if  the  option  is  over-priced,  it  is  written  and 
the  underlying  stock  bought. 
The  hedge  is  liquidated  when  the  market  price  of  the 
option  returns  to  its  model  value,  or  when  the  mis- 
pricing  of  the  option  is  reversed,  or  at  the  end  of 
the  sample  period. 
The  underlying  assumption  for  the  hedging  test  is  that 
the  Amsterdam  stock  market  is  informationally 
efficient,  so  that  stocks  are  fairly  priced.  Some 
evidence  of  the  efficiency  of  the  Amsterdam  stock 
market  is  provided  by  Solnik(1973)  and  by  Dorsman  and 
Gooijer(1981).  Solnik  found  some  evidence  in  support 
of  the  random  walk  hypothesis,  and  showed  that  any 
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sufficient  to  generate  abnormal  returns  after 
transactions  costs.  Dorsman  and  Gooijer(1981)  also 
studied  the  behaviour  of  Dutch  stock  prices  and 
concluded  that  "the  Amsterdam  Stock  Exchange  can  be 
considered  to  operate  in  a  perfectly  efficient  way" 
(p.  30)  during  the  period  of  their  study. 
4.11  Calculation  of  the  Rate  of  Return  from  a  Hedge 
A  formula  similar  to  that  for  the  annualised  rate  of 
return  from  a  spread  is  used  to  compute  the  annualised 
rate  of  return  from  a  hedge.  The  formula  is  : 
Total  profit  (loss)  from  a  hedge 
Investment  in  the  hedge 
250 
x  Holding  period 
The  investment  in  the  hedge  is  the  amount  required  to 
set  up  the  long  side  of  the  hedge.  In  the  case  where 
the  option  is  bought  and  the  stock  is  sold  short,  it 
is  likely  that  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  stock 
are  not  immediately  available  to  the  trader.  Hence, 
the  investment  in  the  hedge  is  equal  to  the  amount 
required  to  buy  the  option.  Similarly,  when  the  stock 
is  bought  and  the  option  is  written,  the  proceeds  from 
option  writing  are  not  immediately  available  to  the 
trader;  in  fact,  a  net  margin  has  to  be  furnished  in 
the  form  of  securities.  As  discussed  in  Section  4.8, 
this  net  margin  is  to  be  ignored  in  this  study. 
Therefore,  the  investment  in  the  hedge  is  equal  to  the 
110 amount  required  to  buy  the  stock. 
4.12  Rebalancing  of  Hedges 
For  the  duration  that  the  hedge  is  held,  the  hedge 
ratio  (that  is,  e-DTN(dl))  is  re-calculated  each  day 
and  the  proportions  of  option  and  stock  in  the  hedge 
are  adjusted  accordingly. 
Consider  the  case  where  the  option  is  bought  and  the 
stock  is  sold  short.  If  the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t+l  is 
greater  than  the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t,  then  on  day  t+l 
the  hedge  is  adjusted  by  selling  more  of  the  stock;  if 
the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t+1  is  less  than  the  hedge 
ratio  on  day  t,  then  on  day  t+1  the  hedge  is  adjusted 
by  buying  more  of  the  option. 
Next  consider  the  case  where  the  stock  is  bought  and 
the  option  is  written.  If  the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t+1 
is  greater  than  the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t,  then  on  day 
t+1  the  hedge  is  adjusted  by  buying  more  of  the  stock; 
if  the  hedge  ratio  on  day  t+1  is  less  than  the  hedge 
ratio  on  day  t,  then  on  day  t+l  the  hedge  is  adjusted 
by  writing  more  of  the  option. 
Rebalancing  the  hedges  daily  deviates  from  the  Black- 
Scholes  assumption  of  continuous  rebalancing  and  the 
111 hedge  will,  therefore,  not  be  completely  riskless. 
Boyle  and  Emmanuel(1980)  had  shown  that  discretely 
adjusted  Black-Scholes  hedge  constructed  with  model 
prices  will  have  excess  returns  with  zero  means  and 
positive  skewness,  resulting  in  about  sixty  eight  per 
cent  of  all  hedge  excess  returns  being  negative. 
However,  if  the  discretely  adjusted  hedges  are 
established  at  market  prices,  the  hedge  excess  returns 
need  not  have  these  distributional  characteristics. 
Galai(1983a)  showed  that  the  hedging  return  can  be 
decomposed  into  three  components  : 
a)  the  riskiess  rate  of  return  on  the  initial 
investment  in  the  hedge, 
b)  the  return  from  the  discreteness  of  adjustment  of 
the  hedge  and 
c)  the  return  from  the  change  in  the  deviation  of  the 
actual  option  price  from  the  model  price  over  the 
period  the  hedge  is  held. 
He  provided  evidence  that  the  effect  of  discreteness 
of  adjustment  (component  (b))  was  negligible  and  that 
component  (c)  dominated  the  hedge  return.  Thus,  he 
concluded  that  "adjustments  at  one  (trading)  day 
intervals  apparently  do  not  affect  the  returns  in  a 
significant  way  and  can  thus  be  regarded  as 
operational  for  hedging  activity"  (p.  52). 
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Even  though  an  American  option  can  be  exercised 
prematurely,  Merton(1973a)  had  shown  that  early 
exercise  is  never  optimal  when  the  underlying  stock 
does  not  pay  dividends.  However,  for  an  American 
option  on  a  dividend-paying  stock,  there  is  the 
possibility  that  it  is  optimal  to  exercise  the  option 
prematurely.  As  all  stock  options  traded  on  the 
European  Options  Exchange  are  American  options,  this 
possibility  cannot  be  ignored,  because  options  that 
are  bought  or  written  and  assumed  to  be  held  till  the 
mis-pricing  is  reversed  or  till  the  end  of  the  sample 
period,  might  in  fact  be  exercised  in  the  interim. 
Jarrow  and  Rudd(1983)  considered  the  case  where  over 
the  life  of  the  option  the  underlying  stock  pays  two 
dividends  D1  and  D2  at  times  T1  and  T2  respectively. 
The  option  matures  at  time  T  (T  >  T2  >  T1)  and  X  is 
the  exercise  price.  They  showed  that  if 
X(1  -  e-r(T-TI))  >  D1 
and 
X(1  -  e-r(T-Tz))  >  D2 
then  the  American  option  will  never  be  exercised 
early.  Violation  of  either  of  the  conditions  will  mean 
that  the  probability  of  early  exercise  may  no  longer 
be  zero.  However,  there  is  no  unambiguous  criterion  to 
113 determine  whether  the  option  will  be  exercised  early. 
In  order  to  overcome  this  uncertainty,  all  in-the- 
money  options  on  stocks  that  are  expected  to  pay 
dividends  during  the  period  of  study  are  ignored  for 
trading  purposes  if  they  violate  any  of  the  above 
conditions. 
4.14  Tests  of  Significance 
The  t-test  is  used  to  test  the  significance  of  the 
difference  between  the  average  annualised  rates  of 
return  from  spreading  (and  from  hedging)  and  an 
estimated  risk-free  interest  rate. 
In  this  study,  the  conventional  five  per  cent 
significance  level  is  used.  This  choice  must  be 
arbitrary  as  Henkel(1976)  stated  that  "the  choice  of 
significance  level  at  which  to  work  is  an  arbitrary 
decision,  since  neither  substantive  theory  nor 
statistical  theory  dictate  a  particular  level  of 
significance  be  used"  (p.  77). 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  determine  the 
efficiency  of  the  European  Options  Exchange.  Given  the 
definition  of  efficiency  in  this  study,  it  would  only 
be  of  interest  to  know  whether  the  average  rate  of 
return  is  significantly  greater  than  the  estimated 
114 risk-free  interest  rate.  It  makes  no  difference  to  the 
conclusion  whether  the  average  rate  of  return  is  less 
than  or  equal  to  the  estimated  riskless  interest  rate. 
Hence,  a  one-tail  test  is  appropriate.  The  null 
hypothesis  is  :  HO  :u=r  and  the  alternative 
hypothesis  is  H1  :u>r  where  u  is  the  average  rate 
of  return  and  r  is  the  estimated  risk-free  interest 
rate. 
To  use  the  t-test,  the  average  rates  of  return  have  to 
be  normally  distributed.  Since  the  sample  sizes  are 
large  in  most  cases,  we  can  be  sure,  by  virtue  of  the 
central  limit  theorem,  that  the  average  rates  of 
return  are  normally  distributed  (Hoel(1971)). 
4.15  Summary 
This  chapter  reviewed  the  methodological  issues  and 
described  the  methodology  used  in  this  study. 
One  major  issue  that  needed  to  be  resolved  was  the 
choice  of  the  estimator  for  the  standard  deviation  of 
the  underlying  stock's  return.  Black  and  Scholes(1972) 
had  stressed  the  importance  of  using  an  accurate 
estimation  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying 
stock's  return  in  their  model.  The  standard  deviation 
of  the  underlying  stock's  return  is  difficult  to 
estimate.  A  particular  estimator  might  produce 
115 inaccurate  estimates  so  that  the  conclusion  of  the 
tests  may  be  sensitive  to  a  change  of  the  estimator  in 
the  trading  rule.  Hence,  if  there  is  no  reason  for 
rejecting  a  particular  estimator,  then  it  is  necessary 
to  include  that  estimator  in  the  tests. 
Three  estimators  (items  (b),  (i)  and  (m))  out  of  the 
list  of  thirteen  (see  Section  4.2)  will  be  tested  in 
this  study.  The  other  estimators  are  rejected  because 
1)  they  have  no  theoretical  foundation  (items  (d), 
(g),  (h),  (j)  and  (k))  or 
2).  the  available  empirical  evidence  showed  that  they 
are  inferior  to  one  of  the  three  estimators  that 
will  be  tested  in  this  study  (items  (a),  (c)  and 
(e))  or 
3)  the  estimates  cannot  be  observed  and  there  are  too 
few  observations  available  to  get  reliable 
estimates  (item  (f))  or 
4)  the  exact  prediction  rule  is  not  known  and  the 
judgement  of  an  individual  is  sometimes  important 
in  obtaining  the  estimates  (item  (1))  or 
5)  the  data  required  is  not  available  (transactions 
data  implied  standard  deviation). 
The  issue  of  what  to  include  in  the  denominator  (that 
is,  the  size  of  the  investment  in  the  hedge  or  spread) 
when  calculating  the  rate  of  return  from  hedging  or 
spreading  was  also  discussed.  It  was  argued  that  the 
116 investment  in  the  spread  or  hedge  should  be  equal  to 
the  amount  required  to  set  up  the  buy  leg  of  the 
spread  or  hedge. 
Four  types  of  tests  will  be  conducted  in  this  study  : 
the  ex  post  test,  the  ex  ante  test,  the  ex  ante  test 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  and  the  ex  post  test  with 
the  bid-ask  spread  cost.  Two  riskiess  strategies, 
spreading  and  hedging,  will  be  tested  and  daily 
rebalancing  of  spreads  and  hedges  will  be  carried  out 
to  maintain  the  positions  riskless.  Also,  in  order 
to  avoid  problems  caused  by  the  premature  exercise  of 
options,  all  in-the-money  options  with  non-zero 
probability  of  early  exercise  are  ignored  for  trading 
purposes. 
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125 5.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  describes  how  the  data  for  this  study  are 
obtained  from  DATASTREAM.  The  DATASTREAM  option 
pricing  model  is  described,  followed  by  a  discussion 
of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  obtaining  data 
from  this  source.  It  also  describes  the  calculation  of 
the  model  values,  hedge  ratios,  time  to  maturity,  and 
states  the  reasons  for  the  exclusion  of  certain 
options.  It  elaborates  on  DATASTREAM's  method  of 
imputing  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  the 
underlying  stock's  return  from  each  option,  and  shows 
how  this  implied  standard  deviation  is  combined  with  a 
historical  measure  to  estimate  the  stock's  volatility. 
5.2  DATASTREAM's  Option  Pricing  Model 
The  data  for  this  study  are  downloaded  from  DATASTREAM 
each  trading  day  after  the  close  of  the  market  at 
4.30pm  (Amsterdam  time). 
The  DATASTREAM  traded  options  service  uses  the  Black- 
Scholes  model  with  the  Merton  dividend  adjustment  to 
derive  model  values.  The  model  is  described  in 
Appendix  1. 
126 For  options  written  on  dividend-paying  stocks,  there 
is  a  non-zero  probability  of  early  exercise,  so  that 
the  American  ball  is  worth  more  than  the  European 
call.  Since  the  Black-Scholes  model  with  the  Merton 
dividend  adjustment  provides  the  value  for  an  European 
call,  this  undervaluation  needs  to  be  corrected. 
DATASTREAM  computes  the  European  model  values  with 
expiry  dates  corresponding  to  the  ex-dividend  dates  as 
well  as  the  contract  expiry  date.  The  maximum  of  these 
is  taken  as  the  model  value.  This  method  is  commonly 
referred  to  as  the  Pseudo-American  method. 
5.3  Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Obtaining  Data 
from  DATASTREPX 
The  advantage  of  obtaining  the  data  from  DATASTREAM  is 
that  DATASTREAM  receives  online  price  quotations  from 
the  EOE.  The  use  of  price  quotations  eliminates  the 
selection  bias  problem  identified  by  Phillips  and 
Smith(1980).  This  problem  arises  when  transactions 
prices  are  used  to  pick  out  say,  under-priced,  options 
and  an  ex  post  test  is  employed.  Phillips  and  Smith 
argued  that  a  rule  that  uses  transactions  prices  "will 
systematically  pick  out,  as  undervalued,  call  prices 
from  transactions  initiated  by  orders  to  sell" 
(p.  186).  This  is  because  options  are  assumed  to  be 
sold  at  the  bid  price,  which  is  at-the  lower  end  of 
the  bid-ask  spread  and  hence  is  more  likely  to  be 
127 picked  out  as  under-valued  when  it  is  compared  to  model 
prices.  But  the  trading  rule  will,  in  this  case, 
assume  that  these  under-valued  options  are  bought  at 
the  bid  price  since  this  the  transaction  price.  In  the 
zero  transactions  costs  case,  options  should  be  bought 
at  the  mid-market  price  instead  of  the  bid  price. 
Thus,  this  trading  rule  resulted  in  a  selection  bias 
equal,  on  average,  to  approximately  half  the  bid-ask 
spread. 
Using  bid  and  ask  quotations  also  permits  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  to  be  taken  into  account  explicitly.  If 
transaction  prices  are  used,  an  estimated  bid-ask 
spread  has  to  be  used. 
In  addition,  since  the  data  are  downloaded  each  trad- 
ing  day  after  the  close  of  the  market,  the  option  and 
stock  prices  downloaded  are  quotations  from  the  mar- 
ket-makers  and  the  'hoekman'  at  the  close  of  both 
markets  at  4.30pm  (Amsterdam  time).  Thus  there  is  no 
non-simultaneity  problem  with  respect  to  these  prices. 
The  problem  of  possible  non-simultaneity  of  closing 
stock  and  option  transactions  prices  was  noted  as 
early  as  1975  by  Galai(1975).  He  stated  that  "closing 
prices  do  not  always  reflect  a  synchronisation  of  the 
transactions  on  the  CBOE  and  the  NYSE"  (p.  20).  Book- 
staber(1981)  clearly  illustrated  this  problem.  The 
128 consequence  of  non-simultaneity  in  the  closing  prices 
is  that  any  observed  mis-pricing  of  the  option  may  be 
illusory  "(see  Chapter  One  Section  1.5).  The  option 
prices  downloaded  from  DATASTREAM  are  the  highest  bid 
and  lowest  ask  quotations  from  the  traders  on  the 
European  Options  Exchange.  The  stock  prices  are 
quotations  from  the  'hoekman'  on  the  Amsterdam  Stock 
Exchange.  Literally,  the  word  'hoekman'  means  'corner- 
man'.  In  the  old  days,  someone  would  stand  in  a 
'hoek',  or  corner,  of  the  exchange  and  quote  buy  and 
sell  prices  when  asked.  Nowadays,  the  'hoekman'  makes 
market  and  trade  for  his  own  account  but  he  does  not 
deal  with  the  public.  He  specialises  in  certain  stocks 
and  bonds.  For  each  stock  there  is  more  than  one 
'hoekman'  so  that  "the  result  is  that,  at  any  given 
moment,  there's  a  single  price  quotation  agreed  on  by 
the  competing  specialists,  rather  than  bid  and  offer 
prices"  (Adam  and  Peagam(1985)  p.  16). 
Although  there  are  advantages  in  using  online  price 
quotations,  there  are  disadvantages  too.  One 
disadvantage  is  that  market  makers  are  only  obliged, 
under  European  Options  Exchange  Trading  Rules  (see 
Chapter  Two  Section  2.3),  to  buy  (sell)  five  contracts 
at  the  quoted  bid  (ask)  price.  Beyond  five  contracts, 
the  prices  quoted  need  not  necessarily  apply.  Another 
disadvantage  is  that  it  is  very  time  consuming  to 
download  the  data.  The  data  had  to  be  downloaded  each 
129 and  every  trading  day.  It  is  unlike  archival  data, 
where  months  and  even  years  of  data  can  be  downloaded 
in  a  day.  Also,  the  data  for  any  day  can  be  'lost'  if 
it  is  not  collected  within  the  day.  This  can  happen 
when  there  are  technical  problems  either  at  Glasgow 
University  Computer  Centre,  at  DATASTREAM,  or  at  the 
European  Options  Exchange.  When  this  happens,  it 
creates  a  gap  in  the  data  sample  so  that  the  trading 
strategy  cannot  be  properly  tested;  options  cannot  be 
bought  or  sold  on  that  day  since  prices  are  not  down- 
loaded.  To  eliminate  this  gap  in  the  data,  data  col- 
lection  has  to  be  restarted  from  the  following  day. 
Thus,  the  actual  time  required  to  collect  say,  one 
months'  data,  is  usually  much  longer  than  one  month. 
5.4  Downloading  and  'Cleaning'  the  Data 
The  main  part  of  the  data  is  downloaded  using  two  of 
DATASTREAM's  programs  :  201C  and  201F.  The  name  of  the 
underlying  stock,  stock  price,.  maturity  date,  exercise 
price,  bid  price,  ask  price  and  implied  standard 
deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's  return  are 
downloaded  using  program  201F;  the  model  price,  the 
hedge  ratio  and  the  dividends  forecasts  are  downloaded 
using  program  201C. 
The  problem  with  downloading  data  in  this  manner  is 
130 that  the  data  are  downloaded  together  with  other 
unwanted  data  in  the  formats  shown  in  figure  5-1  (for 
201C)  and  figure  5-2  (for  201F).  These  formats  are 
screen  images  that  are  generated  by  the  programs. 
These  data,  therefore,  had  to  be  'cleaned  up';  that 
is,  the  relevant  data  had  to  be  extracted  from  these 
formats  and  arranged  in  a  form  suitable  for  further 
processing. 
5.5  Calculation  of  Model  Values  and  Hedge  Ratios 
The  model  price  and  hedge  ratio  downloaded  from 
DATASTREAM  are  calculated  using  DATASTREAM's  estimator 
of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's 
return.  As  two  other  estimators  of  the  standard 
deviation  are  to  be  tested  in  this  study,  model  prices 
and  hedge  ratios  have  to  be  re-calculated  with  each  of 
these  estimators  as  input.  In  order  to  program  the 
calculations  of  these  model  prices  and  hedge  ratios, 
an  approximation  to  the  cumulative  standard  normal 
distribution  function  is  used.  This  study  uses  the 
following  approximate  integral  from  Stuart  and 
Ord(1987)  (p.  502)  : 
X1 
(V25-1t)  e-05t  dt  <  ý(1 
-e 
(-2  Xz  /T-)  ) 
By  taking  the  equality,  the  error  has  been  shown  to  be 
less  than  0.75  per  cent. 
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To  facilitate  the  calculation  of  the  time  to  maturity, 
the  maturity  dates,  ex  dividend  dates  and  current  date 
are  expressed  as  Julian  dates,  that  is,  the  dates  are 
expressed  as  day  1  for  1  January  1988,  day  2  for  2 
January  1988,  day  366  for  31  December  1988,  day  367 
for  1  January  1989  and  so  on.  With  this  expression, 
the  time  to  maturity  (expressed  as  a  proportion  of  a 
year)  is  simply  the  difference  between  the  maturity 
date  (or  the  ex  dividend  date)  and  the  current  date 
divided  by  366.  The  Julian  dates  are  obtained  from  a 
date  conversion  table  in  Cleeton(1979).  The  table  is 
shown  in  figure  5-3. 
5.7  DATASTREAM's  Estimator  of  the  Standard  Deviation 
of  a  Stock's  Return 
DATASTREAM  estimated  the  standard  deviation  of  a  stock 
in  the  following  way  : 
"(a)  an  historical  measure  of  volatility  (standard 
deviation  of  logged  prices)  is  calculated  for 
each  maturity  using  the  same  duration  of  past 
observation  as  the  period  to  be  forecast,  i.  e.  6 
months  daily  prices  for  a6  months  expiry  date. 
132 (b)  the  market  implied  volatility  for  each  expiry  is 
determined  by  calculating  implied  volatility  for 
each  series  in  the  expiry  month  and  weighting  by 
the  last  5  days'  trading  activity. 
(c)  the  final  volatility  forecast  is  an  average  of  the 
previous  two  estimates. 
The  result  is  a  per  expiry  volatility  forecast  which 
reflects  not  just  an  historical  perspective,  but 
incorporates  the  market's  anticipation  of  future 
volatility.  The  volatilities  are  always  expressed  on 
an  annual  basis  and  are  recalculated  weekly.  " 
(DATASTREAM  Traded  Options  Services  User  Manual  p.  34). 
The  market  implied  volatility  is  the  volatility 
currently  accorded  to  the  stock  by  the  market.  It  is 
obtained  by  equating  the  model  price  of  the  option  to 
its  market  price.  However,  there  are  two  market 
prices,  the  bid  price  and  the  ask  price.  DATASTREAM 
equates  the  model  price  to  the  mid-market  price,  that 
is,  the  average  of  the  bid  and  ask  prices  (confirmed 
through  telephone  conservation  with  DATASTREAM  staff). 
Kerruish(1984)  referred  to  this  as  the  'MID'  method. 
It  is  also  possible  to  impute  two  implied  standard 
deviations  for  each  series  by  equating  the  model  value 
to  the  bid  and  to  the  ask  market  prices.  Kerruish 
referred  to  this  as  the  'B+O'  method.  In  her  test,  she 
133 found  it  "very  difficult  to  discern  which  of  the  bid- 
offer  spread  adaptions  is  more  suitable,  (B+O  or  MID), 
although  casual  observation  suggests  the  MID  model" 
(p.  30).  Furthermore,  she  concluded  that  "an  adjustment 
was  needed  to  account  for  the  bid-ask  spread;  with  the 
'MID'  adjustment  model  recommended"  (p.  40).  In  view  of 
this,  DATASTREAM's  implied  standard  deviation  will  be 
used  and  no  attempts  will  be  made  to  re-calculate  the 
implied  standard  deviations  using  the  'B+O'  method. 
DATASTREAM  uses  the  Pseudo-American  Black-Scholes 
model  to  compute  the  model  values  of  options.  This 
results  in  a  slight  complication  because  with  the 
Pseudo-American  model,  there  may  be  a  few  model 
values,  depending  on  the  number  of  dividends  that  will 
be  paid  during  the  option's  remaining  life.  Each  of 
these  model  values  will  generate  an  implied  standard 
deviation  when  equated  to  the  market  price.  Which  of 
these  implied  standard  deviations  should  be  chosen? 
The  Pseudo-American  method  selects  the  largest  of  all 
possible  model  values  as  the  model  value.  The  problem 
is  that  the  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return 
is  not  known  and  therefore  we  would  not  know  which  of 
the  possible  model  values  is  largest.  However,  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  largest  model  value  is  the  one  that 
generates  the  smallest  implied  standard  deviation,  and 
134 hence  the  implied  standard  deviation  consistent  with 
the  Pseudo-American  method  is  the  smallest  of  all  the 
implied  standard  deviations  generated  .  To  see  why 
this  is  so,  assume  that  there  is  only  one  dividend 
payment  throughout  the  life  of  the  option.  Hence  two 
ISDs  will  be  calculated  : 
1)  The  option  is  assumed  to  be  held  to  maturity  so 
that 
ISD1  =  f(C*,  Se-DT,  r,  X,  T)  where  C*  is  the  actual 
market  price  of  the  option. 
2)  The  option  is  assumed  to  be  exercised  on  the  day 
before  the  ex-dividend  day  so  that 
ISD2  =  f(C*,  S,  r,  X,  Tl)  where  T1  is  the  time  period 
from  the  current  day  to  the  day  before  the  ex- 
dividend  day. 
If  ISDl  <  ISD2  then 
C(ISD2,  Se-DT,  r,  X,  T)  >  C(ISD1,  Se-DT,  r,  X,  T)  =C 
Hence  ISD2  cannot  be  the  'true'  ISD  if  the  standard 
deviation  is  to  be  stationary  over  the  entire  period 
T. 
If  ISD2  <  ISD1  then 
C(ISD1,  S,  r,  X,  T1)  >  C(ISD2,  S,  r,  X,  T1)  =  C*. 
Hence  ISD1  cannot  be  the  'true'  ISD. 
135 Thus  the  appropriate  ISD  is  the  smallest  of  the  ISD 
values  obtained  by  equating  the  market  price  of  the 
call  to  each  of  the  Pseudo-American  values.  This  proof 
is  adapted  from  Beckers(1981). 
5.8  Risk-free  Rate  of  Interest 
The  estimate  of  the  risk-free  interest  rate  used  is 
the  Eurocurrency  rates  of  the  Netherland  guilder  in 
the  London  money  market.  Borrowing  and  lending  rates 
for  short  maturity  (i.  e.  two  days),  seven  days,  one 
month,  three  months,  six  months  and  one  year 
maturities  are  available  from  DATASTREAM  program  28V. 
A  sample  of  the  output  is  shown  in  figure  5-4.  These 
interest  rates  do  not  vary  very  substantially  during 
each  of  the  periods  under  study.  In  the  first  sample 
period  (16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988),  the 
lowest  mid-market  rate  for  the  seven-day  maturity  is  5 
percent  and  the  highest  mid-market  rate  for  the  one- 
year  maturity  is  6.031  percent.  The  average  mid- 
market  rate  for  the  three-month  maturity  is  5.534 
percent.  Thus  the  maximum  error  that  can  result  from 
using  the  average  mid-market  rate  for  the  three-month 
maturity  is  about  0.5  percent.  In  the  second  sample 
period  (4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988),  the 
lowest  mid-market  rate  for  the  seven-day  maturity  is 
5.063  per  cent  and  the  highest  mid-market  rate  for  the 
one-year  maturity  is  5.813  per  cent.  The  average  mid- 
136 market  rate  for  the  three-month  maturity  is  5.377  per 
cent-.;  Thus,  the  maximum  error  that  can  result  from 
using  the  average  mid-market  rate  of  the  three-month 
maturity  is  less  than  0.5  per  cent.  Therefore,  in 
each  sample  period,  the  average  of  the  mid-market  rate 
for  three-month  maturity  during  the  period  is  used. 
This  average  rate  can  be  expected  to  be  higher  than 
the  risk-free  interest  rate  as  it  is  the  average  of 
commercial  borrowing  and  lending  rates  .  However,  the 
results  are  not  expected  to  be  sensitive  to  this 
approximation.  Galai  (1977)  had  shown  that  the  use  of 
various  estimates  of  the  risk-free  interest  rate,  such 
as  8  per  cent  and  10  per  cent  as  approximations  to  the 
average  Treasury  bills  rates  and  commercial  paper 
rates  respectively,  made  no  qualitative  difference  to 
his  results.  He  concluded  that  "the  results  are  robust 
to  changes  in  parameters"  (including  the  risk-free 
interest  rate)  (p.  195).  Also,  Black(1975)  noted  that 
"a  one  percentage  point  change  in  the  interest  rate 
does  not  generally  have  much  effect  on  the  value  of  an 
option"  (p.  41). 
5.9  Sample  Periods 
This  study  covers  two  separate  time  periods 
1.16  August  1988  -  27  September  1988 
2.4  November  1988  -  15  December  1988 
137 These  time  periods  are  chosen  arbitrarily.  Two 
different  time  periods  are  used  in  order  to  determine 
whether  any  efficiency  (or  inefficiency)  is  to  some 
extent  persistent  over  time.  Keane(1983)  argued  that 
to  have  operational  significance  an  inefficiency  must 
be  exploitable  and  to  be  exploitable  it  should  satisfy 
four  criteria.  One  of  these  criteria  is  persistence, 
on  the  basis  that  "it  is  not  sufficient  that  an 
inefficiency  be  shown  to  have  existed  in  the  past,  if 
there  are  no  grounds  for  believing  that  it  will 
continue  to  exist  in  the  future.  Hence,  even  when  a 
material  inefficiency  has  been  identified  and 
authenticated,  one  must  be  reasonably  satisfied  that 
the  market  will  not  learn  from  the  experience"  (p.  24- 
25).  Of  course,  it  can  never  be  known  with  certainty 
whether  the  market  will  be  efficient  or  inefficient  in 
the  future.  However,  by  testing  two  different  time 
periods,  it  is  hoped  that  the  validity  of  the  findings 
will  be  somewhat  enhanced  if  any  efficiency  or 
inefficiency  is  found  to  be  persistent  over  both 
periods.  Finding  that  the  market  is  efficient  or 
inefficient  in  both  periods  makes  it  possible  to 
believe  with  a  greater  degree  of  confidence  that  the 
market  is  likely  to  continue  to  be  efficient  or 
inefficient  in  the  future  than  if  only  one  period  is 
tested,  or  if  the  efficiency  or  inefficiency  does  not 
138 persist  over  both  periods.  If  it  is  found  that  the 
market  is  inefficient  in  one  sample  period,  but  not 
the  other,  then  it  is  difficult  to  say  with  much 
confidence  whether  the  inefficiency  will  continue  to 
exist  in  the  future.  Furthermore,  it  might  be  argued 
that  with  the  available  evidence  the  inefficiency 
observed  is  not  exploitable  since  it  did  not  satisfy 
the  criterion  of  persistence.  In  addition,  if  the 
market  is  inefficient  in  some  time  periods  only,  the 
inefficiencies  are  not  exploitable  if  there  is  no  way 
of  knowing  in  advance  in  which  time  periods  the  market 
will  be  inefficient  and  in  which  it  will  be  efficient. 
In  both  sample  periods,  the  data  consists  of  options 
written  on  nineteen  stocks.  In  the  second  sample 
period  there  are  options  written  on  twenty  one  stocks, 
but  data  on  options  written  on  two  stocks,  Van  Ommeren 
Ceteco  and  Wessanen,  are  ignored  since  data  on  these 
stocks  are  not  available  in  the  first  sample  period. 
It  would  therefore  not  be  possible  to  test  for 
persistence  of  efficiency  or  inefficiency  over  two 
sample  periods  even  if  data  on  these  stocks  are 
collected  in  the  second  sample  period.  A  list  of  all 
the  stocks  and  stock  codes  is  given  in  Table  5-1  . 
5.10  Exclusion  of  Certain  Options 
Options  with  bid  prices  equal  to  zero  are  meaningless, 
139 and  not  traded  since  they  have  to  be  'sold'  to  market- 
makers  free.  Options  with  model  prices  less.  than  DF1 
0.1  will  be  over-priced  if  compared  to  options  with 
bid  prices  of  greater  than  DF1  0.1.  However,  as  ask 
prices  cannot  fall  below  DF1  0.1,  if  these  options  are 
written,  they  can  only  be  bought  at  DF1  0.1  or  more, 
guaranteeing  a  loss.  Both  of  these  classes  of  options 
are  eliminated  from  the  study,  together  with  options 
that  are  in-the-money  and  do  not  satisfy  the  Jarrow 
and  Rudd(1983)  conditions  for  no  early  exercise. 
Also,  options  with  hedge  ratios  equal  to  zero  at  any 
time  during  the  spread  or  hedge  holding  period  are 
eliminated.  In  this  study  spreads  are  set  up  by  buying 
one  contract  of  the  under-priced  option  j  and  writing 
N(dlj)/N(dlk)  of  the  over-priced  option  k,  where 
N(d1j)  and  N(dlk)  are  the  hedge  ratios  of  the  options 
j  and  k  respectively.  Thus,  it  is  obvious  that  a  hedge 
ratio  of  zero  is  problematical  because  it  requires 
either  zero  or  an  infinite  number  of  contracts  of  the 
over-priced  option  to  be  written.  A  similar  problem 
arises  in  the  case  of  hedging.  Thus,  options  with 
hedge  ratios  equal  to  zero  at  any  time  during  the 
hedge  or  spread  holding  period  must  be  eliminated. 
In  addition,  options  with  three,  four  and  five  years 
maturity  are  also  excluded  from  this  study  since  it  is 
140 difficult  to  obtain  an  accurate  forecast  of  the 
stock's  volatility  over  such  a  long  period. 
141 1.  ABN  Algemene  Bank  Nederland 
2.  AEGN  AEGON 
3.  AH  Albert  Heijn 
4.  AKZO  AKZO 
5.  AMEV  AMEV 
6.  AMRO  Amsterdam  Rotterdam  Bank 
7.  BUHR  Buhrmann-Tetterode 
8.  ELS  Elsevier 
9.  GB  Gist  Brocades 
10.  HB  Heineken 
11.  HO  Hoogovens 
12.  KLM  Koninklijke  Luchtvaart  Mij 
13.  KNP  Koninklijke  Nedlloyd  Paperfebriek 
14.  NED  Nedlloyd  Groep 
15.  NN  Nationale  Nederlanden 
16.  PHIL  Philips 
17.  RBC  Robeco 
18.  RD  Koninklijke  Olie  (Royal  Dutch  Petroleum) 
19.  UNIL  Unilever 
Table  5-1  :  List  of  Stocks  and  Stock  Codes 
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144 B  Number  of  Days 
Between  Dates 
The  number  of  days  an  option  has  to.  go  to  expiration  may  be  found 
from  the  following  table  by  subtracting  the  day  number  for  the  present 
date  from  that  for  the  expiration  date.  If  the  expiration  date  is  beyond 
the  end  of  the  current  year,  first  add  365  to  the  day  number  of  the 
expiration  date.  ".  4  --  "'t' 
Day  Number  for  Each  Day  of  the  Year 
Day 
of 
dto.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  Jun.  Jul.  Aug.  Sep.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec 
Day 
of 
Mo. 
1  1  32  60  91  121  152  182  213  244  274  305  335  1 
2  2  33  61  92  122  153  183  214  245  275  306  336  2 
:1  3  34  62  93  123  154  184  215  246  276  307  337-  3 
4  4  35  63  94  124  155  j85  216  247  277  fi08  338-  4 
5  5  36  64  95  125  156  186  217  248  278  309-  339  5 
li  I.  37  65  96  1211  157  187  218  249  279  310-  340  6 
i  7  38  66  97  127  158  186  219  250  280  311  341  7 
ft  8  39  67  96  128  159  189  220  251  281  312  342  8 
9  9  40  68  99  129  160  190  221  252  282  313  343  9 
10  10  41  69  100  130  161  191  222  253  283  314  344'"'  10 
11  11  42  70  101  131  162  192  223  254  284  315  345-  11 
12  12  43  71  102  132  163  193  224  255  285  316-  346  12 
13  13  44  72  103  133  21.4  194  225  256  286  317-  347  23 
14  14  45  73  104  134  165  19S  226  257  287  318  348  14 
1S  15  4G  74  105  135  11.6  196  227  258  288  319  34,  ßj  15 
16  16  47  75  106  136  167  197  228  259  289  320  350  1G 
17  17  48  76  107  137  168  198  229  260  290  321  351  17 
18  18  49  77  108  138  1G9  199  230  261  291  322  352  18 
19  19  50  78  109  139  170  200  231  262  292  323-  353  19 
20  20  51  79  110  140  171  201  232  2G3  293  324-  354  20 
21  21  52  80  111  141  172  202  233  26.1  294  325  355  21 
22  22  53  81  112  142  173  203  234  265  295  326  356  22 
2:  1  23  54  82  113  143  174  204  "  235  266  296  327  357  23 
24  24  55  83  114  144  175  205  236  267  297  328  358  24 
25  25  56  84  115  145  176  206  237  268  298  329  359  25 
26  2G  57  85  IIG  14fi  177  207  238  209  299  330-  360  26 
27  27  56  86  117  147  1:  8  20H  239  270  300  331-  361  27 
28  28  59  87  118  148  179  209  240  271  301  332  362  28 
29  29  88  119  149  180  210  241  272  302  333  363  29 
30  311  89  120  150  281  211  242  273  303  334  364  30 
31  31  90  151  212  243  304  365  31 
Add  7  to  the  numbers  after  this  date  if  a  leap  year. 
157 
Source  :  Cleeton,  C.  E.  "Strategies  for. 
the  Options  Trader",  John  Wiley 
&  Sons,  Inc.,  1979  p157 
Figure  5-3  :  Julian  Dates  Calendar 
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151 6.1  Introduction 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  efficiency  of  the  stock  options  market  of  the 
European  Options  Exchange.  Efficiency  has  been  defined 
as  the  inability  of  any  trader  to  consistently  earn 
above-normal  average  rates  of  return  after 
transactions  costs.  Following  from  this  definition  and 
the  fact  that  riskless  spreading  and  hedging  are 
used  in  this  study,  the  null  hypothesis  to  be  tested 
is  Ho  :u=  rf  and  the  alternative  hypothesis  is  H1 
u>  rf,  where  u  is  the  average  rate  of  return  from 
spreading  or  hedging  and  rf  is  the  estimated  risk-free 
interest  rate.  If  the  market  is  efficient,  then  Ho 
cannot  be  rejected. 
The  results  of  the  spreading  and  hedging  tests  of  the 
null  hypothesis  are  presented  in  the  tables  in  this 
chapter  and  in  Appendix  2.  The  number  of  spreads, 
average  rate  of  return  and  the  t-statistic  for  each 
class  of  options,  and  for  the  whole  sample,  are  given 
in  each  table. 
Two  sample  periods  are  tested  in  this  study.  The  first 
sample  period  is  from  16  August  1988  to  27  September 
1988  and  the  second  sample  period  is  from  4  November 
1988  to  15  December  1988.  Hereinafter,  these  sample 
152 periods  will  be  referred  to  as  Period  1  and  Period  2 
respectively. 
6.2  Spreading  Tests 
The  spreading  tests  in  this  study  combine  options  of 
different  series  but  of  the  same  class,  where  the 
under-priced  option  is  bought  and  the  over-priced 
option  is  written.  Initially,  one  contract  of  the 
under-priced  option  is  bought  and  an  appropriate 
number  of  contracts  of  the  over-priced  option  is 
written  in  order  to  form  a  riskless  position.  The 
number  of  contracts  of  the  over-priced  option  written 
is  determined  by  the  hedge  ratios  of  the  options  in 
the  spread.  The  spread  is  then  held  until  the  price  of 
one  or  both  legs  return  to  its  model  value,  the  mis- 
pricing  of  at  least  one  leg  is  reversed,  or  until  the 
end  of  the  sample  period.  The  spread  is  then 
liquidated.  In  the  case  where  only  one  leg's  mis- 
pricing  has  reversed,  only  that  leg  will  be  liquidated 
if-the  remaining  leg  can  be  matched  with  another  mis- 
priced  option  to  form  another  spread.  To  maintain  a 
riskless  position,  the  spreads  are  rebalanced  every 
day  throughout  the  holding  period. 
153 6.3  Results  of  Spreading  Tests  with  DSISD 
The  results  of  the  spreading  tests  conducted  with  data 
for  Period.  1  are  reported  in  Tables  6-1,6-2,6-3  and 
6-4.  The  data  consists  of  options  written  on  nineteen 
stocks  with  432  series.  There  are  seven  stocks  with 
forecasted  ex-dividend  dates  falling  within  the  sample 
period.  For  these  stocks,  all  in-the-money  series  that 
do  not  satisfy  the  Jarrow  and  Rudd(1983)  conditions 
are  excluded  from  trading.  With  this  exclusion,  388 
series  remained. 
Table  6-1  gives  the  result  of  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  test.  This  test  assumed  that 
mispricings  detected  on  day  t  can  be  exploited  on  day 
t  itself.  For  all  options  taken  as  a  whole  and  for 
each  individual  class  of  options  (with  the  exception 
of  NN),  the  average  rates  of  return  from  spreading 
are  significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  at  the  five  percent  level  of  significance.  The 
spreading  strategy  is  obviously  very  profitable.  The 
inference  is  that  the  trading  rule  demonstrated  its 
ability,  on  average,  to  identify  over-priced  and 
under-priced  options.  However,  this  result  should  not 
be  used  to  assess  the  efficiency  of  the  market.  In 
this  study,  efficiency  has  been  defined  as  the 
inability  of  any  trader  to  consistently  generate 
above-normal  average  rates  of  return  after 
154 transactions  costs.  A  trader  who  detects  mis-priced 
options  on  day  t  may  not  be  able  to  exploit  the  mis- 
pricing  by  buying  (writing)  the  options  immediately. 
This  is  especially  so  for  a  non-member,  or  a  member  of 
the  exchange  who  is  not  permitted  to  trade  on  the 
floor  of  the  exchange.  Neither  can  the  trader  expect 
to  execute  the  spread  on  day  t+l  using  the  prices  he 
observed  on  day  t.  It  is  possible  that  on  day  t+l 
prices  have  moved  against  him  so  that  the  expected 
return  observed  on  day  t  can  no  longer  be  earned.  A 
member  trader  who  is  permitted  to  trade  on  the  floor 
of  the  exchange  may  be  able  to  exploit  the  mis-priced 
situation  almost  immediately.  However,  the  ex  post 
test  results  in  Table  6-1  have  not  taken  into  account 
transactions  costs.  Thus,  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  profits  are  not  profits  that  a 
trader  would  be  able  to  make  in  practice. 
To  determine  whether  significant  returns  can  actually 
be  made  by  traders  who  are  not  permitted  to  trade  on 
the  floor  of  the  exchange,  it  may  be  necessary  to  lag 
the  execution  of  the  spread  by  some  period  of  time.  As 
daily  data  is  used,  the  minimum  lag  is  one  day.  Hence, 
an  ex  ante  test  with  a  one  day  lag  between  the 
formation  of  the  strategy  and  its  implementation  is 
carried  out.  Table  6-2  gives  the  results  of  the  ex 
ante  test,  ignoring  transactions  costs.  The  one-day 
155 lag  in  the  execution  of  the  spreads  has  reduced  the 
profitability  for  all  options  as  a  whole,  and  for  18 
out  of  19  classes  of  options.  The  exception  is 
PHIL.  For  all  options  taken  as  a  whole,  the  average 
rate  of  return  is  not  significantly  greater  than  the 
risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five  percent  level.  In 
six  classes  the  one  day  delay  has  turned  the 
significant  positive  returns  into  losses.  It  would 
seem  that  in  most  cases  prices  converge  fairly  quickly 
to  their  model  values,  so  that  many  profit 
opportunities  disappear  within  a  day. 
Since  the  average  rate  of  return  for  all  options 
as  a  whole  is  not  significantly  greater  than  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate,  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency 
cannot  be  rejected  at  the  zero  transactions  costs 
level.  Thus,  further  investigation  of  the  hypothesis 
at  the  after  transactions  costs  level  is  redundant; 
the  latter  is  necessary  only  when  there  is  a 
significant  average  rate  of  return  on  a  zero 
transactions  costs  basis.  However,  six  classes  of 
options  have  average  rates  of  return  that  are 
significantly  different  from  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  at  the  five  percent  level.  These  are  significant 
returns  from  the  ex  ante  zero  transactions  costs  test. 
Hence  the  market  still  cannot  be  claimed  to  be 
inefficient.  The  market  can  be  said  to  be  inefficient 
only  if  the  profits  can  actually  be  exploited. 
156 Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  determine  whether  these 
significant  returns  persist  when  transactions  costs 
are  taken  into  account.  One  component  of  transactions 
costs,  the  bid-ask  spread,  is  taken  into  account  in 
the  ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost,  which 
be 
has  toAconducted  for  these  six  stocks.  The  results  are 
presented  in  Table  6-3,  where  the  results  for  all 
other  stocks  are  included  in  order  to  maintain  the 
same  format  for  all  the  tables. 
Table  6-3  shows  the  results  of  the  ex  ante  test 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost.  The  criterion  for 
selecting  over-  and  under-priced  options  in  the 
presence  of  bid  and  ask  prices  has  been  described  in 
Chapter  Four  Section  4.5.  The  application  of  this 
criterion  reduces  the  number  of  spreads  from  the  ex 
ante  zero  transactions  costs  figure  of  14657 
(Table  6-2)  to  2066,  an  approximately  86  per  cent 
decrease.  Quite  obviously,  a  large  proportion  of  the 
observed  deviations  of  actual  prices  from  model  prices 
occurs  within  the  bounds  set  by  the  bid  and  ask 
prices. 
The  result  of  this  ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask 
spread  costs  shows  that  all  classes  of  options  have 
negative  average  rates  of  return.  The  bid-ask  spread 
is  sufficiently  large  to  ensure  that,  on  average,  no 
positive  rates  of  return  are  possible.  This  is 
157 certainly  the  position  facing  traders  who  are  not 
permitted  to.  trade  on  the  floor  of  the  exchange. 
Thus,  with  respect  to  the  trading  rule  used  and  the 
sample  period  studied,  the  null  hypothesis  of 
efficiency  cannot  be  rejected.  The  market  seems 
efficient  to  these  traders. 
It  would  be  of  interest  to  look  at  the  position  of  the 
less  constrained  traders,  that  is,  those  who  are 
permitted  to  trade  on  the  floor  of  the  exchange  and 
who  may  be  able  to  trade  almost  immediately  upon 
observing  a  mis-priced  situation.  This  is  done  through 
the  ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost. 
As  discussed  in  Chapter  Four  Section  4.3,  a  lag  of  one 
day  in  the  ex  ante  test  may  be  too  long  in  the  case  of 
floor  traders  who  may  be  able  to  observe  a  mis-pricing 
and  trade  within  a  matter  of  minutes.  To  approximate 
this  case  more  closely,  an  ex  post  test  with  the  bid- 
ask  spread  cost  is  conducted.  The  results  of  this  test 
are  given  in  Table  6-4.  The  application  of  the 
criterion  for  selecting  over-priced  and  under-priced 
options  in  the  presence  of  bid  and  ask  prices  again 
greatly  reduces  the  number  of  spreads  from  the  ex  post 
zero  transactions  costs  figure  of  15424  (Table  6-1)  to 
2129,  an  approximately  86  per  cent  decrease.  The  bid- 
158 ask  spread  has  also  eliminated  all  the  significant 
returns  obtained  in  the  zero  transactions  costs  case; 
all  average  rates  of  return  are  negative.  Thus,  no 
significant  average  rates  of  return  can  be  earned  when 
the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  taken  into  account.  This  is 
so  even  when  it  is  assumed  that  a  trader  can  transact 
immediately  upon  observing  a  mis-priced  situation. 
All  average  rates  of  return  in  Table  6-4  (except  AH 
and  AMEV)  are  higher  (less  negative)  than  the  average 
rates  of  return  in  Table  6-3.  Again,  this  demonstrates 
that,  on  average,  the  one-day  lag  in  the  ex  ante  test 
reduces  the  profitability  of  the  trading  rule,  an 
observation  that  is  also  evident  from  comparing  the 
average  rates  of  return  in  Table  6-1  and  Table  6-2. 
These  results  indicate  that  with  respect  to  this 
trading  rule  and  the  first  sample  period,  the  market 
is  efficient  in  the  sense  that  there  are  no 
opportunities  for  earning  above-normal  average  rates 
of  returns  after  transactions  costs.  It  is  efficient 
not  only  to  the  trader  who  is  not  permitted  to  trade 
on  the  floor  of  the  exchange  (and  is  assumed  to  face  a 
one  day  delay  in  transacting  when  a  mis-priced 
situation  is  observed),  but  also  to  the  less 
constrained  trader  who  is  permitted  to  trade  on  the 
floor  of  the  exchange  (and  is  assumed  to  be  able  to 
trade  immediately  upon  observing  a  mis-priced 
159 situation). 
160 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  15424  4.209  27.33* 
ABN  154  4.778  2.94* 
AEGN  243  3.329  2.36* 
AH  461  5.914  7.81* 
AKZO  1888  3.488  9.25* 
AMEV  248  14.816  8.59* 
AMRO  1095  7.293  11.88* 
BUHR  841  4.919  5.76* 
ELS  759  3.714  7.22* 
GB  1087  7.172  10.56* 
HB  551  9.079  7.53* 
HO  2215  1.133  2.92* 
KLM  677  4.388  5.22* 
KNP  2039  2.090  5.61* 
NED  1084  5.980  13.56* 
NN  146  0.007  -0.02 
PHIL  639  2.880  4.83* 
RBC  428  5.948  5.64* 
RD  324  1.734  2.22* 
UNIL  545  2.706  4.54* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-1  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
161 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  14657  -0.230  -1.84 
ABN  142  3.666  1.93* 
AEGN  209  0.944  1.01 
AH  423  0.587  0.95 
AKZO  1807  -1.003  -2.99 
AMEV  223  14.811  6.57* 
AMRO  1015  3.784  6.25* 
BUHR  821  -1.124  -1.73 
ELS  728  -1.246  -1.80 
GB  1053  0.049  -0.01 
HB  515  1.523  1.09 
HO  2080  -2.774  -7.39 
KLM  677  1.447  1.54 
KNP  1963  -4.349  -12.34 
NED  1036  -0.350  -0.77 
NN  146  -1.886  -1.12 
PHIL  589  4.891  7.94* 
RBC  403  1.583  2.15* 
RD  306  1.499  1.47 
UNIL  521  2.516  3.82* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-2  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
1  162 Option  code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2066  -11.661  -24.72 
ABN  44  -30.425  -5.64 
AEGN  36  -6.906  -5.77 
AH  123  -6.903  -8.67 
AKZO  207  -7.316  -4.83 
AMEV  44  -8.137  -9.41 
AMRO  117  -6.724  -11.65 
BUHR  101  -14.784  -8.61 
ELS  106  -6.426  -8.13 
GB  91  -9.957  -7.03 
HB  137  -12.869  -9.04 
HO  188  -5.976  -8.03 
KLM  67  -5.078  -4.94 
KNP  138  -4.642  -7.65 
NED  209  -29.190  -18.69 
NN  37  -15.410  -3.35 
PHIL  60  -15.055  -4.45 
RBC  90  -14.536  -7.31 
RD  166  -14.022  -4.06 
UNIL  105  -7.985  -8.25 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-3  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
1  163 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2129  -9.400  -23.76 
ABN  46  -25.530  -5.38 
AEGN  42  -6.558  -6.85 
AH  133  -9.210  -7.77 
AKZO  208  -5.442  -5.03 
AMEV  47  -9.392  -8.56 
AMRO  125  -6.015  -7.56 
BUHR  101  -11.024  -10.37 
ELS  107  -5.650  -7.48 
GB  91  -5.101  -4.89 
HB  154  -11.731  -10.88 
HO  188  -4.439  -8.26 
KLM  67  -4.342  -6.84 
KNP  147  -3.856  -7.37 
NED  209  -22.020  -17.40 
NN  37  -14.130  -3.71 
PHIL  60  -9.167  -3.97 
RBC  90  -11.584  -7.77 
RD  166  -12.060  -3.74 
UNIL  111  -5.506  -3.89 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-4  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
164 The  results  of  the  spreading  tests  conducted  with  data 
for  Period  2  are  reported  in  Tables  6-5,6-6,6-7  and 
6-8.  The  data  consist  of  options  written  on  nineteen 
stocks  with  401  series.  There  is  only  one  stock  (UNIL) 
with  a  forecasted  ex-dividend  date  falling  within  the 
test  period.  For  this  stock,  all  in-the-money  series 
that  do  not  satisfy  the  Jarrow  and  Rudd(1983)  condi- 
tions  are  excluded  from  trading.  With  this  exclusion, 
398  series  remained. 
Table  6-5  gives  the  results  of  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  test.  The  results  are  similar  to 
those  of  the  first  sample  period  reported  in  Table  6-1 
All  average  rates  of  return  are  significantly 
greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five 
percent  level.  The  spreading  strategy  again 
demonstrated  its  ability,  on  average,  to  identify 
over-priced  and  under-priced  options. 
Table  6-6  gives  the  results  of  the  ex  ante  test 
ignoring  transactions  costs.  The  results  are  similar 
to  those  of  the  first  sample  period  presented  in  Table 
6-2  in  that,  compared  to  the  ex  post  test, 
profitability  has  been  reduced  for  all  options  as  a 
whole,  and  for  all  nineteen  classes  of  options. 
However,  in  contrast  to  the  previous  period's  result, 
the  average  rate  of  return  for  the  whole  sample  is 
165 significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate 
at  the  five  per  cent  level.  Also,  six  classes  of 
options  have  average  rates  of  return  significantly 
greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five 
per  cent  level. 
Table  6-7  gives  the  result  of  the  ex  ante  test  with 
the  bid-ask  spread  costs.  Again,  the  application  of 
the  criterion  for  selecting  over-  and  under-priced 
options  in  the  presence  of  bid  and  ask  prices  reduces 
the  number  of  spreads  from  the  ex  ante  zero 
transactions  costs  figure  of  15480  (Table  6-6)  to 
2033,  an  approximately  87  per  cent  decrease.  The 
results  of  this  test  show  that  for  the  whole  sample 
and  for  all  classes  of  options,  the  average  rates  of 
return  are  negative. 
Table  6-8  shows  the  results  of  the  ex  post  test  with 
the  bid-ask  spread  cost.  The  average  rates  of  return 
for  the  whole  sample  and  for  individual  classes  are 
negative.  Again,  a  large  proportion  of  the  mispricings 
lie  within  the  bid-ask  spread  :  the  number  of  spreads 
set  up  is  about  87  per  cent  less  than  that  of  the  ex 
post  zero  transactions  costs  test. 
166 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  16057  9.530  39.16* 
ABN  542  5.910  8.29* 
AEGN  957  8.153  7.68* 
AH  781  6.908  9.10* 
AKZO  1378  3.678  7.88* 
AMEV  805  15.156  15.96* 
AMRO  753  8.537  17.03* 
BUHR  698  8.980  10.28* 
ELS  871  4.464  6.43* 
GB  1050  12.935  18.22* 
HB  550  5.790  11.68* 
HO  1763  6.924  9.73* 
KLM  830  15.610  8.64* 
KNP  1609  21.501  15.82* 
NED  866  5.861  6.37* 
NN  705  6.848  6.12* 
PHIL  430  5.788  5.34* 
RBC  440  11.278  9.51* 
RD  671  12.502  13.20* 
UNIL  358  1.400  1.86* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-5  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
167 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  15480  0.533  2.07* 
ABN  535  -1.613  -2.55 
AEGN  909  3.781  3.56* 
AH  776  6.543  7.18* 
AKZO  1331  0.555  1.04 
AMEV  769  -3.874  -4.48 
AMRO  725  2.143  4.10* 
BUHR  666  3.936  5.78* 
ELS  853  -0.084  -0.20 
GB  996  -3.997  -5.82 
HB  550  0.077  0.03 
HO  1656  2.228  2.86* 
KLM  782  -3.745  -1.91 
KNP  1527  -2.475  -2.20 
NED  860  1.154  1.12 
NN  687  5.198  6.00* 
PHIL  418  -0.299  -0.39 
RBC  440  0.916  0.69 
RD  656  0.717  0.72 
UNIL  344  1.096  1.13 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-6  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
168 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2033  -14.346  -25.00 
ABN  53  -20.844  -5.47 
AEGN  107  -14.645  -6.25 
AH  93  -9.721  -7.41 
AKZO  184  -9.476  -7.07 
AMEV  105  -14.157  -5.94 
AMRO  97  -9.852  -8.42 
BUHR  71  -11.009  -6.51 
ELS  164  -29.415  -6.69 
GB  68  -7.531  -9.52 
HB  95  -7.167  -6.71 
HO  220  -23.756  -10.16 
KLM  15  -11.066  -3.82 
KNP  106  -15.608  -10.09 
NED  318  -14.649  -13.01 
NN  60  -11.800  -5.60 
PHIL  47  -8.116  -4.05 
RBC  79  -11.304  -9.10 
RD  61  -1.811  -3.69 
UNIL  90  -8.969  -5.83 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-7  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
169 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2053  -11.023  -25.29 
ABN  54  -17.640  -6.26 
AEGN  107  -11.186  -5.15 
AH  93  -8.300  -6.24 
AKZO  185  -5.660  -7.81 
AMEV  105  -7.603  -5.04 
AMRO  97  -6.850  -5.93 
BUHR  75  -8.920  -7.18 
ELS  164  -17.905  -7.55 
GB  68  -5.390  -7.22 
HB  98  -4.712  -6.52 
HO  223  -16.568  -7.93 
KLM  17  -6.140  -2.21 
KNP  112  -11.435  -7.38 
NED  318  -16.949  -13.70 
NN  60  -8.605  -5.46 
PHIL  47  -3.856  -3.29 
RBC  79  -10.088  -8.68 
RD  61  -1.855  -4.38 
UNIL  90  -7.655  -5.75 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-8  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
170 Therefore,  the  results  of  the  second  sample  period  are 
consistent  with  those-of.  the  first  sample  period.  The 
conclusion  remains  unchanged,  that  is,  with  respect  to 
the  trading  rule  used  and  the  second  sample  period, 
the  market  appears  to  be  efficient  even  to  the  less 
constrained  trader  who  is  assumed  to  be  able  to 
transact  immediately  upon  observing  a  mis-priced 
situation.  The  null  hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot  be 
rejected  in  any  of  the  two  periods.  The  persistence  of 
market  efficiency  over  both  sample  periods  makes  it 
possible  to  believe  with  a  greater  degree  of 
confidence  that  the  market  is  likely  to  be  efficient 
in  the  future  than  if  only  one  period  is  tested,  or  if 
the  efficiency  is  not  persistent  over  both  periods. 
6.4  Tests  with  Alternative  Estimators  of  the 
Volatility  of  the  Underlying  Stock's  Return 
The  importance  of  having  an  accurate  estimate  of  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return  and  the 
difficulty  of  estimating  this  input  had  been  discussed 
in  Chapter  Four  Section  4.2.  Because  of  the  importance 
of  this  input  and  the  difficulty  of  estimating  it,  it 
is  possible  that  the  results  may  be  sensitive  to 
alternative  estimators  of  this  input  and  the 
conclusions  may  be  different.  In  Chapter  Four  Section 
4.2  it  was  argued  that  three  estimators  of  the 
171 standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return  had  to  be 
selected  for  testing,  and  the  reasons  for  the  choice 
of  these  three  estimators  of  the  standard  deviation  of 
the  stock's  return  were  given.  The  results  of  the 
tests  of  the  trading  rule  with  one  estimator,  the 
DSISD,  have  been  presented  above.  The  results  of  the 
tests  with  two  alternative  estimators,  the  Chiras  and 
Manaster  weighted  implied  standard  deviation  (CMISD) 
and  the  implied  standard  deviation  of  the  option  most 
sensitive  to  changes  in  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
underlying  stock's  return  (AMISD),  are  reported  below. 
6.5  Results  of  Spreading  Tests  with  CESD 
The  results  of  the  spreading  tests  with  CMISD 
conducted  with  data  from  Period  1  and  Period  2  are 
presented  in  tables  A2-1  to  A2-4  and  A2-5  to  A2-8 
respectively  in  Appendix  2. 
In  the  ex  post  tests,  all  classes  of  options  (except 
PHIL  in  the  second  sample  period)  have  average  rates 
of  return  that  are  significantly  greater  than  the 
risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five  per  cent  level 
(Tables  A2-1  and  A2-5);  in  the  ex  ante  tests, 
profitability  is  less  than  the  ex  post  tests  for  all 
stocks  (except  HB  in  the  first  sample  period)  but 
overall,  the  average  rates  of  return  are  still 
172 significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate 
(Tables  A2-2  and  A2-6);  in  the  ex  ante  tests  with  the 
bid-ask  spread  cost,  all  average  rates  of  return  are 
negative  and  the  numbers  of  spreads  are  greatly 
reduced  compared  to  the  ex  ante  tests  (Tables  A2-3 
and  A2-7);  in  the  ex  post  tests  with  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost,  all  average  rates  of  return  are  not 
significantly  different  from  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  at  the  five  per  cent  level  (Tables  A2-4  and 
A2-8). 
Hence,  the  results  of  the  tests  with  the  trading  rule 
using  CMISD  are  generally  similar  to  the  results  of 
the  tests  with  DSISD.  With  respect  to  the  trading  rule 
used  and  both  sample  periods,  the  hypothesis  of 
efficiency  cannot  be  rejected. 
6.6  Results  of  Spreading  Tests  with  AMISD 
The  results  of  the  spreading  tests  with  AMISD  for  the 
sample  periods,  Period  1  and  Period  2,  are  presented 
in  Tables  A2-9  to  A2-12  and  A2-13  to  A2-16 
respectively  in  Appendix  2.  The  results  of  the  tests 
with  this  estimator  are  also  generally  similar  to  the 
results  of  the  tests  with  DSISD  and  CMISD.  The 
conclusion  remains  unchanged;  that  is,  for  the  trading 
rule  used  and  the  sample  periods,  the  hypothesis  of 
efficiency  cannot  be  rejected. 
173 6.7  Summary  of  Results  of  Spreading  Tests 
The  results  of  the  tests  with  all  three  estimators  of 
the  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's  return  are 
broadly  similar.  The  ex  post  zero  transaction  costs 
results  showed  that,  on  average,  the  trading  rule 
worked  very  well  and  the  inference  is  that  it  is  able 
to  identify  over-priced  and  under-priced  options. 
However,  taking  into  account  just  one  component  of 
transactions  costs,  that  is,  the  bid-ask  spread,  all 
average  rates  of  return  are  not  significantly 
different  from  the  risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five 
per  cent  level.  This  is  so  even  for  the  less 
constrained  trader  who  is  assumed  to  be  able  to 
transact  immediately  upon  observing  any  mis-pricing. 
Hence,  with  respect  to  the  trading  rule  used  and  both 
sample  periods,  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot  be 
rejected. 
174 6_8  Hedging  Tests 
The  hedging  test  in  this  study  sets  up  hedges 
consisting  of  one  contract  of  an  option  and 
100e-DTN(dl)  shares  of  its  underlying  stock,  where 
e-DTN(dl)  is  the  hedge  ratio  (see  Appendix  1  for 
definition  of  the  parameters).  If  the  option  is  under- 
priced,  it  is  bought  and  the  underlying  stock  sold 
short;  if  the  option  is  over-priced,  it  is  written  and 
the  underlying  stock  bought. 
The  hedge  is  liquidated  when  the  market  price  of  the 
option  returns  to  its  model  value,  when  the  mis- 
pricing  of  the  option  is  reversed,  or  at  the  end  of 
the  sample  period. 
6.9  Results  of  Hedging  Tests  with  DSISD 
The  results  of  the  hedging  tests  conducted  with  data 
from  Period  1  are  reported  in  Tables  6-9,6-10,6-11 
and  6-12. 
Table  6-9  gives  the  results  of  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  test.  For  all  options  as  a  whole, 
the  average  rate  of  return  is  significantly  different 
from  the  risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five  per  cent 
level.  For  the  individual  classes,  sixteen  out  of 
175 nineteen  classes  have  significant  average  rates  of 
return.  The  hedge  trading  rule  demonstrated  its 
ability,  on  average,  to  identify  over-priced  and 
under-priced  options. 
Table  6-10  gives  the  result  of  the  ex  ante  test  with 
zero  transactions  costs.  The  one  day  lag  in  execution 
of  the  spreads  has  greatly  reduced  the  profits.  The 
overall  average  rates  of  return  is  reduced  from  3.262 
in  the  ex  post  zero  transactions  costs  test  to  0.206, 
and  it  is  not  significantly  different  from  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate.  As  discussed  in  the  sections  on 
spreading  tests,  if  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency 
cannot  be  rejected  at  the  zero  transactions  costs 
level,  then  further  investigation  of  the  hypothesis  at 
the  after  transactions  costs  level  is  redundant;  the 
latter  is  necessary  only  when  there  is  a  significant 
average  rate  of  return  on  a  zero  transactions  costs 
basis. 
However,  there  are  four  stocks  (ABN,  AMEV,  PHIL  and 
RD)  with  average  rates  of  return  significantly  greater 
than  the  risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five  per  cent 
level.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  test  where  sixteen  stocks  have 
significant  average  rates  of  return.  Even  though  the 
overall  average  rate  of  return  is  not  significant,  the 
market  can  still  be  said  to  be  inefficient  if  there 
176 are  exploitable.  abnormal  profits  at  the  individual 
stock  level.  Thus  the  ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  has  to  be  conducted  for  these  four  stocks. 
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  6-11.  The  results 
for  all  other  stocks  are  also  included  in  order  to 
maintain  the  same  format  for  all  the  tables. 
Table  6-11  shows  that  two  of  the  four  stocks  that  have 
significant  returns  in  the  zero  transactions  costs 
case  (AMEV  and  PHIL),  now  have  negative  average  rates 
of  return.  The  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  sufficiently 
large  to  eliminate  all  the  profits.  One  of  the  four 
(ABN)  still  has-  a  positive  rate  of  return,  but  it  is 
not  significantly  different  from  the  risk-free 
interest  rate.  Thus  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency 
cannot  be  rejected. 
However,  one  stock  (RD)  has  a  significant  (at  five 
per  cent)  average  rate  of  return  after  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  has  been  taken  into  account.  Although  it 
is  possible  that  with  commissions  cost  this 
significant  average  rate  of  return  could  become  non- 
significant  or  even  negative,  for  members  of  the 
exchange  who  do  not  incur  commissions  cost,  this  might 
have  been  an  opportunity  to  earn  an  above-normal 
average  rate  of  return.  Hence,  the  market  is 
inefficient  during  this  sample  period  at  least  to 
177 members  of  the  exchange  who  do  not  need  to  pay 
commissions.  However,  it  would  be  of  interest  to  know 
whether  such  above-normal  profit  opportunities  are 
likely  to  continue  to  exist  in  the  future.  If  such 
opportunities  are  found  to  be  persistent  over  time, 
then  it  is  more  likely  that  they  might  continue  to 
exist  in  the  future.  To  see  whether  the  significant 
average  rate  of  return  for  the  stock  RD  is  to  some 
extent  persistent  over  time,  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  the  results  of  the  second  sample  period. 
The  results  of  the  ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  are  given  in  Table  6-12.  The  overall 
average  rate  of  return  is  negative.  All  average  rates 
of  return  for  the  individual  stocks  are  not 
significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate 
at  the  five  per  cent  level. 
To  summarise,  the  results  in  the  first  sample  period 
show  that  an  above-normal  average  rate  of  return  after 
transactions  costs  could  be  earned  at  least  by  members 
of  the  exchange  if  the  ex  ante  hedge  trading  rule  had 
been  applied  to  the  stock  RD.  To  see  whether  such  an 
inefficiency  is  persistent  over  time,  it  is  necessary 
to  examine  the  results  of  the  second  sample  period. 
178 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1929  3.262  10.65* 
ABN  38  5.299  2.38* 
AEGN  50  6.103  1.50 
AH  65  2.988  2.34* 
AKZO  186  1.745  3.22* 
AMEV  52  7.631  2.41* 
AMRO  130  2.610  3.79* 
BUHR  114  4.463  3.98* 
ELS  108  1.103  1.94* 
GB  142  3.961  3.51* 
HB  94  5.323  2.98* 
HO  190  1.932  6.54* 
KLM  95  4.033  4.06* 
KNP  193  1.528  4.89* 
NED  124  6.517  2.66* 
NN  38  7.784  2.57* 
PHIL  97  1.283  3.69* 
RBC  71  5.600  2.15* 
RD  59  1.705  1.04 
UNIL  83  0.834  1.54 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-9  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
179 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1844  0.206  0.36 
ABN  35  10.278  1.71* 
AEGN  45  -1.7.95  -1.50 
AH  60  -1.854  -1.37 
AKZO  177  -0.332  -1.26 
AMEV  47  3.466  1.79* 
AMRO  125  0.142  0.12 
BUHR  112  -0.241  -0.31 
ELS  105  -1.555  -3.08 
GB  139  -1.047  -2.14 
HB  90  -0.567  -0.81 
HO  181  -0.397  -1.77 
KLM  95  -1.216  -2.02 
KNP  187  -0.668  -1.46 
NED  122  -3.482  -2.90 
NN  38  3.000  0.84 
PHIL  89  0.581  1.74* 
RBC  66  0.491  0.33 
RD  53  21.864  1.83* 
UNIL  78  -1.821  -2.62 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-10  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27'September  1988 
180 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  563  -2.727  -4.30 
ABN  20  1.666  0.66 
AEGN  16  -1.347  -4.04 
AH  27  -3.965  -2.40 
AKZO  44  -3.070  -3.54 
AMEV  19  -1.357  -2.41 
AMRO  32  -2.571  -3.68 
BUHR  29  -1.639  -3.07 
ELS  29  -3.647  -4.41 
GB  26  -1.354  -1.93 
HB  45  -5.275  -2.65 
HO  43  -2.593  -4.83 
KLM  17  -1.414  -2.68 
KNP  36  -2.273  -2.28 
NED  46  -12.457  -3.03 
NN  16  -3.187  -3.49 
PHIL  23  -1.602  -4.90 
RBC  29  -6.661  -1.58 
RD  38  10.368  1.70* 
UNIL  28  -3.328  -3.60 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-11  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  Bid-Ask  Spread  Cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
181 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  578  -1.436  -3.18 
ABN  21  1.413  0.68 
AEGN  17  -1.219  -3.28 
AH  29  -3.511  -2.72 
AKZO  44  -1.001  -1.86 
AMEV  20  -1.587  -2.23 
AMRO  34  -1.067  -1.40 
BUHR  29  -0.839  -1.21 
ELS  29  -3.760  -3.59 
GB  26  0.116  0.06 
HB  47  -2.768  -3.41 
HO  43  -2.240  -4.41 
KLM  17  -1.454  -2.64 
KNP  37  -1.557  -2.62 
NED  46  4.442  1.46 
NN  16  -2.021  -2.84 
PHIL  23  -0.540  -0.82 
RBC  29  -0.007  -0.03 
RD  42  -5.957  -1.29 
UNIL  29  -3.288  -3.89 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  6-12  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
182 The  results  of  the  hedging  tests  for  Period  2  are 
presented  in  Tables  6-13,6-14,6-15  and  6-16. 
Table  6-13  gives  the  results  of  the  ex  post  zero 
transactions  costs  test.  Unlike  the  results  of  the 
first  sample  period,  in  this  period  all  classes  of 
options  have  average  rates  of  return  that  are 
significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate 
at  the  five  per  cent  level.  The  trading  rule  worked 
very  well  in  all  cases. 
The  results  of  the  ex  ante  test  are  shown  in 
Table  6-14.  The  one  day  delay  in  the  execution  has 
turned  the  overall  average  rate  of  return.  negative. 
Only  two  stocks  (AH  and  HB)  have  average  rates  of 
return  that  are  significantly  greater  than  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate.  When  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is 
taken  into  account  in  the  ex  ante  test,  the  average 
rates  of  return  for  these  two  stocks  turned 
negative  (Table  6-15). 
The  results  of  the  ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask 
spread  cost  are  given  in  Table  6-16.  All  average  rates 
of  return  are  not  significantly  greater  than  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate  at  the  five  per  cent  level. 
183 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2200  4.515  13.98* 
ABN  101  3.691  3.87* 
AEGN  140  6.754  4.06* 
AH  103  6.793  4.92* 
AKZO  154  3.348  4.30* 
AMEV  120  4.435  5.70* 
AMRO  105  2.028  2.72* 
BUHR  102  4.710  3.09* 
ELS  122  3.941  4.88* 
GB  139  3.254  6.11* 
HB  80  2.151  3.44* 
HO  172  4.095  3.70* 
KLM  135  7.917  2.68* 
KNP  182  3.975  4.21* 
NED  119  3.636  2.58* 
NN  112  4.880  4.65* 
PHIL  85  7.101  3.90* 
RBC  72  4.545  3.23* 
RD  89  4.783  2.09* 
UNIL  68  3.473  3.81* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-13  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
184 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2127  -0.678  -3.05 
ABN  100  -1.382  -2.91 
AEGN  137  -0.264  -0.23 
AH  102  2.266  1.91* 
AKZO  150  -1.539  -2.72 
AMEV  115  -1.862  -1.98 
AMRO  101  -0.846  -1.44 
BUHR  98  -0.118  -0.22 
ELS  116  0.232  0.33 
GB  133  0.018  -0.06 
HB  80  2.521  1.91* 
HO  164  -0.724  -1.07 
KLM  127  -3.733  -1.94 
KNP  174  0.685  0.71 
NED  113  0.276  0.31 
NN  109  --1.332  -1.43 
PHIL  82  -1.806  -1.63 
RBC  72  -3.097  -1.49 
RD  88  -1.915  -2.52 
UNIL  66  -0.932  -1.40 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-14  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
185 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  605  -4.142  -10.44 
ABN  23  -3.895  -3.35 
AEGN  35  -6.738  -3.80 
AH  29  -1.877  -5.35 
AKZO  40  -3.325  -2.02 
AMEV  29  -3.337  -2.35 
AMRO  30  -3.159  -4.37 
BUHR  23  -2.349  -3.31 
ELS  46  -5.168  -2.74 
GB  21  -2.138  -3.85 
HB  25  -0.659  -0.81 
HO  49  -4.262  -2.51 
KLM  23  -4.475  -2.46 
KNP  41  -5.082  -3.28 
NED  64  -6.099  -3.04 
NN  25  -4.403  -2.55 
PHIL  23  -4.009  -2.76 
RBC  24  -3.340  -2.41 
RD  26  -4.970  -2.34 
UNIL  29  -4.352  -2.75 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-15  :  Results  of  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  Bid-Ask  Spread  Cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
186 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  611  -1.580  -6.81 
ABN  23  -1.462  -1.53 
AEGN  35  -3.585  -4.06 
AH  29  -0.981  -3.11 
AKZO  40  -0.296  -2.05 
AMEV  29  -1.487  -3.17 
AMRO  30  -2.212  -4.34 
BUHR  24  -2.363  -3.51 
ELS  46  -0.988  -2.15 
GB  21  -1.348  -4.15 
HB  26  -0.736  -2.20 
HO  49  -2.441  -3.83 
KLM  23  0.912  0.33 
KNP  42  -0.504  -0.66 
NED  67  -3.819  -2.69 
NN  25  -1.603  -3.22 
PHIL  23  1.470  0.97 
RBC  24  -2.320  -1.88 
RD  26  -2.009  -5.65 
UNIL  29  -0.584  -0.94 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  6-16  :  Results  of  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
187 Hence,  in  the  second  sample  period  there  are  no 
opportunities  for  earning  above-normal  average  rates 
of  return  and  the  market  is  efficient  even  to  the  less 
constrained  trader  who  is  assumed  to  be  able  to 
transact  immediately  upon  observing  any  mis-pricing. 
In  the  first  sample  period,  the  ex  ante  hedge  trading 
rule  generated  an  above-normal  average  rate  of  return 
for  the  stock  RD.  This  above-normal  profit  opportunity 
did  not  persist  into  the  second  sample  period  :  the 
average  rate  of  return  for  the  stock  RD  in  the  ex  ante 
test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  negative.  Since 
the  criterion  of  persistence  is  not  met,  it  can  be 
argued  that  with  the  available  evidence,  the 
inefficiency  observed  in  the  first  sample  period  is 
not  likely  to  be  exploitable. 
6.10  Results  of  Hedging  Tests  with  C?  1ISD 
The  results  of  the  hedging  tests  for  Period  1  and 
Period  2  are  presented  in  Tables  A2-17  to  A2-19  and 
A2-20  to  A2-23  respectively  in  Appendix  2.  The  results 
of  the  tests  with  the  CMISD  follow  aa  pattern  similar 
to  the  results  of  the  tests  with  the  DSISD  :  in  the  ex 
post  test,  all  classes  of  options  (except  PHIL  in  both 
sample  periods)  have  significant  average  rates  of 
return  (Tables  A2-17  and  A2-20);  in  the  ex  ante  test, 
188 the  one  day  lag  has  turned  the  overall  ex  post  profits 
in  both  periods  into  losses  (Tables  A2-18  and  A2-21). 
In  the  first  sample  period,  no  individual  class  of 
options  has  an  ex  ante  zero  transactions  costs  average 
rate  of  return  significantly  greater  than  the  risk- 
free  interest  rate.  Hence,  the  ex  ante  test  with  the 
bid-ask  spread  cost  is  redundant  as  the  returns  from 
this  test  must  be  lower  than  the  zero  transactions 
costs  test  and  therefore  cannot  be  significantly 
greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate.  In  Period  2 
one  stock  (NED)  has  a  significant  ex  ante  average  rate 
of  return  (Table  A2-21),  but  this  turned  negative  when 
the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  taken  into  account  (Table 
A2-22).  The  results  of  the  ex  post  tests  with  the  bid- 
ask  spread  cost  are  given  in  Tables  A2-19  and  A2-23. 
All  average  rates  of  return  are  not  significantly 
greater  than  the  risk-free  interest  rate.  Hence,  with 
respect  to  the  trading  rule  with  the  CMISD  and  the 
sample  periods  studied,  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency 
cannot  be  rejected  at  the  five  per  cent  level. 
6.11  Results  of  Hedging  Tests  with  AMISD 
The  results  of  the  hedging  tests  for  Period  1  and 
Period  2  are  presented  in  Tables  A2-24  to  A2-27  and 
A2-28  to  A2-31  respectively  in  Appendix  2.  The 
results  are  broadly  similar  to  the  results  of  the 
tests  with  the  DSISD  and  the  CMISD.  There  are  no 
189 opportunities  for  earning  above-normal  average  rates 
of  return  after  transactions  costs.  Hence,  with 
respect  to  the  trading  rule  used  and  the  sample 
periods  studied,  the  hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot 
be  rejected  at  the  five  per  cent  level. 
6.12  Summary  of  Results  of  Hedging  Tests 
The  results  of  the  hedging  tests  with  all  three 
estimators  of  the  volatility  of  the  stock's  return  are 
broadly  similar.  The  ex  post  zero  transactions  costs 
results  show  that  the  trading  rule  worked  very  well  in 
most  cases  and  the  inference  is  that  it  is  able  to 
distinguish  between  over-priced  and  under-priced 
options.  However,  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  large 
enough  to  eliminate  the  abnormal  profits  in  nearly  all 
cases  (except  for  the  stock  RD  in  the  first  sample 
period)  so  that  the  average  rates  of  return  are  not 
significantly  different  from  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  at  the  five  per  cent  level.  With  the  exception  of 
the  stock  RD  in  the  first  sample  period,  the 
hypothesis  of  efficiency  cannot  be  rejected  .  However, 
the  above-normal  average  rate  of  return  for  RD  in  the 
first  sample  period  did  not  persist  into  the  second 
period  and  therefore,  with  the  available  evidence,  the 
inefficiency  is  regarded  as  not  exploitable. 
190 6.13  Comparison  with  results  of  some  other  studies 
Van  der  Hilst(1980)  concluded  that  the  EOE  was  not 
perfectly  efficient,:.,  but  his  study  ignored 
transactions  cost  (see  Chapter  Three  Section  3.2).  The 
results  of  this  study  show  that  although  average 
abnormal  profits  were  available  before  transactions 
cost  were  taken  into  account,  these  profits  turned 
into  losses  when  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  was  accounted 
for. 
The  findings  of  this  study  are  also  broadly 
consistently  with  those  of  other  studies.  For  example, 
Blomeyer  and  Klemkosky(1983)  tested  the  efficiency  of 
the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  using  a  hedging 
strategy.  They  found  that  although  the  ex  post  returns 
were  statistically  significant  at  the  five  per  cent 
level,  the  ex  ante  returns  after  transactions  costs 
were  not.  Their  results  supported  option  market 
efficiency. 
On  the  other  hand,  Galai(1977)  used  both  spreading  and 
hedging  strategies  and  found  that  the  Chicago  Board 
Options  Exchange  was  less  than  perfectly  efficient. 
However,  as  Phillips  and  Smith(1980)  pointed  out,  it 
is  likely  that  the  transactions  costs  in  Galai's  study 
were  under-estimated.  Phillips  and  Smith  showed  that 
after  taking  into  account  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  that 
191 Phillips  and  Smith  themselves  estimated,  the  abnormal 
profits  in  Galai's  study  were  eliminated,  a  result 
that  is  consistent  with  market  efficiency. 
Bhattacharya(1983)  found  that  his  spreading  test 
of  the  Chicago  Board  Options  Exchange  produced 
abnormal  returns  even  after  transactions  costs  were 
taken  into  account.  This  would  seem  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the  findings  of  this  study.  However, 
Bhattacharya's  result  must  be  treated  with  caution 
since  his  fortnightly  revision  of  spreads  cannot 
maintain  riskless  spreads  positions. 
In  the  UK,  options  market  efficiency  tests  have  been 
conducted  by  Kerruish(1984)  and  Gemmill  and 
Dickins(1986).  Kerruish(1984)  found  the  London  Traded 
Options  Market  (LTOM)  to  be  efficient.  Gemmill  and 
Dickins(1986)  found  statistically  significant-profits 
in  excess  of  the  risk-free  interest  rate.  However, 
these  profits  turned  into  losses  when  the  bid-ask 
spread  was  applied.  These  results  are  therefore 
consistent  with  the  evidence  in  this  study. 
6.14  Summary  and  Conclusions 
In  this  study,  a  market  is  said  to  be  efficient  if  no 
trader  can  consistently  earn  an  above-normal  average 
192 rate  of  return  after  transactions  costs.  The  evidence 
presented  in  this  chapter  shows  that  with  respect  to 
the  trading  rules  used  and  the  sample  periods  studied, 
there  have  been  no  persistent  opportunities  in  the 
stock  options  market  of  the  EOE  for  earning  above- 
normal  average  rates  of  return  after  transactions 
costs.  Hence,  the  stock  options  market  of  the  EOE  can 
be  said  to  be  efficient. 
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197 7_1  Introduction 
This  chapter  provides  a  summary  of  the  methodology, 
results  and  conclusion  of  this  study  and  highlights 
its  limitations.  It  ends  with  some  suggestions  for 
future  research. 
7.2  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  efficiency  of  the  stock  options  market  of  the  EOE. 
Efficiency  has  been  defined  as  the  inability  of  any 
trader  to  consistently  earn  above-normal  average  rates 
of  return  after  transactions  costs. 
The  hypothesis  of  efficiency  is  tested  with  spreading 
and  hedging  strategies  on  stock  options.  The  trading 
rule  uses  DATASTREAM's  option  pricing  model,  that  is, 
the  Black-Scholes  model  with  Merton's  dividend 
adjustment  (see  Appendix  1),  to  identify  mispriced 
options.  The  model  is  assumed  to  be  correct  so  that 
any  deviation  of  the  market  price  from  DATASTREAM's 
model  price  is  taken  as  a  signal  to  buy  or  write  the 
option.  Riskless  spreads  are  set  up  with  over-priced 
and  under-priced  options  on  the  same  stock  and  held 
until  the  mispricing  of  at  least  one  leg  of  the  spread 
198 is  reversed,  or  until  the  end  of  the  sample  period. 
'Riskless'  hedges,  however,  are  set  up  with  these 
mispriced  options  and  their  underlying  stocks  and  held 
until  the  mispricing  of  the  option  in  the  hedge  is 
reversed,  or,  until  the  end  of  the  sample  period. 
During  the  period  the  hedges  and  spreads  are  held, 
daily  rebalancing  is  employed  to  maintain  riskless 
positions. 
The  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  alternative 
estimators  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  stock's 
return  is  also  tested  by  using  two  variations  of  the 
trading  rule.  In  each  case,  the  same  model  is  used  but 
with  a  different  estimator  of  the  standard  deviation 
of  the  underlying  stock's  return  as  input  to  the  model. 
The  results  of  these  tests  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
EOE  are  summarised  as  follows  : 
i)  the  spread  trading  rule  using  the  DATASTREAM  option 
pricing  model  to  identify  mispriced  options  performed 
very  well  in  the  ex  post  tests.  The  inference  is  that 
it  is  able  to  identify  over-priced  and  under-priced 
options, 
ii)  delaying  the  execution  and  liquidation  of  the 
spreads  by  one  day  greatly  reduces  the  profitability 
of  the  trading  rule,  indicating  that  actual  prices 
199 converge  fairly  quickly  to  model  prices  during  the  one 
day  lag.  The  average  rate  of  return  is,  however,  still 
significantly  different  from  the  risk-free  interest 
rate  for  at  least  some  classes  of  options, 
iii)  introduction  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
eliminates  all  profit  opportunities  in  both  the  ex 
ante  and  the  ex  post  tests, 
iv)  the  lack  of  profit  opportunities  on  an  after 
transactions  costs  basis  is  persistent  over  both 
sample  periods, 
v)  a  large  proportion  (around  eighty  six  per  cent) 
of  the  deviations  of  the  actual  price  from  the  model 
price  occurs  within  the  bounds  set  by  the  bid  and  ask 
prices, 
vi)  the  results  of  the  hedging  tests  are  generally 
similar  to  those  of  the  spreading  tests, 
vii)  using  two  alternative  estimators  of  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  stock's  return  as  input  to  the  model 
changes  the  results  quantitatively,  but  makes  no 
difference  to  the  conclusion. 
The  conclusion  is  that  during  the  sample  periods 
studied,  the  EOE  is  efficient  with  respect  to  the 
200 trading  rule  used.  Although  market  prices  do  deviate 
from  model  prices,  no  persistent  profit  opportunities 
exist  for  any  trader.  Even  a  member  of  the  exchange 
trading  on  the  floor  of  the  EOE  and  assumed  to  be  able 
to  trade  immediately  upon  observing  a  mispricing,  is 
not  able  to  earn  an  above-normal  average  rate  of 
return  when  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  taken  into 
account. 
The  implication  for  investors  in  this  market  is  that 
attempts  to  identify  mispriced  options  either  through 
their  own  efforts  or  by  relying  on  recommendations  of 
investment  analysts  will  be  a  waste  of  resources. 
7.3  Limitations 
This  study  has  several  limitations  : 
i)  The  EOE  is  found  to  be  efficient  only  with  respect 
to  the  trading  rules  used.  However,  this  does  not 
diminish  the  importance  of  this  evidence.  The  nature 
of  such  evidence  is  cumulative  and  can  never  be 
conclusive.  Keane(1983)  noted  that  "despite  the  fact 
that  the  statistical  method  provides  the  only  vehicle 
for  establishing  a  case  in  favour  of  or  against  market 
efficiency,  even  this  can  never  be  capable  of 
providing  conclusive  proof".  Furthermore,  Fama(1970)'s 
observation  on  the  nature  of  the  evidence  for  semi- 
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relevant  here.  He  noted  that  "each  individual  test, 
however,  is  concerned  with  the  adjustment  of  security 
prices  to  one  kind  of.  information  generating  event 
..........  .  Thus  each  test  only  brings  supporting 
evidence  for  the  model,  with  the  idea  that  by 
accumulating  such  evidence  the  validity  of  the  model 
will  be  '  established  1':  (p404-), 
Although  the  trading  rules  used  have  been  shown  to 
perform  very  well  in  the  ex  post  zero  transactions 
costs  tests,  it  may  be  possible  for  other  trading 
rules,  such  as  those  using  different  models  or 
different  estimators  for  the  inputs  to  produce 
superior  results.  Less  mechanistic  trading  strategies 
may  also  be  more  profitable  but  such  trading 
strategies  may  not  be  amenable  to  testing.  As 
Gastineau(1988)  observed  that  "certain  investors  and 
portfolio  managers  have  obtained  superior  results  over 
long  periods.  The  art  or  science  of  market  efficiency 
testing  has  not  yet  reduced  the  techniques  used  by 
these  investors  and  managers  to  testable  decision 
rules".  The  possibility  of  existence  of  such 
profitable  trading  rules  does  not,  however,  imply  that 
the  market  is  inefficient.  Keane(1983)  argued  that 
"even  if  one  believes  that  a  small  proportion  of  the 
many  trading  rules  on  offer  in  the  market  at  any  given 
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little  practical  significance  until  the  successful 
strategies  are  identified  and  distinguished  from  the 
rest"  - 
(Q  61). 
ii)  The  bid  and  ask  price  quotations  used  in  this 
study  are  valid  for  five  contracts  only.  EOE  Trading 
Regulations  7B(ii)  stipulates  that  market  makers  and 
floor  traders  are  not  obliged  to  buy  or  sell  more  than 
five  contracts  at  the  prices  they  quote.  Hence,  when 
the  trading  rule  requires  more  than  five  contracts  to 
be  bought,  written  or  sold,  there  is  no  assurance  that 
it  can  be  done  at  the  quoted  bid  and  ask  prices. 
Contracts  in  excess  of  five  may  have  to  be  bought  at  a 
price  higher  than  the  quoted  ask  price  or  written  (or 
sold)  at  a  price  lower  than  the  quoted  bid  price. 
Thus,  assuming  that  the  price  quotations  are  valid  for 
more  than  five  contracts  will  bias  the  results  against 
efficiency. 
iii)  Assuming  that  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  equal  to 
the  whole  of  the  quoted  bid-ask  spread  may  overstate 
this  component  of  transactions  costs  because  in  some 
cases  transactions  may  occur  within  the  quoted  spread. 
This  will  bias  the  results  in  favour  of  efficiency. 
In  order  to  mitigate  the  effect  of  this  bias,  an 
additional  ex  post  test  with  80  per  cent,  instead  of 
203 100  per  cent,  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  was  carried 
out.  The  ex  post  test  was  used  and  only  the  DSISD 
estimator  was  tested  because  earlier  results  had  shown 
that  the  conclusion  is  not  sensitive  to  other 
estimators  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  underlying 
stock's  return  and  that  generally  the  ex  Post  tests 
produced  results  that  are  superior  to  those  of  the  ex 
ante  tests.  The  choice  of  80  per  cent  is  arbitrary. 
Whether  an  average  discount  of  20  per  cent  overstates 
or  understates  the  actual  bid-ask  spread  cost  is  a 
matter  for  future  research. 
The  results  of  this  test  are  presented  in  Tables  A3-1 
to  A3-4  in  Appendix  3.  All  average  rates  of  return 
(with  the  exception  of  NED  in  Period  1  hedging  test) 
are  not  significantly  greater  than  the  risk-free 
interest  rate.  There  are  no  persistent  opportunities 
for  earning  above-normal  average  rates  of  return  after 
taking  into  account  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread 
cost.  The  conclusion  of  market  efficiency  remains 
unchanged. 
iv)  The  use  of  daily  closing  price  quotations  also  has 
its  limitations.  With  daily  closing  price  quotations, 
it  is  not  possible  to  use  a  more  realistic  lag  in 
setting  up  and  liquidating  the  spreads  and  hedges. 
Studies  that  used  intra-day  transactions  data,  for 
204 example,  Blomeyer  and  Klemkosky(1983),  can  allow  for 
lags  of  five  minutes  and  fifteen  minutes  between  the 
identification  of  the  mispricing  and  the  execution  of 
the  spread.  In  this  study,  the  two  extremes  of  no  lag 
(ex  post  test)  and  a  one-day  lag  (ex  ante  test)  are 
examined  (see  Chapter  Four  Section  4.3).  The  results 
of  this  study  show  that  the  profitabililty  of  the  ex 
ante  tests  are  generally  greatly  reduced  when  compared 
to  the  ex  post  tests  (see  Chapter  Six),  implying  that 
delays  in  execution  are  costly.  Hence,  compared  to 
lags  of  five  minutes  and  fifteen  minutes,  generally 
the  no  lag  case  biases  the  results  against  efficiency 
and  the  one-day  lag  case  biases  it  in  favour  of 
efficiency. 
v)  For  various  reasons,  the  spreads  and  hedges  in  this 
study  are  not  entirely  riskless.  First,  in  the  ex  ante 
test,  the  delay  in  executing  the  spreads  and  hedges 
leads  to  risky  positions  because  with  the  delay,  the 
prices  at  which  the  spreads  and  hedges  are  executed 
may  not  be  the  same  as  those  with  which  the 
mispricings  are  observed.  Returns  are  influenced  by 
price  drifts  during  the  delay. 
Second,  the  Leland(1985)  modification  to  the  hedge 
ratio  has  not  been  used.  Leland  showed  that  if  his 
modified  hedge  ratio  is  not  used,  riskless  hedging  is 
not  possible  in  the  presence  of  transactions  costs. 
205 However,  the  Leland  modified  hedge  ratio  is  ignored  in 
this  study  because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  an 
accurate  estimate  of  the  bid-ask  spread  for  input  into 
the  modified  hedge  ratio  (see  Chapter  Four  Section 
4.6). 
Third,  with  bid  and  ask  prices  it  is  possible  to 
calculate  two  ISDs  for  each  option  by  equating  the 
model  price  to  the  bid  and  ask  prices  respectively. 
Let  the  ISD  calculated  using  the  bid  price  be  ISDBID 
and  the  ISD  calculated  using  the  ask  price  be  ISDASK. 
By  using  ISDBID  and  ISDASK  as  estimators  of  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  underlying  stock's  return, 
two  corresponding  hedge  ratios  can  be  computed.  It  may 
be  that  hedge  ratios  calculated  using  these  ISDs  can 
lead  to  riskless  hedging.  For  example, 
Bhattacharya(1983)  stated  that  the  neutral  hedge  ratio 
for  a  spread  consisted  of  buying  N(di)m  /  N(dl)n 
contracts  of  n  for  each  contract  of  m  sold,  where 
N(dl)m.  is  the  hedge  ratio  of  option  m  calculated 
using  ISDbid  and  N(d1)n  is  the  hedge  ratio  of  option  n 
calculated  using  ISDASK"  Presumably,  since  option  m  is 
to  be  sold  and  it  is  assumed  that  it  will  be  sold  at 
the  bid  price,  therefore,  the  hedge  ratio  N(d1)m  is 
used  for  option  m.  Similarly,  since  option  n  is  to  be 
bought  and  it  is  assumed  that  it  will  be  bought  at  the 
ask  price,  therefore,  the  hedge  ratio  N(dl)n  is  used 
206 for  option  n.  However,  there  has  been  no  formal  proof 
that  using  these-he  dge  ratios  will  lead  to  riskless 
positions. 
This  study  uses  the  mid-market  price  ((bid  +  ask)  /  2) 
to  calculate  the  ISDs  for  input  into  the  hedge  ratio 
calculation.  Hedges  and  spreads  set  up  using  these 
hedge  ratios  may  not  be  riskless. 
However,  even  if  the  spreads  and  hedges  in  this  study 
are  not  riskless,  this  limitation  is  not  critical  to 
this  study  since  no  inefficiencies  had-  been  found.  If 
any  inefficiency  has  been  found,  the  question  would 
arise  as  to  whether  the  use  of  a  estimated  risk-free 
interest  rate  as  the  expected  average  rate  of  return 
is  appropriate. 
vi)  The  distributions  of  all  the  rates  of  return  for 
tests  using  the  DSISD  estimator  are  skewed.  The  values 
of  the  skewness  measure  are  given  in  Tables  A4-1  to 
A4-4  in  Appendix  4. 
In  the  case  of  skewed  distributions,  the  mean,  the 
median  and  the  mode  are  all  likely  to  differ  from  one 
another.  Which  of  these  should  be  used  as  a  summary 
measure  of  the  distribution  ?  The  choice  is  arbitrary 
as  statistical  theory  does  not  provide  any  guidance. 
Hoaglin,  Mosteller  and  Tukey(1983)  stated  that  "this 
207 is  not  a  question  a  statistician  alone  should  try  to 
resolve  .....  ".  This  study  uses  the  mean  since  it  is 
a  commonly  used  measure. 
However,  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  conclusion 
is  sensitive  to  the  use  of  an  alternative  measure,  the 
median,  a  non-parametric  SIGN  test  is  carried  out  on 
the  returns  of  the  ex  post  test  with  80  per  cent  of 
the  bid-ask  spread  cost,  using  the  DSISD  estimator. 
The  SIGN  test  is  used  to  test  the  null  hypothesis 
H0  :m=  rf  against  the  alternative  hypothesis 
H1  :m>  rf  where  m  is  the  median  rate  of  return  and 
rf  is  the  estimated  risk-free  interest  rate.  The  one- 
sample  SIGN  test  is  described  in  detail  in  Hoel(1971) 
p310-311. 
The  results  of  this  test  are  presented  in  Tables  A4-5 
and  A4-6  in  Appendix  4.  They  are  consistent  with  those 
obtained  using  the  mean.  In  all  cases,  the  null 
hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected  at  the  five  per  cent 
level  of  significance  implying  that  none  of  the  median 
rates  of  return  are  significantly  greater  than  the 
risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  five  percent  level. 
Therefore,  the  conclusion  of  market  efficiency  remains 
unchanged. 
208 vii)  Finally,  this  study  tests  the  joint  hypothesis  of 
model  validity,  input  accuracy  and  market  efficiency. 
Model  validity  and  input  accuracy  have  been  assumed  in 
order  to  draw  inferenceswith  regard  to  market 
efficiency. 
7.4  Suggestions  for  future  research 
This  study  has  shown  that  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  is 
the  main  reason  for  the  inability  of  the  trading  rule 
to  generate  above-normal  average  rates  of  return  after 
transactions  costs.  The  trading  rule  has  been  shown  to 
be  highly  profitable  on  an  ex  post  before  transactions 
costs  basis.  But,  whether  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  on 
the  EOE  is  relatively  higher  than  those  of  other 
markets  remains  to  be  investigated.  If  it  is,  it  would 
be  interesting  to  determine  the  reasons  for  the  large 
bid-ask  spreads  and  whether  they  are  consistent  with 
the  risks  borne  by  market  makers. 
The  EOE  assigns  at  least  four  market  makers  to  each 
option  class  to  ensure  a  competitive  market  place  (see 
Chapter  Two  Section  2.5).  Thus,  it  may  be  unlikely 
that  bid  and  ask  spreads  will  be  relatively  large  due 
to  a  lack  of  competition.  However,  if  market  makers  on 
the  EOE  do  not  act  independently,  then  it  may  be 
possible  for  large  bid-ask  spreads  to  be  due  to  a 
lack  of  competition.  For  example,  market  makers  on  the 
209 London  Traded  Options  Market  had  been  described  as  a 
"close-knit  'cosy  cartel  of  old  style  jobbers'" 
(Financial  Times  20-June  1989).  It  is  not  known 
whether  EOE  market  makers  behave  in  the  same  way. 
This  study  ignored  the  question  of  the  depth  of  the 
market,  that  is,  the  number  of  contracts  that  can  be 
traded  at  a  given  price.  It  is  assumed  that  any  number 
of  contracts  can  be  bought  or  written  at  the  quoted 
price.  Future  research  should  use  transaction-by- 
transaction  data  to  test  this  aspect  of  the  market. 
Also,  with  transactions  data  a  more  realistic  lag  than 
that  used  in  this  study  is  possible.  Although 
transactions  data  can  overcome  some  problems,  it  also 
has  its  limitations,  as  Galai(1983b)  stated  :  "Stored 
data  may  mislead,  even  when  refined  transaction  data 
are  used".  Galai  suggested  that  "ex  ante  efficiency 
tests  should  be  carried  out  on  the  floor  of  the 
exchange  by  monitoring,  on  real  time,  the 
opportunities  available  to  market  participants". 
This  study  has  also  emphasised  the  problem  of  the 
joint  hypotheses  of  model  validity,  input  accuracy  and 
market  efficiency.  Model  validity  and  input  accuracy 
have  been  assumed  in  order  to  test  for  market 
efficiency.  Future  research  could  try  to  decompose 
these  joint  hypotheses  and  analyse  each  separately. 
210 Tests  should  also  be  conducted  with  other  trading 
rules.  However,  this  study  has  shown  that  the  impact 
of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost  on  trading  profits  is  non- 
trivial  and  hence,  it  may  be  unlikely  that  above- 
normal  profits  can  be  generated  with  mechanistic 
trading  rules.  Tests  with  less  mechanistic  trading 
strategies,  as  mentioned  by  Gastineau(1988)  (see 
Section  7.3  of  this  Chapter),  may  be  more  worthwhile 
if  those  strategies  can  be  identified  and  made 
amenable  to  testing. 
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213 Appendix  1 
The  Option  Pricing  Model 
214 The  Black-Scholes  model  with  the  Merton  dividend 
adjustment  is  : 
C=  e-DTSN(d1)  -  e-rTXN(d2) 
where 
d1  =(  ln(S/X)  +  (r  -D+0.5d2)T  )/  rýT 
d2  =  d1  -  OVT- 
and 
C=  model  price 
D=  constant  known  continuous  dividend  yield 
S=  share  price 
X=  exercise  price 
e,  =  standard  deviation  of  returns  on  the  stock 
during  the  period  T 
r=  risk-free  interest  rate 
T=  time  to  expiry 
N(.  )  =  cumulative  standard  normal  distribution 
function 
The  following  assumptions  are  needed  to  derive  the 
model  : 
(a)  Short  selling  is  allowed 
(b)  The  option  can  only  be  exercised  at 
maturity 
(c)  The  stock  pays  a  constant  known  continuous 
dividend  with  yield  D 
(d)  The  risk-free  rate  is  constant  through  time 
(e)  There  are  no  transactions  costs  in  the 
stock  and  options  markets 
215 (f)  Assets  are  divisible 
(g)  It  is  possible  to  borrow  at  the  risk-free 
rate 
(h)  The  stock  price  follows  a  random  walk  in 
continuous  time  with  a  variance  rate 
proportional  to  the  square  of  the  stock 
price.  Thus  the  distribution  of  the 
possible  stock  prices  at  the  end  of  any 
finite  interval  is  lognormal.  The  variance 
rate  of  return  on  the  stock  is  constant. 
(Black  and  Scholes  (1973)). 
216 APPENDIX  TWO 
RESULTS  OF  TESTS  WITH  ALTERNATIVE  ESTIMATORS 
OF  THE  STANDARD  DEVIATION 
OF  THE  UNDERLYING  STOCK'S  RETURN 
217 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  19838  9.619  42.70* 
ABN  215  27.716  6.85* 
AEGN  476  13.775  6.43* 
AH  752  10.874  14.14* 
AKZO  1679  6.092  10.18* 
AMEV  435  16.711  7.34* 
AMRO  1421  10.295  17.04* 
BUHR  1164  11.775  12.67* 
ELS  1286  13.090  18.44* 
GB  1370  11.172  12.14* 
HB  479  6.355  4.80* 
HO  3463  7.760  16.53* 
KLM  826  14.896  12.52* 
KNP  2648  4.230  9.42* 
NED  1734  6.119  10.17* 
NN  345  19.106  11.48* 
PHIL  210  9.586  7.07* 
RBC  371  9.154  9.59* 
RD  367  24.767  4.69* 
UNIL  597  11.776  11.74* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-1  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
218 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  19288  0.764  3.69* 
ABN  206  12.783  3.76* 
AEGN  476  5.463  2.75* 
AH  728  4.576  6.20* 
AKZO  1635  -0.904  -1.53 
AMEV  421  0.947  0.38 
AMRO  1373  3.401  5.53* 
BUHR  1146  1.043  1.58 
ELS  1230  -0.108  -0.22 
GB  1360  -0.682  -1.07 
HB  474  8.284  7.03* 
HO  3313  -2.343  -6.06 
KLM  812  3.987  4.92* 
KNP  2567  -1.971  -3.65 
NED  1708  1.657  2.41* 
NN  345  -2.659  -1.76 
PHIL  207  4.966  2.92* 
RBC  355  -0.266  -0.47 
RD  367  11.392  6.00* 
UNIL  565  1.915  2.29* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-2  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
219 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1086  -13.666  -19.35 
ABN  18  -7.441  -8.03 
AEGN  35  -36.923  -4.44 
AH  49  -11.038  -10.14 
AKZO  73  -15.501  -4.18 
AMEV  10  -12.083  -3.48 
AMRO  78  -10.816  -8.74 
BUHR  35  -10.506  -6.72 
ELS  62  -10.426  -6.22 
GB  34  -11.134  -6.25 
HB  55  -21.951  -5.33 
HO  98  -8.344  -6.40 
KLM  23  -15.404  -2.12 
KNP  146  -8.150  -7.97 
NED  148  -9.872  -4.84 
NN  34  -18.233  -4.26 
PHIL  9  -12.472  -6.32 
RBC  30  -27.089  -4.21 
RD  72  -20.690  -8.02 
UNIL  77  -17.157  -5.29 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-3  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
220 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1106  -9.145  -16.97 
ABN  18  -7.015  -7.35 
AEGN  37  -32.275  -4.11 
AH  49  -9.932  -12.80 
AKZO  75  -5.096  -2.73 
AMEV  13  -12.376  -4.33 
AMRO  78  -8.379  -7.46 
BUHR  35  -8.507  -5.96 
ELS  65  -7.361  -3.33 
GB  34  -5.499  -3.93 
HB  55  -14.378  -7.34 
HO  102  -5.830  -5.19 
KLM  23  -10.160  -2.09 
KNP  146  -5.217  -6.67 
NED  148  -6.885  -4.51 
NN  34  -9.130  -3.73 
PHIL  9  -8.053  -6.12 
RBC  30  -16.794  -4.34 
RD  78  -21.086  -7.61 
UNIL  77  -2.810  -2.27 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-4  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
221 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  17979  12.427  42.37* 
ABN  264  11.215  5.80* 
AEGN  1143  10.904  7.26* 
AH  976  17.669  16.95* 
AKZO  1359  5.847  9.12* 
AMEV  830  12.852  13.19* 
AMRO  909  13.052  15.74* 
BUHR  701  10.990  11.60* 
ELS  855  10.981  12.60* 
GB  1072  17.340  18.83* 
HB  717  8.833  9.69* 
HO  2320  9.672  9.17* 
KLM  964  17.921  13.92* 
KNP  1675  12.098  10.37* 
NED  1352  17.647  10.60* 
NN  770  13.921  12.01* 
PHIL  118  4.570  1.57 
RBC  309  6.032  3.55* 
RD  1222  13.604  15.17* 
UNIL  423  11.081  9.81* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-5  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
222 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  17406  2.090  7.25* 
ABN  264  4.263  2.84* 
AEGN  1104  -0.607  -0.38 
AH  957  6.266  6.46* 
AKZO  1303  -0.483  -0.93 
AMEV  804  0.084  0.03 
AMRO  897  5.542  7.53* 
BUHR  699  -0.178  -0.21 
ELS  840  6.263  6.42* 
GB  1027  1.485  1.91* 
HB  702  1.403  1.36 
HO  2253  3.898  3.61* 
KLM  934  -5.178  -4.74 
KNP  1612  3.548  3.34* 
NED  1269  3.413  2.17* 
NN  734  0.715  0.69 
PHIL  111  -3.265  -1.34 
RBC  309  1.503  1.28 
RD  1190  3.284  4.18* 
UNIL  397  -1.673  -1.35 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-6  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
223 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1006  -14.349  -16.92 
ABN  10  -7.388  -6.40 
AEGN  26  -9.780  -5.80 
AH  56  -14.990  -3.30 
AKZO  172  -5.503  -6.51 
AMEV  26  -7.519  -3.11 
AMRO  29  -12.011  -6.06 
BUHR  56  -5.434  -4.36 
ELS  33  -38.422  -3.85 
GB  14  -20.617  -6.03 
HB  37  -11.051  -8.01 
HO  135  -22.424  -8.33 
KLM  20  -14.728  -4.47 
KNP  56  -26.417  -6.82 
NED  132  -7.930  -4.27 
NN  23  -5.703  -8.33 
PHIL  4  -33.638  -1.81 
RBC  31  -19.404  -4.29 
RD  83  -11.668  -8.01 
UNIL  63  -28.954  -4.52 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-7  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
224 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1034  -8.380  -13.58 
ABN  10  -6.645  -6.40 
AEGN  28  -11.590  -3.92 
AH  56  -7.840  -4.25 
AKZO  175  -4.336  -3.87 
AMEV  26  -5.894  -2.33 
AMRO  29  -8.357  -4.61 
BUHR  56  -1.544  -1.90 
ELS  33  -19.147  -4.05 
GB  14  -10.988  -10.79 
HB  37  -8.497  -7.95 
HO  137  -9.675  -6.30 
KLM  20  -6.210  -2.69 
KNP  56  -15.401  -6.08 
NED  139  -0.861  -0.77 
NN  26  -14.475  -2.38 
PHIL  5  -23.756  -1.86 
RBC  31  -10.372  -5.34 
RD  93  -11.008  -5.75 
UNIL  63  -19.219  -3.31 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-8  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
225 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  23002  7.523  37.72* 
ABN  221  5.039  1.43 
AEGN  486  14.244  5.67* 
AH  773  8.682  9.29* 
AKZO  1957  3.320  6.35* 
AMEV  429  17.256  7.69* 
AMRO  1634  10.856  15.63* 
BUHR  1112  10.590  10.41* 
ELS  1352  5.981  9.65* 
GB  1572  5.523  7.37* 
HB  518  4.169  3.37* 
HO  3860  7.543  14.29* 
KLM  1014  11.752  10.59* 
KNP  2776  5.842  12.44* 
NED  2152  4.202  7.43* 
NN  466  17.434  10.21* 
PHIL  957  8.615  10.93* 
RBC  434  7.827  8.49* 
RD  480  14.240  7.80* 
UNIL  809  3.786  5.31* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-9  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
226 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  22555  -1.159  -6.13 
ABN  221  0.250  0.08 
AEGN  473  3.613  2.31* 
AH  757  -0.569  -0.82 
AKZO  1932  -2.120  -4.70 
AMEV  407  0.726  0.49 
AMRO  1573  -3.273  -4.41 
BUHR  1107  -4.191  -5.19 
ELS  1292  1.602  2.63* 
GB  1528  0.171  0.17 
HB  513  3.810  3.01* 
HO  3665  -3.442  -6.32 
KLM  977  -1.118  -1.70 
KNP  2720  -2.167  -4.62 
NED  2271  1.944  2.02* 
NN  446  -7.281  -3.74 
PHIL  926  4.130  6.77* 
RBC  416  -2.113  -1.94 
RD  557  -5.589  -3.42 
UNIL  774  0.565  0.91 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-10  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
227 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1337  -15.048  -15.78 
ABN  21  -147.440  -4.14 
AEGN  50  -13.959  -4.19 
AH  48  -27.929  -4.01 
AKZO  129  -5.263  -6.20 
AMEV  22  -18.828  -3.01 
AMRO  69  -25.213  -6.03 
BUHR  27  -13.038  -3.20 
ELS  59  -13.441  -5.54 
GB  20  -13.455  -2.76 
HB  91  -19.562  -9.01 
HO  123  -9.045  -7.07 
KLM  29  -8.796  -5.46 
KNP  142  -6.509  -5.62 
NED  152  -7.158  -5.07 
NN  -  13  -13.960  -1.43 
PHIL  44  -13.173  -5.16 
RBC  69  -18.397  -4.66 
RD  140  -15.927  -7.04 
UNIL  89  -14.797  -5.97 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-11  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
228 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1344  -10.223  -14.46 
ABN  21  -109.244  -4.87 
AEGN  50  -10.623  -3.46 
AH  48  -19.398  -3.31 
AKZO  131  -3.590  -6.59 
AMEV  22  -16.467  -2.78 
AMRO  69  -14.688  -5.28 
BUHR  28  -11.309  -2.88 
ELS  62  -9.823  -4.37 
GB  20  -9.564  -2.65 
HB  91  -15.037  -8.95 
HO  124  -3.838  -4.36 
KLM  29  -6.991  -4.17 
KNP  142  -3.834  -4.69 
NED  152  -6.122  -3.99 
NN  13  -3.049  -3.35 
PHIL  44  -5.968  -3.06 
RBC  69  -12.140  -3.53 
RD  140  -12.276  -6.81 
UNIL  89  -7.195  -3.44 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-12  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
229 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  21895  7.446  27.18* 
ABN  737  5.547  4.33* 
AEGN  1406  7.496  6.19* 
AH  1297  8.396  13.06* 
AKZO  1515  -1.638  -3.31 
AMEV  947  7.623  7.36* 
AMRO  1157  4.802  10.58* 
BUHR  1000  8.731  10.17* 
ELS  1248  5.629  8.15* 
GB  1309  11.667  15.69* 
HB  811  6.008  8.34* 
HO  2816  11.352  7.91* 
KLM  1150  10.369  10.72* 
KNP  2005  8.204  7.60* 
NED  1294  3.223  2.98* 
NN  1005  10.344  11.11* 
PHIL  237  13.382  8.90* 
RBC  427  4.576  3.88* 
RD  1235  8.731  11.20* 
UNIL  299  1.669  1.44 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-13  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
230 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  21046  1.076  3.80* 
ABN  728  1.545  1.68* 
AEGN  1351  2.175  1.77* 
AH  1256  4.491  5.22* 
AKZO  1441  -1.283  -2.16 
AMEV  901  -2.099  -2.12 
AMRO  1097  0.534  1.11 
BUHR  969  1.815  2.64* 
ELS  1203  7.456  9.10* 
GB  1268  0.328  0.42 
HB  807  -0.163  -0.33 
HO  2686  4.027  2.60* 
KLM  1108  -1.901  -1.96 
KNP  1911  2.277  2.59* 
NED  1192  -5.208  -5.58 
NN  965  -0.403  -0.60 
PHIL  237  5.312  5.26* 
RBC  419  0.314  0.30 
RD  1208  -1.821  -2.85 
UNIL  299  -1.881  -1.98 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-14  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
231 Option  Code  No.  Of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1150  -23.210  -15.85 
ABN  19  -114.879  -2.09 
AEGN  17  -10.347  -3.17 
AH  60  -24.174  -4.09 
AKZO  174  -15.012  -10.00 
AMEV  35  -38.717  -5.35 
AMRO  39  -9.027  -4.68 
BUHR  53  -17.706  -5.37 
ELS  66  -30.129  -4.77 
GB  50  -38.836  -3.71 
HB  46  -9.348  -5.59 
HO  97  -16.482  -6.48 
KLM  9  -42.293  -3.04 
KNP  90  -42.037  -7.91 
NED  171  -14.106  -6.28 
NN  30  -10.217  -4.31 
PHIL  22  -33.844  -4.90 
RBC  32  -8.042  -7.75 
RD  78  -20.979  -3.99 
UNIL  62  -34.600  -5.87 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-15  :  Ex  Ante  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
232 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  1172 
-  -18.108  -11.66 
ABN  19  -118.205  -2.14 
AEGN  17  -9.608  -2.91 
AH  62  -22.429  -4.34 
AKZO  175  -5.645  -3.47 
AMEV  35  -25.748  -5.18 
AMRO  39  -6.929  -4.73 
BUHR  47  -12.085  -5.53 
ELS  67  -21.493  -5.18 
GB  53  -38.288  -2.89 
HB  47  -7.520  -4.51 
HO  98  -13.410  -5.91 
KLM  10  -16.417  -2.62 
KNP  91  -28.531  -6.58 
NED  184  -18.085  -3.99 
NN  30  -5.613  -5.56 
PHIL  22  -17.795  -4.49 
RBC  32  -7.500  -7.06 
RD  82  -18.291  -3.10 
UNIL  62  -18.875  -4.38 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-16  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
233 Option  code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2384  2.578  11.68* 
ABN  54  4.741  2.01* 
AEGN  97  4.689  3.12* 
AH  101  2.322  2.70* 
AKZO  170  1.203  2.03* 
AMEV  90  5.246  3.20* 
AMRO  163  2.884  4.85* 
BUHR  149  2.416  3.76* 
ELS  172  3.048  3.36* 
GB  181  3.681  3.01* 
HB  75  1.401  1.68* 
HO  286  1.445  3.09* 
KLM  123  3.451  5.28* 
KNP  223  1.402  2.99* 
NED  166  2.172  2.20* 
NN  76  . 
4.829  3.61* 
PHIL  47  -0.368  -0.32 
RBC  61  2.916  2.86* 
RD  61  3.782  1.73* 
UNIL  89  1.458  2.16* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-17  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
234 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2320  -0.441  -2.06 
ABN  52  1.959  0.82 
AEGN  97  0.656  0.39 
AH  98  -0.188  -0.35 
AKZO  164  -0.307  -0.61 
AMEV  88  0.631  0.42 
AMRO  159  -0.289  -0.58 
BUHR  147  0.617  1.14 
ELS  165  -1.914  -2.10 
GB  176  0.148  0.14 
HB  74  0.157  0.12 
HO  274  -0.512  -1.03 
KLM  121  -1.578  -2.17 
KNP  217  -1.381  -1.78 
NED  164  0.949  0.47 
NN  76  -1.183  -0.95 
PHIL  45  0.761  1.24 
RBC  59  -0.584  -0.53 
RD  61  -1.496  -1.06 
UNIL  83  -3.427  -2.89 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-18  :  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
235 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  434  -1.898  -8.38 
ABN  15  -5.634  -1.31 
AEGN  23  -2.176  -1.80 
AH  21  -3.037  -3.69 
AKZO  29  -1.886  -3.12 
AMEV  14  -0.874  -1.84 
AMRO  29  -1.178  -2.92 
BUHR  17  -1.830  -2.49 
ELS  29  -2.289  -3.57 
GB  22  -0.990  -1.63 
HB  20  -0.874  -1.92 
HO  34  -1.920  -3.97 
KLM  13  -3.875  -3.93 
KNP  32  -1.214  -2.32 
NED  31  -1.551  -1.91 
NN  17  -0.557  -0.62 
PHIL  17  -2.139  -4.32 
RBC  21  -1.633  -3.57 
RD  24  -1.442  -2.49 
UNIL  26  -2.700  -1.87 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-19  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
236 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2314  3.226  14.16* 
ABN  56  2.280  3.64* 
AEGN  152  3.528  2.99* 
AH  123  4.321  4.41* 
AKZO  145  1.673  2.11* 
AMEV  121  3.939  4.61* 
AMRO  120  2.074  3.32* 
BUHR  103  1.699  2.16* 
ELS  113  4.525  4.21* 
GB  143  4.491  3.62* 
HB  103  1.224  1.87* 
HO  225  2.454  4.36* 
KLM  146  3.646  5.64* 
KNP  185  2.927  4.48* 
NED  150  3.867  3.80* 
NN  117  4.137  5.30* 
PHIL  32  0.486  1.12 
RBC  53  1.427  2.74* 
RD  145  6.125  3.51* 
UNIL  82  2.158  2.75* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-20  .  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
237 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2252  -0.158  -0.96 
ABN  56  -0.610  -1.46 
AEGN  145  -0.551  -0.67 
AH  121  0.008  -0.06 
AKZO  139  -1.425  -2.37 
AMEV  118  -1.384  -1.61 
AMRO  117  -0.496  -0.87 
BUHR  102  0.407  0.32 
ELS  112  2.620  1.46 
GB  140  -0.086  -0.20 
HB  101  0.844  0.87 
HO  220  -0.864  -1.09 
KLM  142  -0.453  -0.85 
KNP  179  0.803  0.81 
NED  143  1.953  1.65* 
NN  112  -0.202  -0.37 
PHIL  31  -0.555  -1.17 
RBC  53  0.311  0.48 
RD  143  -1.800  -2.09 
UNIL  78  -1.531  -1.63 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-21  :  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
238 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  445  -2.901  -11.59 
ABN  13  -3.013  -7.50 
AEGN  21  -2.807  -3.30 
AH  24  -2.730  -3.21 
AKZO  40  -1.993  -4.11 
AMEV  20  -2.199  -4.88 
AMRO  24  -3.577  -3.45 
BUHR  22  -2.504  -3.27 
ELS  22  -3.050  -3.16 
GB  18  -2.849  -5.50 
HB  20  -1.889  -3.99 
HO  37  -3.669  -3.75 
KLM  15  -1.583  -2.98 
KNP  26  -5.922  -2.00 
NED  37  -1.560  -2.62 
NN  16  -2.079  -3.43 
PHIL  16  -2.398  -3.77 
RBC  16  -3.722  -4.88 
RD  30  -3.241  -5.21 
UNIL  28  -3.819  -2.98 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-22  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  Bid-Ask  Spread  Cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
239 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  450  -2.033  -12.57 
ABN  13  -2.673  -6.43 
AEGN  22  -2.413  -3.49 
AH  24  -1.363  -3.63 
AKZO  40  -1.639  -3.56 
AMEV  20  -1.806  -4.05 
AMRO  24  -2.204  -4.48 
BUHR  23  -2.301  -3.31 
ELS  22  -2.163  -3.05 
GB  18  -2.145  -5.14 
HB  20  -1.709  -3.84 
HO  37  -2.431  -4.28 
KLM  15  -1.285  -2.89 
KNP  26  -2.249  -1.37 
NED  38  -1.224  -2.55 
NN  17  -1.804  -3.86 
PHIL  16  -1.740  -3.29 
RBC  16  -3.280  -4.60 
RD  31  -2.093  -4.48 
UNIL  28  -2.732  -2.77 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-23  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (CMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask.  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
240 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2925  2.398  10.51* 
ABN  70  2.771  0.95 
AEGN  95  3.565  2.16* 
AH  110  2.874  1.99* 
AKZO  207  1.531  3.30* 
AMEV  95  7.421  3.09* 
AMRO  197  2.222  2.31* 
BUHR  149  3.821  3.39* 
ELS  185  0.137  0.10 
GB  212  1.621  2.69* 
HB  90  1.572  1.12 
HO  348  2.574  5.84* 
KLM  155  2.279  3.10* 
KNP  246  1.960.  3.29* 
NED  221  1.285  1.86* 
NN  112  4.862  3.11* 
PHIL  150  2.121  2.35* 
RBC  67  5.230  3.74* 
RD  91  3.219  1.94* 
UNIL  125  0.846  1.27 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-24  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
241 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2846  -0.671  -2.95 
ABN  69  0.539  0.18 
AEGN  93  0.905  0.82 
AH  109  -0.415  -0.62 
AKZO  202  -1.072  -2.67 
AMEV  89  2.448  1.97* 
AMRO  190  -0.987  -1.06 
BUHR  144  0.131  0.07 
ELS  177  -0.389  -0.55 
GB  207  -0.482  -0.83 
HB  89  0.929  0.50 
HO  331  -1.171  -1.57 
KLM  151  -0.357  -0.53 
KNP  242  -1.406  -2.19 
NED  220  -0.582  -0.42 
NN  107  -2.235  -2.04 
PHIL  145  -0.460  -1.05 
RBC  65  -2.710  -1.04 
RD  96  -2.163  -1.38 
UNIL  120  -1.104  -1.54 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-25  :  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
242 Option.  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  582  -4.963  -8.15 
ABN  24  -15.439  -1.80 
AEGN  31  -3.425  -3.04 
AH  26  -4.456  -3.35 
AKZO  33  -3.223  -3.66 
AMEV  23  -9.684  -2.05 
AMRO  41  -7.505  -2.51 
BUHR  21  -1.398  -2.28 
ELS  39  -6.062  -2.71 
GB  20  -4.261  -1.79 
HB  34  -9.969  -2.22 
HO  52  -3.921  -4.56 
KLM  24  -2.977  -3.58 
KNP  35  -2.947  -1.64 
NED  41  -3.871  -2.26 
NN  20  -2.490  -4.24 
PHIL  26  -2.209  -5.48 
RBC  22  -2.017  -2.76 
RD  42  -4.321  -2.22 
UNIL  28  -3.537  -3.02 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-26  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  Bid-Ask  Spread  Cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
243 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  586  -3.270  -6.93 
ABN  25  -13.245  -1.99 
AEGN  31  -3.824  -2.66 
AH  26  -2.665  -3.86 
AKZO  33  -1.513  -2.18 
AMEV  24  -5.078  -1.85 
AMRO  42  -3.011  -2.83 
BUHR  21  -0.833  -2.46 
ELS  39  -6.742  -2.05 
GB  20  -3.809  -1.68 
HB  34  -3.602  -2.09 
HO  53  -2.441  -3.80 
KLM  25  -2.298  -3.06 
KNP  35  -2.016  -1.58 
NED  41  -0.992  -0.74 
NN  20  -1.850  -3.62 
PHIL  26  -1.389  -3.51 
RBC  22  -1.471  -2.03 
RD  41  -4.821  -2.03 
UNIL  28  -0.671  -1.27 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A2-27  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
244 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  3030  2.581  11.86* 
ABN  146  1.817  2.56* 
AEGN  213  2.914  2.26* 
AH  166  5.616  5.08* 
AKZO  174  2.003  3.10* 
AMEV  156  3.436  3.73* 
AMRO  165  1.093  1.64 
BUHR  146  2.744  3.16* 
ELS  172  2.356  4.05* 
GB  176  2.273  2.75* 
HB  128  0.517  0.79 
HO  300  3.171  4.65* 
KLM  183  4.274  3.90* 
KNP  241  1.530  1.53 
NED  149  1.973  2.51* 
NN  155  3.616  4.93* 
PHIL  58  1.121  2.60* 
RBC  69  -0.639  -0.30 
RD  162  3.186  4.06* 
UNIL  71  2.419  2.61* 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-28  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
245 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of.  Return 
All  options  2931  0.318  1.08 
ABN  145  -0.507  -0.72 
AEGN  202  1.931  1.11 
AH  162  1.728  1.59 
AKZO  167  -1.047  -2.47 
AMEV  149  -1.155  -1.47 
AMRO  157  -0.173  -0.30 
BUHR  142  0.819  1.05 
ELS  166  2.941  2.04* 
GB  170  0.365  0.38 
HB  128  0.006  -0.06 
HO  290  1.239  1.43 
KLM  177  -1.397  -1.41 
KNP  233  -0.463  -0.46 
NED  140  2.514  2.12* 
NN  149  -0.817  -1.43 
PHIL  58  0.715  1.72* 
RBC  68  1.667  1.35 
RD  159  -2.310  -3.19 
UNIL  69  0.277  0.16 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-29  :  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
246 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  576  -4.092  -9.09 
ABN  23  -4.598  -2.46 
AEGN  29  -3.718  -2.37 
AH  31  -4.023  -3.39 
AKZO  52  -4.070  -3.45 
AMEV  26  -9.847  -2.40 
AMRO  27  -2.561  -4.34 
BUHR  27  -5.078  -2.55 
ELS  30  -1.544  -1.59 
GB  31  -7.578  -2.25 
HB  22  -2.352  -1.73 
HO  49  -3.218  -3.43 
KLM  14  -1.740  -2.23 
KNP  48  -7.040  -3.17 
NED  47  -0.519  -0.38 
NN  22  -2.462  -3.06 
PHIL  25  -4.465  -3.90 
RBC  14  -3.061  -3.48 
RD  29  -3.085  -1.95 
UNIL  30  -5.648  -1.81 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-30  :  Ex  Ante  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  Bid-Ask  Spread  Cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
247 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  585  -3.204  -7.49 
ABN  23  -3.599  -2.46 
AEGN  29  -3.461  -3.03 
AH  32  -1.818  -2.17 
AKZO  53  -1.344  -2.47 
AMEV  26  -3.409  -2.53 
AMRO  27  -1.802  -3.83 
BUHR  28  -3.472  -3.50 
ELS  31  -9.427  -1.88 
GB  32  -6.668  -1.85 
HB  22  -0.872  -2.87 
HO  49  -2.919  -4.73 
KLM  15  -0.979  -2.05 
KNP  49  -5.826  -3.47 
NED  48  -0.364  -0.47 
NN  22  -1.834  -3.03 
PHIL  25  -2.551  -3.05 
RBC  14  -3.127  -3.09 
RD  29  -1.111  -1.83 
UNIL  31  -5.210  -1.80 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A2-31  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (AMISD) 
with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
248 APPENDIX  THREE 
RESULTS  OF  EX  POST  TEST  (DSISD)  WITH 
80  PER  CENT  OF  THE  BID-ASK  SPREAD  COST 
249 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2129  -7.645  -22.18 
ABN  46  -21.512  -5.31 
AEGN  42  -5.739  -6.45 
AH  133  -7.845  -7.19 
AKZO  208  -4.010  -4.50 
AMEV  47  -8.068  -7.30 
AMRO  125  -4.764  -6.32 
BUHR  101  -8.936  -9.05 
ELS  107  -4.385  -6.71 
GB  91  -3.304  -3.12 
HB  154  -9.434  -9.93 
HO  188  -3.597  -7.04 
KLM  67  -3.883  -6.66 
KNP  147  -2.822  -5.84 
NED  209  -17.537  -15.99 
NN  37  -10.938  -3.94 
PHIL  60  -7.097  -3.85 
RBC  90  -9.400  -6.96 
RD  166  -8.920  -3.35 
UNIL  111  -4.609  -3.44 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A3-1  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
250 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  2053  -8.278  -22.64 
ABN  54  -14.000  -6.06 
AEGN  107  -9.001  -4.82 
AH  93  -6.563  -5.83 
AKZO  185  -3.898  -6.80 
AMEV  105  -5.283  -4.28 
AMRO  97  -4.806  -5.04 
BUHR  75  -6.834  -6.91 
ELS  164  -13.377  -7.13 
GB  68  -3.745  -6.02 
HB  98  -3.156  -4.65 
HO  223  -11.888  -6.63 
KLM  17  -3.498  -1.46 
KNP  112  -7.698  -5.91 
NED  318  -13.796  -13.00 
NN  60  -6.158  -4.67 
PHIL  47  -2.118  -1.77 
RBC  79  -7.731  -8.10 
RD  61  -1.048  -2.90 
UNIL  90  -6.100  -5.13 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A3-2  :  Ex  Post  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
251 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  578  -0.752  -1.72 
ABN  21  2.078  0.98 
AEGN  17  -0.987  -2.81 
AH  29  -2.926  -2.52 
AKZO  44  -0.535  -0.89 
AMEV  20  -0.993  -1.84 
AMRO  34  -0.739  -0.95 
BUHR  29  -0.457  -0.66 
ELS  29  -3.327  -3.52 
GB  26  0.522  0.41 
HB  47  -1.856  -3.13 
HO  43  -1.991  -4.21 
KLM  17  -1.307  -2.52 
KNP  37  -1.098  -2.05 
NED  46  5.858  1.78* 
NN  16  -1.647  -2.37 
PHIL  23  -0.173  -0.28 
RBC  29  1.196  0.42 
RD  42  -4.015  -0.93 
UNIL  29  -2.815  -4.21 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.5% 
Table  A3-3  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
252 Option  Code  No.  of  Average  Rate  t 
Spreads  of  Return 
All  options  611  -0.771  -3.14 
ABN  23  -0.957  -0.93 
AEGN  35  -2.761  -3.73 
AH  29  -0.569  -1.89 
AKZO  40  0.147  0.41 
AMEV  29  -1.060  -2.89 
AMRO  30  -1.825  -4.08 
BUHR  24  -1.816  -3.65 
ELS  46  -0.071  -0.25 
GB  21  -0.881  -2.63 
HB  26  -0.211  -0.61 
HO  49  -1.664  -3.30 
KLM  23  2.976  0.68 
KNP  42  0.532  0.52 
NED  67  -2.200  -1.69 
NN  25  -1.031  -2.37 
PHIL  23  2.125  1.26 
RBC  24  -1.596  -1.42 
RD  26  -1.353  -2.91 
UNIL  29  0.097  0.05 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Estimated  risk-free  interest  rate  =  5.4% 
Table  A3-4  :  Ex  Post  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
253 APPENDIX  FOUR 
VALUES  OF  SKEWNESS  MEASURE 
AND  RESULTS  OF  SIGN  TESTS 
254 Opt  ion  Code  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All  options  1.44  0.96  -6.03  -6.94 
ABN  1.52  -0.86  -1.56  -1.94 
AEGN  7.05  0.32  -1.04  -0.83 
AH  1.94  -0.41  -4.56  -3.04 
AKZO  0.97  0.05  -4.78  -5.99 
AMEV  0.98  2.26  -0.66  -0.75 
AMRO  2.54  0.10  -1.46  -3.52 
BUHR  0.66  0.51  -2.80  -1.11 
ELS  1.13  -0.73  -3.37  -3.47 
GB  0.82  1.48  -2.85  3.19 
HB  1.88  1.06  -2.28  -1.42 
HO  0.12  0.22  -3.11  -1.72 
KLM  0.84  3.88  -5.29  -2.85 
KNP  1.93  -0.07  -2.82  -2.88 
NED  0.05  -1.08  -0.55  -0.48 
NN  -1.13  0.79  -3.30  -2.42 
PHIL  -0.60  2.13  -3.92  -5.58 
RBC  3.11  0.67  -2.56  -2.45 
RD  -0.30  -3.72  -5.86  -5.92 
UNIL  0.92  0.91  -2.40  -2.07 
(1)  Ex  post  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(2)  Ex  ante  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(3)  Ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
(4)  Ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
Table  A4-1  :  Values  of  Skewness 
for  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
255 Option  Code  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All  options  3.07  0.96  -4.39  -2.88 
ABN  0.66  -1.64  -2.68  -1.91 
AEGN  1.42  2.82  -3.67  -3.94 
AH  3.01  1.96  -3.04  -3.53 
AKZO  0.61  0.90  -3.73  -2.23 
AMEV  1.97  -0.39  -3.33  -3.11 
AMRO  1.03  1.46  -1.58  -3.85 
BUHR  2.66  0.47  -2.05  -2.02 
ELS  1.44  0.24  -3.07  -3.04 
GB  1.13  -1.03  -1.33  -2.39 
HB  0.09  3.13  -3.65  -1.30 
HO  1.51  0.79  -1.20  -1.31 
KLM  3.24  0.83  -0.40  -2.55 
KNP  2.04  0.81  -1.54  -1.90 
NED  1.22  0.77  -1.68  -1.30 
NN  3.14  0.74  -2.67  -1.89 
PHIL  0.79  0.38  -2.54  0.47 
RBC  3.63  0.08  -2.99  -2.75 
RD  1.61  -0.13  -2.69  -2.26 
UNIL  0.97  1.73  -1.41  -1.67 
(1)  Ex  post  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(2)  Ex  ante  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(3)  Ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
(4)  Ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
Table  A4-2  :  Values  of  Skewness 
for  Spreading  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
256 Option  Code  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All  options.  8.07  16.21  2.07  -1.14 
ABN  2.09  4.73  2.36  2.27 
AEGN  5.71  -5.07  -1.12  -1.47 
AH  3.09  -1.90  -3.98  -4.13 
AKZO  6.65  -5.28  -2.28  -0.48 
AMEV  4.66  2.17  -3.78  -3.10 
AMRO  5.05  -0.16  -2.41  1.99 
BUHR  3.78  0.46  -0.31  0.78 
ELS  1.94  -3.20  -1.22  -1.82 
GB  9.52  -2.75  -0.27  2.12 
HB  5.70  -0.63  -5.09  -3.36 
HO  2.14  0.62  -1.64  -1.36 
KLM  5.80  -3.93  -1.44  -1.54 
KNP  3.14  1.60  -2.63  -2.22 
NED  5.30  -4.20  -2.54  2.79 
NN  2.98  3.10  -1.29  -0.84 
PHIL  2.21  0.87  -0.74  1.78 
RBC  5.20  0.26  -5.08  4.06 
RD  -1.22  4.12  4.31  -1.83 
UNIL  2.07  -5.08  -3.29  -2.15 
(1)  Ex  post  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(2)  Ex  ante  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(3)  Ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
(4)  Ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
Table  A4-3  :  Values  of  Skewness 
for  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
257 Option  Code  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
All  options  8.76  -3.00  -4.45  0.43 
ABN  4.26  -2.92  -2.40  2.12 
AEGN  5.43  4.12  -2.23  -1.72 
AH  3.28  2.79  -1.17  -1.87 
AKZO  6.68  -3.44  -5.38  0.84 
AMEV  3.58  -4.24  -4.68  -3.13 
AMRO  4.81  -1.91  -2.06  -2.01 
BUHR  4.51  -1.75  -3.50  -2.48 
ELS  3.63  -0.83  -3.58  -0.25 
GB  2.06  -1.93  -2.00  -1.93 
HB  3.47  5.33  3.33  1.64 
HO  8.08  -4.29  -5.80  -1.93 
KLM  7.23  -5.39  -3.07  4.37 
KNP  -0.13  -1.49  -1.72  0.78 
NED  6.76  -0.71  -3.31  -0.90 
NN  3.42  -3.31  -3.19  -2.90 
PHIL  4.16  -4.03  -2.78  3.68 
RBC  5.50  -4.78  -3.35  -1.23 
RD  6.12  -2.43  -4.71  -0.73 
UNIL  2.44  -1.91  -3.77  2.83 
(1)  Ex  post  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(2)  Ex  ante  test  with  zero  transaction  costs 
(3)  Ex  ante  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
(4)  Ex  post  test  with  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
Table  A4-4  :  Values  of  Skewness 
for  Hedging  Test  (DSISD) 
4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
258 -----(1)------  ------(2)------ 
Option  Code  Skewness  Z  Skewness  Z 
All  options  -6.31  -29.26  -2.56  -30.90 
ABN  -1.85  -6.93  -1.93  -6.67 
AEGN  -0.76  -3.55  -3.92  -7.54 
AH  -3.22  -9.89  -3.53  -7.88 
AKZO  -5.48  -4.78  -1.42  -8.82 
AMEV  -0.80  -5.54  -2.81  -7.03 
AMRO  -3.77  -7.51  -3.36  -4.67 
BUHR  -0.74  -7.36  -1.94  -7.16 
ELS  -3.05  -7.93  -3.03  -10.23 
GB  4.83  -6.92  -2.28  -6.43 
HB  -1.39  -8.46  -0.43  -4.75 
HO  -1.72  -7.80  -1.00  -10.85 
KLM  -2.68  -6.60  -2.08  -2.91 
KNP  -2.80  -5.61  -1.45  -7.28 
NED  -0.50  -11.07  -1.24  -13.74 
NN  -2.33  -5.92  -1.90  -6.07 
PHIL  -6.05  -7.36  1.01  -3.50 
RBC  -2.70  -8.33  -2.45  -6.30 
RD  -5.86  -4.58  -2.13  -1.28 
UNIL  -1.72  -4.37  -1.66  -5.38 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Z  is  a  standard  normal  va  riable 
(1)  16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
(2)  4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
Table  A4-5  Values  of  Skewness  and 
Results  of  SIGN  Tests  for 
Ex  Post  Spreading  (DSISD) 
with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
259 -----(1)------  ------(2)------ 
Option  Code  Skewness  Z  Skewness  Z 
All  options  1.21  -8.11  5.73  -9.95 
ABN  2.27  -0.87  2.97  -2.50 
AEGN  -  -1.53  -2.91  -1.49  -2.70 
AH  -4.22  -2.60  -0.97  -3.34 
AKZO  1.17  -0.45  2.00  0.47 
AMEV  -3.30  -1.57  -2.86  -2.97 
AMRO  2.68  -2.92  -2.08  -3.10 
BUHR  1.11  -1.11  -1.99  -3.88 
ELS  -1.73  -2.60  0.94  -1.62 
GB  2.28  -1.37  -0.79  -2.62 
HB  -2.71  -3.50  2.08  -2.55 
HO  -1.31  -3.66  -1.46  -3.14 
KLM  -1.51  -2.43  4.68  -2.50 
KNP  -1.53  -1.97  1.33  -1.08 
NED  3.03  -1.03  0.08  -3.91 
NN  -0.62  -2.25  -1.43  -2.80 
PHIL  2.39  -2.09  3.68  -0.42 
RBC  4.54  -3.71  0.42  -4.29 
RD  -1.08  -0.15  1.00  -2.94 
UNIL  -1.37  -2.23  3.42  -1.49 
*  Significant  at  5% 
Z  is  a  standard  normal  va  riable 
(1)  16  August  1988  to  27  September  1988 
(2)  4  November  1988  to  15  December  1988 
Table  A4-6  :  Values  of  Skewness  and 
Results  of  SIGN  Tests  for 
Ex  Post  Hedging  (DSISD) 
with  80  per  cent  of  the  bid-ask  spread  cost 
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